

111

Transcript

TRANSCRIPT OF RECORD

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1925

No. ~~294~~ 46

FIDELITY NATIONAL BANK & TRUST COMPANY OF KANSAS CITY, STANDARD INVESTMENT COMPANY, SILAS DE LAP, ET AL., APPELLANTS,

vs.

FELIX H. SWOPE AND GERTRUDE M. BROWN

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

FILED FEBRUARY 24, 1926

(30,895)



(30,895)

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

OCTOBER TERM, 1925

No. 294

FIDELITY NATIONAL BANK & TRUST COMPANY OF KANSAS CITY, STANDARD INVESTMENT COMPANY, SILAS DELAP, ET AL., APPELLANTS,

vs.

FELIX H. SWOPE AND GERTRUDE M. BROWN

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

INDEX

	Page
Proceedings in the United States circuit court of appeals, eighth circuit.	<i>a</i>
Caption.....(omitted in printing)...	<i>a</i>
Record from district court of the United States, western district of Missouri	1
Citation and service.....	1
Caption	2
Bill of complaint.....	2
Separate answer of Silas C. Delap et al.....	16
Amended answer of Standard Investment Company.....	16
Amended separate answer of Fidelity National Bank and Trust Company	20
Reply to amended answer of Standard Investment Company.....	24
Final decree.....	25
Petition for appeal.....	27
Assignment of errors.....	27
Order allowing appeal.....	29

	Page
Election as to printing of record.....	30
Bond on appeal.....	30
Notice of lodgment of condensed statement of testimony in office of clerk	32
Condensed statement of testimony.....	32
Caption	32
Agreement between counsel that cases Nos. 163, 207, and 215 be tried together, etc.....	33
Offers in evidence.....	33
Section 28 of article VIII of the charter of Kansas City, Missouri	33
Section 3 of article VIII of the charter of Kansas City, Missouri	36
Testimony of B. W. Gantt.....	42
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1—Ordinance No. 21831, approved by the city council of Kansas City, Missouri.....	42
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 2—Resolution No. 1762 of the board of park commissioners of Kansas City, Missouri.....	45
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 3—Ordinance No. 9525 of Kansas City, Missouri, approved August 9, 1911.....	48
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 4—Resolution No. 10363 of the board of park commissioners of Kansas City, Missouri.....	50
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 5—Ordinance No. 16850 of Kansas City, Missouri, approved August 1, 1913.....	52
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 6—Resolution No. 381 of the board of park commissioners of Kansas City, Missouri, approved August 9, 1911.....	54
Defendants' Exhibit A—Ordinance No. 24693 of Kansas City, Missouri, approved December 9, 1915.....	56
Defendants' Exhibit B—Ordinance No. 85155 of the board of park commissioners of Kansas City, Missouri, adopted December 10, 1915.....	58
Testimony of Seaman Russell.....	59
Exhibits—Pages 209 to 212, inclusive, of volume 92 of grading record of board of public works of Kansas City, Missouri.....	59
Notice to the city assessor by board of public works, November 14, 1916.....	60
Certificate of city assessor as to value of land..	60
Certificate of board of public works as to apportionment of cost of grading.....	61
Receipt of McMillan Contracting Company for special tax bills.....	61
Testimony of Maurice Carey.....	62
Exhibits—Statement of assessed valuations of certain tracts of land for the years 1915, 1916, and 1917	62
Statement of assessed valuation of certain tracts of land for the years 1915, 1916, and 1917....	63
Testimony of Charles D. Woodward.....	63

INDEX

iii

Page

Plaintiffs' Exhibit 14—Compilation of results from investigation of the grading of Meyer Boulevard.....	67
Extracts from official public report of board of public works of Kansas City, Missouri, for the year 1914...	73
Testimony of Carrie Singer Abernathy.....	76
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 15—Agreement between Standard Investment Company et al. and Fidelity Trust Company, December 11, 1915.....	79
Testimony of Walter Dobbs.....	82
Testimony of Garrett Ellison.....	84
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 24—Certified copies of record entries in case No. 90627 in the circuit court of Jackson County, Missouri	90
Testimony of J. C. Petherbridge.....	101
Testimony of Herbert V. Jones.....	103
Defendants' Exhibit C—Petition filed in the matter of the grading of Meyer Boulevard, etc., in the circuit court of Jackson County, Missouri.....	108
Defendants' Exhibit D—Resolution of board of public works, adopted February 9, 1915.....	110
Defendants' Exhibit E—Resolution of board of park commissioners of Kansas City, Missouri, February 9, 1915...	111
Defendants' Exhibit F—Certified copies of record entries in cause No. 90628 in the circuit court of Jackson County, Missouri	112
Defendants' Exhibit G—Contract between McMillan Contracting Co., E. E. Tutt, et al. and Kansas City, Mo., for the grading of Meyer Boulevard, October 26, 1915.....	117
Approval of contract, etc., by city comptroller and board of park commissioners.....	118
Specifications	120
Defendants' Exhibit H—Approval of specifications of board of park commissioners for grading of Meyer Boulevard by the board of public works.....	121
Defendants' Exhibit I—Order for publication of ordinance No. 21831 of Kansas City, Missouri, and proof of service...	122
Defendants' Exhibit J—Answer of Gertrude P. Brown filed in the matter of the grading of Meyer Boulevard, etc., in the circuit court of Jackson County, Missouri.....	126
Defendants' Exhibit K—Motion of Gertrude P. Brown for new trial in the matter of the grading of Meyer Boulevard, etc., in the circuit court of Jackson County, Missouri	127
Testimony of W. H. Dunn.....	128
Charles C. Craver.....	132
Cecil Lechtman.....	141
Kelly Brent.....	141
John A. Moore.....	144
Defendants' Exhibit L—Agreement between Thomas H. Swope and N. P. Dodge, April 14, 1920.....	146
Judge's certificate to statement of evidence.....	150

	Page
Præcipe for transcript of record.....	150
Order extending time.....	152
Stipulation for transmission of certain original exhibits to circuit court of appeals.....	152
Order for transmission of certain original exhibits to circuit court of appeals.....	153
Supplemental præcipe for transcript of record.....	154
Order extending time.....	155
Second supplemental præcipe for transcript of record.....	155
Opinion, Van Valkenburgh, J.....	156
Clerk's certificate.....	164
Appearances of counsel.....	165
Notice of motion to dismiss.....	165
Motion to dismiss.....	166
Argument and submission of motions to dismiss.....	167
Opinion per curiam on motion to dismiss.....	168
Order denying motion to dismiss.....	171
Motion and order re printing of certain exhibits.....	171
Argument and submission.....	172
Opinion, Johnson, J.....	173
Decree.....	178
Petition for appeal.....	179
Assignment of errors.....	179
Order allowing appeal.....	181
Bond on appeal..... (omitted in printing) ..	181
Citation and service..... (omitted in printing) ..	181
Præcipe for transcript of record.....	181
Motion and order for transmission of original exhibits.....	182
Clerk's certificate.....	183

a

Citation

In the District Court of the United States for the
Western Division of the Western District of
Missouri.

Felix M. Swope and Gertrude M. Brown, Complainants,
No. 215. vs. In Equity.

The Fidelity National Bank and Trust Company of Kansas
City, a corporation, Standard Investment Company, a
corporation, Silas C. Delap, Hunter M. Meriwether and
Gilmer Meriwether, Defendants.

United States of America To Felix M. Swope and Gertrude
M. Brown,—Greetings:

You are hereby cited and admonished to be and appear in
the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit in the City of St. Louis, Missouri, sixty days from
and after the day this citation bears date, pursuant to the
petition for appeal and assignment of errors filed in the
Clerk's office of the United States District Court for the
Western Division of the Western District of Missouri,
wherein Fidelity National Bank and Trust Company
of Kansas City, a corporation, Standard Investment
Company, a corporation, Silas C. Delap, Hunter M.
Meriwether and Gilmer Meriwether are defendants and
appellants, and Felix M. Swope and Gertrude M. Brown
are complainants and appellees, to show cause if
any there [by] why the judgment and decree entered against
said appellants in said cause, as in said assignment of errors
mentioned, should not be corrected, and why speedy justice
should not be done to the parties in that behalf.

Witness the Honorable Arba S. Van Valkenburgh, Judge of
said District Court, this 4th day of January, 1922.

ARBA S. VAN VALKENBURGH,
District Judge.

Service of the within citation is hereby acknowledged this 6th day of January, 1922.

SCARRITT JONES SEDDON &
NORTH

Attorneys for Felix M. Swope and
Gertrude M. Brown, Appellees.

Endorsed: Filed in the District Court on Jan. 6, 1922.

1 United States of America. —Set:

Be it remembered, that heretofore, to-wit, at the regular April Term of the United States District Court for the Western Division of the Western District of Missouri, and on the 13th day of October, 1919, a Bill of Complaint was filed in the cause wherein Felix H. Swope and Gertrude M. Brown are [defendants] and Fidelity National Bank and Trust Company, Standard Investment Company, Silas C. Delap, Hunter M. Meriwether and Gilmer Meriwether are defendants.

Said Bill of Complaint is in words and figures as follows, to-wit:

2 Bill of Complaint, in Equity

In the District Court of the United States, for the Western Division of the Western District of Missouri, at Kansas City November Term, 1919

Felix H. Swope and Gertrude M. Brown, Complainants,
No. 215 vs.

Fidelity National Bank & Trust Company, a corporation,
Standard Investment Company, a corporation, Silas
C. Delap, Hunter M. Meriwether, and Gilmer Meri-
wether, Defendants.

Now come complainants and for their cause of action against defendants, state:

1. That complainants, Felix H. Swope and Gertrude M. Brown, are now, and were during all the time here in question, residents and citizens of the State of Tennessee, and defendants, and each of them, are now, and were at all the time here in question, residents and citizens of the State of Missouri and of the Western District thereof.

2. That this court has jurisdiction of this cause for the reason that there is the necessary diversity of citizenship; that is, both complainants are residents and citizens of the

State of Tennessee and defendants are all residents and citizens of the State of Missouri and of the Western District thereof, and said action is of a civil nature in equity wherein the matter and amount in controversy exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of three thousand dollars (\$3,000.00), as hereinafter more fully set forth, and this Court has jurisdiction also because said controversy arises under the Constitution of the United States and particularly the fourteenth amendment thereof, as hereinafter more fully set forth.

3 That in January, 1915, the City Council of Kansas City, Missouri, passed or pretended to pass and enact, a certain Ordinance No. 21831, which ordinance was approved and purported to become effective January 26, 1915, and is as follows:

“Ordinance No. 21831

An Ordinance to grade Meyer Boulevard from the West line of Swope Parkway to the East line of the Paseo and to condemn easements to support embankments or fills, describing the nature of the improvement, providing how the cost thereof shall be paid, and prescribing the limits within which private property is deemed benefited by the proposed improvement, and assessed and charged to pay damages caused by said grading, and by the condemnation of said easements, and assessed and charged to pay the cost of said improvement.

Whereas, the Board of Park Commissioners has, by Resolution No. 1762, adopted on the 11th day of December, 1914, recommended to the Common Council of Kansas City that Meyer Boulevard from the west line of Swope Parkway to the east line of The Paseo, be graded to the full width thereof, and to the established grade of the same, and that easements to support embankments or fills be condemned, and

Whereas, The Board of Public Works, by its Resolution under Entry No. 73992, on the 11th day of December, 1914, has joined in said recommendation, Now, Therefore,

Be It Ordained By The Common Council Of Kansas City:

Section 1. That the boulevard or highway known and designated as Meyer Boulevard from the west line of Swope Parkway to the east line of The Paseo, be graded to the full width thereof and to the established grade of the same.

Section 2. That as the proposed grading of said Meyer Boulevard, or part thereof, to the established grade for the full width thereof will cause certain embankments or fills to be made leaving abutting property below the proposed grade of said boulevard or highway, there is hereby condemned in said abutting property, easements or right to support said embankments or fills so far as may be necessary to bring the said boulevard or highway to the required grade, and by allowing the material of which said embankments are made to fall upon the abutting land at the natural slope so that the surface of the boulevard or highway may be graded to the full width thereof. The areas of land in which said easements are condemned are shown in the plat forming part of the plans hereinafter referred to in Section 3 hereof, prepared and on file in the office of the Board of Park Commissioners, showing a profile of the portion of said boulevard or highway proposed to be graded and indicating thereon approximately the amount of the encroachment of the embankments upon the abutting property, which said plat is hereby referred to and identified. Just compensation for the easements herein condemned shall be assessed, collected and paid according to law.

Section 3. Said work and improvement shall be of the nature described and specified in, and shall be in accordance with, the plans and specifications, adopted, perfected, and approved by the Board of Public Works, on the 11th day of December, 1914, by Resolution under its entry Number 73991, and by the Board of Park Commissioners of Kansas City, Missouri, on the 11th day of December, 1914, under Resolution No. 1761, which said plans and specifications are now on file in the office of said Board of Park Commissioners. Said improvement is hereby provided for and authorized.

Section 4. Whereas, private property may be disturbed or damaged by the grading herein provided for and authorized and by the condemnation of the easements herein provided for, and the owners thereof lawfully entitled to remuneration or damages under the constitution of this state have not waived all right or claim thereto, it is ordered that proceedings to ascertain and assess all such damages or remuneration be begun and carried on as provided by Article VII of the Charter of said City; and the Common Council prescribed and determines the limits within which private property is deemed benefited by the proposed grading and improvement herein provided, and within which said property may be assessed or charged to pay such remuneration

or damages, including the taking and damaging of private property for public use for or in the acquiring of said easements, to be as follows, to-wit:

Beginning at the intersection of the south line of Sixty-third (63rd) Street with the west line of the east half of the east half of the northwest quarter of the southeast quarter of Section No. Four (4), Township No. Forty-eight (48) North, Range No. Thirty-three (33) West; thence East along the south line of Sixty-third (63rd) Street and said line prolonged east to the east line of the west half of the southeast quarter of Section No. Three (3), Township No. Forty-eight (48) North, Range No. Thirty-three (33) West; thence south along the east line of the west half of the southeast quarter of said Section No. Three (3) to the east prolongation of the north line of Sixty-seventh (67th) Street west of Swope Parkway; thence west along the east prolongation of the North line of Sixty-seventh (67th) Street and along the north line of Sixty-seventh (67th) Street to the west line of Brooklyn Avenue; thence North along the West line of Brooklyn Avenue to a point two hundred (200) feet south of the south line of Meyer Boulevard; thence west to a point in the east line of The Paseo ten hundred seventy-nine and nine-hundredths (1079.09) feet south of the north line of the southwest quarter of the southeast quarter of said Section No. Four (4); thence north along the east line of The Paseo and said line prolonged north, said line being two hundred forty-seven and three-tenths (247.3) feet west of and parallel with the east line of the southwest quarter of the southeast quarter of said Section No. Four (4), to the north line of the southwest quarter of the southeast quarter of said Section No. Four (4); thence west along the north line of the southwest quarter of the southeast quarter of said Section No. Four (4) to the southwest corner of the east half of the east half of the northwest quarter of the southeast quarter of said Section No. Four (4); thence north along the west line of the east half of the east half of the northwest quarter of the southeast quarter of said Section No. Four (4) to the point of beginning.

Section 5. The Common Council hereby finds and declares that in the grading of said boulevard or highway a very large or unusual amount of filling in, or cutting or grading away of earth or rock is necessary, necessitating an expense of such magnitude as to impose too heavy a burden on the land situate in the benefit district as limited in Section 3 of Article VIII of the Charter of Kansas City.

Section 6. The cost of grading said boulevard or highway as provided herein, shall be charged as a special tax on parcels of land (exclusive of improvements) benefited thereby after deducting the portion of the whole cost, if any, which the City may pay, and in proportion to the benefits accruing to the said several parcels of land, exclusive of improvements thereon, and not exceeding the amount of said benefits, said benefits to be determined by the Board of Public Works and after said work shall have been fully completed, the cost thereof shall be estimated by the said Board of Public Works and shall be apportioned by said

Board of Public Works against the various lots, tracts, 6 and parcels of land within the benefit district, according to the assessed value thereof, exclusive of improvements, as provided in Section 28, of Article VIII of the Charter of Kansas City aforesaid; and that limits within which parcels of land are benefited as aforesaid, and within which it is proposed to assess property for the payment of said work and improvement, are hereby prescribed and determined to be the same limits as are hereinbefore, in Section 4 of this Ordinance, prescribed and determined as the limits within which private property is deemed benefited by the proposed grading of said boulevard or highway, all in pursuance to Section 28 of Article VIII of the Charter of Kansas City aforesaid.

Section 7. Payment of the cost of all of said work shall be made in Special Tax Bills evidencing special assessments made and levied against each lot or parcel of land chargeable therewith respectively, as set forth in Section 6 of this Ordinance. Said Tax Bills shall be payable in ten (10) annual installments according to law, the first of said installments to become due and collectible as provided in Section 25 of Article VIII of the Charter of Kansas City aforesaid, in the case of Tax Bills payable in installments, and the remaining installments shall be due and collectible, one each year thereafter, on the 30th day of June of each year until all said installments are paid.

The Common Council hereby finds and declares that its action herein has been recommended by the Board of Public Works, and also by the Board of Park Commissioners.

The improvement provided for herein the Common Council deems necessary to have done, but the passage of this Ordinance and the doing of such work shall not render Kansas City liable to pay for such work, or any part thereof,

otherwise than by the issue of Special Tax Bills, and except as herein provided.

Section 8. The Board of Public Works shall make an approximate estimate of the cost of the work herein provided for, and after the passage of this Ordinance, and after such approximate estimate of the cost of said work shall have been made by said Board, a proceeding separate from the proceeding provided for in Section 4 of this Ordinance, shall be filed in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, in the name of the City, against the respective owners of land chargeable under the provision of Section 28 of Article VIII, of the Charter of Kansas City aforesaid, with the cost of said work, for the purpose, and in the manner prescribed in said Section 28, of Article VIII of the Charter of Kansas City, Missouri, and as provided in this Ordinance.

Section 9. The Common Council hereby finds and declares that its action herein has been recommended by the Board of Park Commissioners of Kansas City, Missouri,

and by the Board of Public Works, and that the said
7 Boards have recommended to the Common Council that the above mentioned boulevard or highway be graded to the full width thereof as herein provided for and that easements to support embankments or fills be condemned as herein provided for and that payment for all said work be made in Special Tax Bills as herein provided for; and the action of said Board of Park Commissioners and the Board of Public Works in determining that said work shall be done and that the payment for same be made in special tax bills is hereby ratified and confirmed.

Section 10. All Ordinances, or parts of Ordinances in conflict with this Ordinance, are, insofar as they conflict with this ordinance, hereby repealed."

4. That thereafter, on or about October 26, 1915, the Board of Park Commissioners of Kansas City, Missouri pretended to enter into a contract with the McMillan Contracting Company for the work of grading said Meyer Boulevard, as provided for in said Ordinance No. 21831.

That thereafter said McMillan Contracting Company proceeded with the work of grading said boulevard in accordance with said pretended contract and after it had completed said work, or claimed to have completed it, the Board of Public Works of Kansas City, Missouri, proceeded to assess, or pretended to assess all of the computed cost of said grading, to-wit, ninety seven thousand six hundred eighty eight

and 90/100 dollars (\$97,688.90), against the parcels of land located within a pretended benefit district, as set forth and described in said Ordinance No. 21831, and apportioned the cost of such grading in accordance with a certain assessed value of said respective parcels of land, exclusive of improvements, all being pretended to be done under and in accordance with the provisions of Section 28 of Article VIII of the Charter of Kansas City, Missouri, of 1909 and the ordinance of Kansas City, No. 21831 aforesaid; that in pretending to apportion said cost of grading the Board of Public Works of Kansas City, Missouri, on or about November 14, 1916, directed the city assessor to make an assessment as to the value of said lands located in said benefit district, and on

8 or about November 18, 1916, the city assessor made an assessment, or pretended to make an assessment, of all the parcels of land in said benefit district and reported the same to the Board of Public Works, and in such assessment and report thereof he assessed the parcel of land, first hereinafter described and belonging to Felix H. Swope, at the sum of twenty five thousand four hundred forty dollars (\$25,440.00), and he assessed the second parcel of land, hereinafter described and belonging to complainant, Felix H. Swope, at twenty nine thousand two hundred fifty dollars (\$29,250.00), and he assessed the parcel of land, hereinafter described and belonging to Gertrude M. Brown, at twenty five thousand nine hundred sixty five dollars (\$25,965.00); that thereupon, on or about the 21st day of November, 1916, the Board of Public Works of Kansas City certified that it had apportioned the cost of the grading of said Meyer Boulevard from the west line of Swope Parkway to the east line of The Paseo, among the lots and parcels of land to be charged therewith, and that it had charged each lot or parcel of land with its proper share of said cost, and said Board of Public Works thereby pretended to charge and apportion against the first tract of land hereinafter described, belonging to complainant, Felix H. Swope, the sum of six thousand five hundred fifty eight dollars (\$6558.00), and against the second tract of land hereinafter described and belonging to said Felix Swope the sum of seven thousand five hundred forty and 20/100 dollars (\$7540.20), and against the tract of land hereinafter described and belonging to complainant, Gertrude M. Brown, the sum of six thousand six hundred ninety three and 40/100 dollars (\$6693.40); that thereupon, on or about November 23, 1916, special tax bills were issued by Kansas City, Missouri to said McMillan Contracting Com-

pany against said first tract of land belonging to said
9 Swope in the sum of six thousand five hundred fifty
eight dollars (\$6558.00), and against said second tract
[—] land belonging to said Swope in the sum of seven thousand
five hundred forty and 20/100 dollars (\$7540.20), and
against said tract of land belonging to said Gertrude Brown
in the sum of six thousand six hundred ninety three and
40/100 dollars (\$6693.40); that thereupon, the said McMil-
lan Contracting Company sold, transferred or assigned all
of said tax bills to defendants, who now own, hold and have
some interest in said tax bills.

5. That at all the times herein referred to complainant,
Felix H. Swope, was and now is the owner of two tracts or
parcels of land within the pretended benefit district as de-
scribed in said ordinance No. 21831, the first tract being de-
scribed as that part of the south half (S. $\frac{1}{2}$) of the north-
east quarter (N. E. $\frac{1}{4}$) of the southwest quarter (S. W. $\frac{1}{4}$)
of Section three (3), township forty eight (48), range thirty
three (33) lying west of the west line of Indiana Avenue
as established by Ordinance No. 16863 approved August 29,
1913, in Kansas City, Jackson County, Missouri, and the
second tract of ground in said benefit district belonging to
said Swope being described as follows: that part of the
south half (S. $\frac{1}{2}$) of the northwest quarter (N. W. $\frac{1}{4}$) of the
southeast quarter (S. E. $\frac{1}{4}$) of section three (3), township
forty eight (48), range thirty three (33) lying between the
west line of Swope Parkway and the east line of Indiana
Avenue as established by Ordinance No. 16863 approved
August 29, 1913, and north of the center line of an abandon-
ed road formerly known as 64th Street, in Kansas City,
Jackson County, Missouri; that at all the times herein re-
ferred to complainant, Gertrude M. Brown, was and now is
the owner of the following tract or parcel of land situated
in Kansas City, Jackson County, Missouri, and within the
benefit district described in said ordinance No. 21831, which
tract is described as follows: Part of the N. W. $\frac{1}{4}$
10 of the S. E. $\frac{1}{4}$ of Section 3, Township 48, Range 33,
more particularly described as follows, to-wit: Be-
ginning at the intersection of the east line of Indiana Avenue,
as established by Ordinance No. 16863, approved August
29, 1913, with the south line of the N. $\frac{1}{2}$ of said quarter
quarter section; thence east along the south line of the
N. $\frac{1}{2}$ of the quarter quarter section aforesaid, to the west
line of Swope Parkway, thence north along the west line
of said Swope Parkway to a point 125 feet south of the north
line of said quarter quarter section, thence west 132.7 feet,

thence north to the south line of Sixty-third Street, thence west along the south line of Sixty-third Street to the east line of Indiana Avenue, established as aforesaid, thence south along the east line of said Indiana Avenue to the point of beginning.

6. Complainants state that the assessment of the parcels of land within said benefit district as described in said Ordinance No. 21831, made, or attempted to be made, by the city assessor in November, 1916, at the direction of the Board of Public Works of Kansas City, to a large extent determined the amounts of the respective tax bills thereafter to be issued, and which were issued as aforesaid against the respective tracts of land belonging to complainants as hereinbefore stated, but said pretended assessment was made by the city assessor without his even viewing said lands and was made without the knowledge of or any notice to or any opportunity to be heard by complainants, or either of them, and said assessment so made by the city assessor was about four times the assessment made against said tracts of lands of complainants by said city assessor and by the county assessor of Jackson County, Missouri, for general taxes for City and for State and County purposes last before November, 1916, and complainants state that the said assessment or pretended assessment of their said lands, so made by the city assessor, on or about November 14, 1916, for the purpose of said grading proceeding, was
11 arbitrary, irrational, unjust, excessive and far beyond the actual values of said tracts of land of complainants, and each of them.

7. Complainants state that section 28 of Article VIII of the Charter of Kansas City, under which these proceedings were attempted to be had, provides that;

“Public Works Shall Be Provided For By Ordinance—Proceedings In Circuit Court Against Owners—Petition To Contain, What.—The public work described above shall be provided for by ordinance, and the city may provide that after the passage of the ordinance and after an approximate estimate of the cost of the work shall have been made by the Board of Public Works, the city shall file a proceeding in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, in the name of the city, against the respective owners of land chargeable under the provisions of this section with the cost of such work. In such proceeding the city shall allege the passage and approval of the ordinance providing for the work, and the approximate estimate of the cost of said work; and shall define and set forth

the limits of the benefit district, prescribed by the ordinance, within which it is proposed to assess property for the payment of said work. The prayer of the petition shall be that the court find and determine the validity of said ordinance, and the question of whether or not the respective tracts of land within said benefit district shall be charged with the lien of said work in the manner provided by said ordinance."

Said section of the charter further provides for the method of procedure in such suit, and further provides that after the termination of and final judgment in such suit "the city may enter into a contract with the successful bidder to whom such work may be let; and, after the work under such contract shall have been fully completed" the cost thereof may be apportioned against the lands to be charged therewith.

And the said ordinance of Kansas City, No. 21831, providing for the work here in question, provides and requires that such a suit be brought, it being provided in section 8 of said ordinance that "a proceeding separate from the proceeding provided for in section 4 of this ordinance, shall be filed in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, in the name of the City, against the respective owners of land chargeable under the provisions of section 28 of Article VIII, of the
12 Charter of Kansas City, aforesaid, with the cost of said work, for the purpose, and in the manner prescribed in said section 28, of Article VIII of the Charter of Kansas City, Missouri, and as provided in this ordinance."

But no such suit or proceeding was brought or prosecuted in said Circuit Court of Jackson County, in the name of Kansas City against the respective owners of the land to be charged with the cost of said work, as required by said charter and ordinance, and hence the Board of Park Commissioners was without right or authority to let a contract for said work and the Board of Public Works of Kansas City was without right or power to apportion or levy the cost of said work against the lands in said benefit district or to issue tax bills for such work against said lands.

8. Complainants further state that the pretended benefit district described in and fixed by said ordinance of Kansas City, No. 21831, was unreasonable, discriminating, arbitrary and unjust, and was such as to place an unconscionable burden and inequitable proportion of the cost of said work upon the lands of complainants; a large amount of land, including the said tracts of complainants, lying a long distance north of and

not abutting on or nearly approaching said Meyer Boulevard, and not specially benefitted by the grading of Meyer Boulevard, was included within said benefit district while a large amount of land east and south of said Meyer Boulevard, particularly and peculiarly and obviously benefitted by the grading of said Meyer Boulevard, was left wholly out of said benefit district and was not assessed at all for such grading. Complainants further state that the benefit district described in said ordinance No. 21831 was limited and confined to a relatively small territory, thereby fixing the improvement of Meyer Boulevard in question as one of a purely local nature and benefit, while, as a matter of fact, the improve-

13 ment was not of a local nature, but was designed to be and is of a general nature and for the general public benefit, the said boulevard being designed as an annex to and an approach to Swope Park, the latter being a park and public play-ground comprising about fourteen hundred acres, owned by the city of Kansas City and the public and being the great recreation place and play-ground of the people of Kansas City. Said Meyer Boulevard is not, in fact, a street or boulevard, but is, in fact, a great and broad parkway varying from two hundred twenty to five hundred feet in width, and it is not appropriate, necessary or useful to nor a peculiar local benefit to the lands abutting on it or adjacent thereto, or to the lands in said benefit district, the same being unimproved, unplatted suburban lands, far out, to-wit, about seven miles from the heart of the city. And, although said Meyer Parkway is primarily and obviously a benefit to said Swope Park, and to the general public, neither said park lands were assessed anything toward the cost of said grading, although said park lands might, under the charter of Kansas City, have legally been so assessed, nor did the city or general public otherwise contribute or pay any part of the cost of said grading, although such is contemplated by the charter of Kansas City.

Complainants further state that the benefit district, fixed by said ordinance is such that it extends north of said Meyer Boulevard a distance varying from one thousand three hundred eighty-seven feet at the east line of the benefit district to a distance of two thousand one hundred ninety-six feet at the west line of the benefit district, while on the south of said Meyer Boulevard the benefit district extends only a distance of about three hundred seventy-five feet at the west line of the benefit district and about six hundred fifty feet at the east line of the benefit district, the result being the amount of land in the benefit district ly-

14 ing north of Meyer Boulevard is more than double the amount of land in the benefit district lying south of the boulevard, whereas, it is an obvious and palpable fact that the owners and occupants of the land lying north of said boulevard, and toward the center of the city, will have practically no use of nor benefit from said boulevard, while the owners and occupants of the land south of said boulevard will have some use of said boulevard as an approach to and from the center of the city. And, notwithstanding the obvious fact that the land north of said boulevard has less use of and less benefit from said Meyer Boulevard than the land on the south, the land north of said boulevard was assessed over seventy-one thousand dollars (\$71,000.00), or about 73 per cent of the cost of grading said boulevard, while the land south of said boulevard was assessed only about twenty-six thousand dollars (\$26,000.00), or only about 23 per cent of the cost of grading said boulevard.

Complainants further state that all the land in said benefit district fixed by said ordinance No. 21831 is unplatted and unimproved suburban land, there being no house or other improvement fronting on said boulevard and no house or other edifice except one, in the entire benefit district. The lands in said benefit district are purely acre properties, and are of small value, and the lands that do not abut on said Meyer Boulevard, and such are the lands of complainants, were assessed by the city assessor, as aforesaid, for the purpose of this proceeding, equally as high or higher per acre than the lands abutting upon the boulevard and the apportionment of the assessments of the said cost of grading Meyer Boulevard was laid ratably over the lands in said benefit district according to the said assessed value, the result being that lands far removed, much of it more than one-fourth of a mile distant

15 from and north of said Meyer Boulevard, were taxed for said grading, per acre equally with or greater than the land abutting on said boulevard. None of the lands in the benefit district were laid off into lots and blocks, and so it is true that the land abutting and adjacent to the boulevard and extending back therefrom to a depth of one hundred fifty feet, which, according to Article VIII of Section 3 of the Charter of Kansas City, should be deemed as the land abutting upon a boulevard and be chargeable with grading costs, was assessed with but approximately twelve thousand dollars (\$12,000.00), or only about 12 per cent of the cost of said grading, while the lands in the benefit district that do not abut on said boulevard or lie within one hundred fifty feet thereof and

are but little, if at all, specially benefited by said grading, were assessed with about eighty-five thousand dollars (\$85,000.00), or about 88 per cent of the cost of said grading.

Complainants state that the taxing of their lands, which are far removed from and have no access to or use of said boulevard, at the same rate as the lands immediately fronting on and particularly benefited by said boulevard, was in violation of said Section 28 of Article VIII of the Kansas City charter, which requires that the tax for such grading costs shall be laid "in proportion to the benefits accruing to the several parcels of land" in the benefit district, and was palpably discriminatory, inequitable and unjust.

The said land of complainant, Felix Swope, in said benefit district is north of said boulevard, and does not at any point abut upon or have access to said boulevard. At no place is any of his land nearer to said boulevard than sixty eight feet, and at the farthest point his land is eight hundred sixty-eight feet distant from said boulevard, but said Swope's land was taxed fourteen thousand ninety-eight and 20/100 dollars (\$14,098.-

20), or with approximately 14 per cent of the total cost of said grading, that is, the land of said Swope, which does not at any place abut upon said boulevard, was alone assessed a greater amount than all the land immediately abutting upon said boulevard although the total frontage of land on said boulevard is eleven thousand two hundred twenty-eight feet. The land of complainant, Gertrude Brown, in said benefit district is far north of said boulevard, and at no place abuts upon or has access to said boulevard, but at the nearest point is seven hundred twenty-eight feet from said boulevard and at the farthest point her land is fifteen hundred and twenty-eight feet distant from said boulevard, nevertheless, her land was taxed six thousand six hundred ninety-three dollars (\$6,693.00), or about 7 per cent of the total cost of said grading, more than half as much as all the land immediately fronting on said boulevard was assessed, the said land belonging to complainant, Brown, being a little over nineteen acres while the land fronting upon said boulevard and running back to a depth of one hundred fifty feet comprises about forty acres. Complainants state that their said lands were assessed in a purely arbitrary, unjust and discriminatory manner and not in accordance with or in consideration of the benefits to said lands by reason of said improvement, and that the assessments made and tax bills issued against their said lands are far in excess of the specific benefits, if any, accruing to their lands

by reason of such grading, and are so great as to amount to a confiscation of complainants' lands.

9. Complainants state that the said Ordinance of Kansas City, No. 21831 and section 28 of Article VII of the charter of Kansas City, Missouri, and said proceedings thereunder, are null and void, and that the enforcement of said apparent lien upon complainants' lands of the said tax bills would take the property of complainants without due process of law, that is, without any or due notice or proper hearing, and without any or due compensation therefor and be contrary to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and contrary to the Constitution of Missouri, guaranteeing to complainants due process of law and the equal protection of the law. And complainants state that the said taxes levied, or attempted to be levied, against complainants' lands, and the proceedings by which said assessments were attempted to be levied, were and are unreasonable, arbitrary, discriminatory, unjust, unconscionable and confiscatory, and therefore void.

10. Complainants state that the defendants threaten to proceed to enforce said tax bills against the property of complainants and that said tax bills constitute a cloud upon the title of complainants to their said lands, and that complainants have no adequate remedy at law.

11. Wherefore, complainants pray the court:

(1) That a subpoena may issue out of this Honorable Court, directed to said defendants, requiring and commanding them, and each of them, to appear in this Court on a day certain and answer the several allegations in this bill of complaint contained, an answer under oath being hereby expressly waived;

(2) That during the pendency of this cause a temporary injunction be issued against the defendants, and each of them, restraining and enjoining them, and each of them, until further order of this Court, from transferring or otherwise disposing of said tax bills, and from enforcing or attempting to enforce the purported lien of said tax bills against the property of these complainants;

(3) That on the final hearing of said cause said tax bills, and each of them, be cancelled and set aside and for naught held, and that the said property of these complainants be adjudged and declared to be free of any and all liens on account

of said tax bills, and on account of said ordinances of
18 Kansas City and the proceedings taken thereunder, and
from all assessments attempted to be levied or assessed
against the properties of these complainants pursuant thereto;

(4) That the complainants have such other and further
relief as to the court may seem meet, equitable and proper in
the premises.

SCARRITT, JONES,
SEDDON & NORTH,
Attorneys for Complainants.

E. L. Searritt,
Of Counsel.

20 Separate Answer of Defendants, Silas C. Delap, Hunter
M. Meriwether and Gilmer Meriwether.

(Filed in the U. S. District Court on January 22, 1920.)

Defendants, Silas C. Delap, Hunter M. Meriwether and
Gilmer Meriwether, deny each and every allegation contained
in complainants' bill of complaint filed herein.

Wherefore, defendants pray that the complaint herein be
dismissed, that they do hence without day and recover their
costs expended herein, and for such other and further relief
as the court may deem just and equitable.

NEW, MILLER CAMACK & WINGER

Attorneys for Defendants, Silas C.
Delap, Hunter M. Meriwether and
Gilmer Meriwether.

22 Amended Answer of Standard Investment Company.

(Filed in U. S. District Court on January 24, 1921.)

Now comes the Standard Investment Company, a corpora-
tion, a defendant in the above entitled cause and by leave of
court, first had and obtained, files its amended answer to com-
plainant's Bill of Complaint, and states:

1. That this defendant is a corporation duly organized
and existing under the laws of the state of Missouri, with its
principal office and place of business at Kansas City, in the
Western District of Missouri; this defendant is without
knowledge or information as to the residence and citizenship
of complainants.

2. This defendant admits that this is an action of a civil nature in equity wherein the matter and amount in controversy exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of Three Thousand Dollars (\$3,000.00). Except as stated in paragraph One of this amended answer this defendant is without knowledge or information as to the other allegations of fact in paragraph two of said complaint.

23 3. This defendant admits and alleges the fact to be that in January 1915 the City Council of **Kansas City**, Missouri, passed Ordinance No. 21831 as set forth in paragraph 3 of said Bill of Complaint, and that said Ordinance was approved and became effective January 26th, 1915.

4. Defendant admits and alleges that the facts, proceedings and things set forth in paragraph 4 of the complaint herein were actually had and done, all in accordance with Section 28 of Article VIII of the Charter of Kansas City, Missouri, of 1909, and Ordinance of Kansas City, Missouri, No. 21831, and denies that any of said facts, proceedings and things were merely pretended or claimed. Defendant states that it and defendant, Fidelity National Bank & Trust Company, are the sole owners of the special tax bills described in said paragraph 4, and denies that the other defendants herein have any right, title or interest in said bills.

5. Except as to the present ownership of the three tracts described in paragraph 5 of complainant's bill, defendant admits the facts and things set out in said paragraph; but as to the present ownership of said tracts defendant is without knowledge.

6. Defendant admits that the assessment of the parcels of land made by the City Assessor to a large extent determined the amounts of the respective bills, and that said bills were issued as alleged, but defendant denies each and every other allegation in paragraph 6 contained.

7. Defendant admits the provisions of Ordinance of Kansas City, #21831 and of Section 28 of Article 8 set out in paragraph 7 of complainants' bill; but denies that no such suit or proceeding referred to under said Ordinance and Section, was brought in said Circuit Court of Jackson
24 County, Missouri, and denies that the Board of Park Commissioners was without right or authority to let a contract for such work; and denies that the Board of Public Works of Kansas City was without right or power to ap-

portion or levy the cost of said work or to issue tax bills for same against said lands.

8. This defendant denies each and every allegation contained in paragraph 8 of said bill of complaint.

9. This defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 9 of said bill of complaint.

10. This defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 10 of said bill of complaint.

11. Defendant states that proceedings such as are required by said Section 28, Article VIII, and Ordinance No. 21831, and referred to in paragraph 7 of the Complaint herein were filed in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, at Kansas City, being cause No. 90628 in said Court; service was duly had according to law on all of the owners of the lands within the benefit district prescribed by said Ordinance No. 21831, and on all parties to said proceeding; that a hearing was duly had therein of which complainants herein had actual notice, and at which they appeared; and that on May 17, 1915, a judgment was duly entered in said court, finding and adjudging that said Ordinance No. 21831 was valid and legal, and that the contract for the doing of the work provided for therein might be entered into by Kansas City in conformity with said Ordinance, and that the proposed lien and assessments for the payment of the cost of said work against the respective lots, tracts and parcels of land within the benefit district prescribed in said Ordinance, and against the respective lots, tracts and parcels of land owned by the respective defendants

in said proceeding, and each of them respectively, when assessed, apportioned and charged as provided in said Ordinance and said Charter is and shall be a valid and legal lien. Defendant states that no appeal was taken from said judgment and the same became and is final and binding upon complainants herein.

That thereafter Ordinance No. 24693 entitled "An Ordinance Providing for and Authorizing the Work of Grading Meyer Boulevard from the West Line of Swope Parkway to the East Line of the Paseo, Stating the Nature of the Improvement, How the Cost Thereof Shall Be Paid and How the Assessments Thereof Shall Be Made and Divided and Ratifying, Approving and Confirming a Contract Thereof With the McMillan Contracting Company" was duly passed by the Common Council of Kansas City, Missouri, and duly approved by the Mayor on December 9, 1915. That thereafter

all proceedings necessary and proper to the issuance of the tax bills described in complainants' bill of complaint were duly and legally had and said tax bills were issued in accordance with law and said Charter and said Ordinance.

Defendant states that all of the proceedings aforesaid were regular and legal that said tax bills are a valid lien on the lands described herein; that all questions involved in said proceeding in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, at Kansas City, were finally adjudged and decreed therein, and that such final adjudication is in full force and effect, is binding upon complainants herein and is a bar to this action.

12. Defendant further states that Section 24, Article VIII of the Charter of Kansas City provides as follows:

"The ordinance authorizing any public improvement and the contract therefor, and approving and confirming such contract, shall operate and shall be held by all the departments and courts, to cure all errors and irregularities, if any, on the part of the city in the proceedings relating to such improvements, up to and including the time such ordinance takes effect, and no tax bill shall be defeated, or the amount or lien thereof, in anywise be affected, by reason of any such error or irregularity."

26 That by reason of the above all errors and irregularities in connection with the suit brought by Kansas City as required by ordinance No. 21831, and Section 28 Article VIII, being cause No. 90628 in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, were cured.

13. Defendant states that the complainants herein had notice of the pendency of the proceedings referred to above to charge the lands described in said bill of complaint with the lien of said special tax bills, and that throughout all of the said proceedings and the doing of said work, said complainants were in possession of said lands, stood by and watched the progress of said proceedings and received and are now receiving the benefits of said work. That it is contrary to equity and good conscience for complainants, at this late date, and after the completion of said work and the issuance and sale of said tax bills, to attack the validity of said proceedings and of said tax bills.

14. Defendant states that in the action or actions to enforce said tax bills complainants will have an adequate opportunity to be heard on any questions complained of herein and not heretofore finally adjudged.

Wherefore, defendant prays that complainants take nothing herein and that defendant go hence without day and recover its costs herein incurred and expended, and for such other and further relief as to the court may seem equitable and just.

MILLER, CAMACK & WINGER
Attorneys for Standard Investment
Company.

27 State of Missouri,
 County of Jackson.—ss.

Frank P. Barker, on his oath states that he is one of the attorneys for the defendant, Standard Investment Company; that he has read the foregoing answer, and that the matters and things set out therein are true, as he verily believes.

FRANK P. BARKER

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 24 day of January,
1921.

EDITH L. STURMAN
Notary Public, Jackson County, Mo.

My commission expires June 30, 1921.

Seal

29 Amended Separate Answer of Fidelity National
 Bank and Trust Company of Kansas City:

(Filed in the U. S. District Court on January 25, 1921.)

Comes now Fidelity National Bank and Trust Company of Kansas City, a corporation, defendant in the above entitled cause, and by leave of court first had and obtained files its amended separate answer to complainants' bill of complaint herein, and answering said bill of complaint states:

1. Answering paragraph 1 of said complaint this defendant states that it is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the United States as a national banking corporation, with its principal office and place of business at Kansas City, in the Western District of Missouri. This defendant is without knowledge or information as to the residence and citizenship of complainants and the other defendants hereto.

2. This defendant admits that this is an action of a civil nature in equity wherein the matter and amount in contro-

30 very exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of Three Thousand Dollars. Except as stated in paragraph 1 of this amended answer this defendant is without knowledge or information as to the other allegations of fact in paragraph 2 of said complaint.

3. This defendant admits, and alleges the fact to be, that in January, 1915, the City Council of Kansas City, Missouri, passed Ordinance No. 21831 as set forth in paragraph 3 of said bill of complaint, and that said Ordinance was approved and became effective January 26, 1915.

4. Defendant admits, and alleged that the facts, proceedings and things set forth in paragraph 4 of the complaint herein were actually had and done, and denies that any of said facts, proceedings and things were merely pretended or claimed.

This defendant states that it and defendant, Standard Investment Company are the sole owners of the special tax bills described in said paragraph 4, and denies that the other defendants hereto have any right, title or interest in or to said bills.

5. With the exception of the allegations as to the present ownership of the three tracts of land described in paragraph 5 of complainants' bill, defendant admits the facts and things set out in said paragraph; but as to such present ownership defendant is without knowledge.

6. Defendant admits that the assessment made by the City Assessor in November, 1916, referred to in paragraph 6 of complainants' bill, to a large extent determined the amounts of the respective tax bills; but defendant denies each and every other allegation contained in said paragraph.

31 7. This defendant admits the provisions of Section 28 of Article VIII of the Charter of Kansas City, and of Ordinance No. 21831, referred to in paragraph 7 of said bill of complaint, but defendant denies that no such suit or proceeding as provided for by said Charter and Ordinance was brought in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, and the Board of Park Commissioners was without right or authority to let a contract for such work, and that the Board of Public Works of Kansas City was without right or power to apportion or levy the cost of said work against the lands in the benefit district set forth in said Ordinance, or to issue tax bills for such work against said lands.

8. This defendant denies each and every allegation contained in paragraph 8 of said bill of complaint.

9. This defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 9 of said bill of complaint.

10. This defendant denies the allegation of paragraph 10 of said bill of complaint, but alleges that the tax bills in question constitute a valid and existing lien against complainants' lands.

11. And for further answer to said bill of complaint defendant states that on or about February 17, 1915, the proceeding provided for in Section 8 of said Ordinance No. 21831, and in that part of Section 28 of Article VIII of the Charter of Kansas City set out in paragraph 7 of said bill of complaint, was duly filed in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, at Kansas City, being cause No. 90628 in said Court; that in said proceeding service was duly had according to law on all of the owners of the lands within the benefit district prescribed by said Ordinance No. 21831, and on all parties to said proceeding; that a hearing was duly had therein
32 of which complainants herein had actual notice and at which they appeared; and that on May 17, 1915, a judgment was duly entered in said court, finding and adjudging that said Ordinance No. 21831 is valid and legal, and that a contract for the doing of the work provided for therein might be entered into by Kansas City in conformity with said Ordinance, and that the proposed lien of the assessments for the payment of the cost of said work against the respective lots, tracts and parcels of land within the benefit district prescribed in said Ordinance, and against the respective lots, tracts and parcels of land owned by the respective defendants in said proceeding, and each of them respectively, when assessed, apportioned and charged as provided in said Ordinance and said charter is and shall be a valid and legal lien; that no appeal was taken from said judgment and that the same became and is final and binding; that thereafter the Board of Park Commissioners of Kansas City duly entered into a contract with McMillan Contracting Company for the work of grading said boulevard, and that thereafter Ordinance No. 24693, entitled "An Ordinance Providing for and Authorizing the Work of Grading Meyer Boulevard from the West Line of Swope Parkway to the East Line of the Paseo, Stating the Nature of the Improvement, how the Cost Thereof shall be Paid and how the Assessments Therefor shall be Made and Levied, and Ratifying, Approving and Confirming a Contract Therefor

with the McMillan Contracting Company," was duly passed by the Common Council of Kansas City, Missouri, and duly approved by the Mayor on December 9, 1915; and that there-
after all the proceedings necessary and proper for the
33 issuance of the tax bills described in complainants' bill
of complaint were duly and legally had, and that said
tax bills were duly issued in accordance with law.

Defendant states that all of the proceedings aforesaid were regular and legal; that said tax bills are a valid lien on the lands described herein; that all questions involved in said proceedings in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, at Kansas City, were finally adjudged as decreed therein, and that such final adjudication is in full force and effect, is binding upon complainants herein, and is a bar to this action.

Defendant states that the complainants herein had notice of the pendency of the proceedings above referred to, to charge the lands described in said bill of complaint with the lien of said special tax bills, and that throughout all of said proceedings and the doing of said work, said complainants were in possession of said lands and received and are now receiving the benefits of said work, and that it is contrary to equity and good conscience for complainants, at this late date, and after the completion of said work and the issuance and sale of said tax bills, to attack the validity of said proceedings and of said tax bills.

Defendants state that in the action or actions to enforce said tax bills complainants will have an adequate opportunity to be heard on any questions complained of herein and not heretofore finally adjudged.

Wherefore, defendant prays that complainants take nothing herein and that defendant go hence without day and recover its costs herein incurred and expended, and for such other and further relief as to the court may see equitable and just.

POWERSOCK & FIZZELL,
Attorneys for Defendant, Fidelity National Bank and
Trust Company of Kansas City.

34 Received copy of the above and foregoing amended
answer, and consent to the filing thereof, this 24 day
of January, 1921.

SCARRITT, JONES, SEDDON,
& NORTH,

Attorneys for Complainants.

Reply to Amended Answer of Defendant,
Standard Investment Company.

(Filed in U. S. District Court on January 28, 1921.)

Now come complainants, and for their reply to the answer of the Standard Investment Company herein, deny each and every allegation of new matter therein contained. Complainants deny that there was brought in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, the suit provided by Section 28 of Article VIII of the Kansas City Charter and by Ordinance of Kansas City, No. 21831, to determine the validity of said ordinance, and deny that Cause No. 90682 in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, mentioned in said defendant's answer, was such a suit as required by said ordinance and charter or that complainants appeared, therein, and complainants further state that the petition in said Cause No. 90682 in the Jackson County Circuit Court did not state facts sufficient to constitute any cause of action or to invoke any relief in a court of equity on behalf of Kansas City, or any other party, and that the said Circuit Court was without jurisdiction to enter any finding or judgment in said pretended cause because there was no proper service of process therein and no sufficient facts were stated in the petition therein to constitute any cause of action at law or in equity, and because said pretended action did not institute a real controversy, but a fictitious one, and there was an attempt to submit a mere moot question; and complainants state that in said pre-

37 tended action there was not identity of either subject matter or parties with the present action; and complainants further state that to hold that said pretended Cause No. 90682 determined or adjudicated all or any of the rights of complainants herein would be in violation of Section 28 of Article II of the constitution of Missouri, which provides that the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate and would be contrary to the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which guarantees the right of trial by jury, and would be taking complainants' property without due process of law contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

Wherefore, complainants pray judgment as in their complaint herein.

SCARRITT, JONES, SEDDON,
& NORTH,

Attorneys for Complainants.

39 (Final Decree, July 7, 1921.)

In the District Court of the United States for the Western Division of the Western District of Missouri, at Kansas City.

April Term—1921.

Felix H. Swope and Gertrude M. Brown, Complainants,
No. 215 vs. In Equity
Fidelity National Bank and Trust Company, a corporation,
Standard Investment Company, a corporation, Silas H.
Delap, Hunter M. Meriwether and Gilmer Meriwether,
Defendants.

This cause was heretofore submitted to and heard by the court upon the pleadings and the evidence and was by the court taken under advisement, and this cause came on to be further heard at this term and the court examined and considered the briefs and arguments of counsel; and thereupon, being fully advised in the premises, the Court finds that complainants are entitled to the relief prayed for in the bill of complaint herein, and it is ordered, adjudged and decreed as follows:

1. That special tax bill numbered 8, for \$7540.20, dated on or about the 21st day of November, 1916, issued by Kansas City, Missouri, to McMillan Contracting Company, pursuant to Ordinance of Kansas City number 21831, approved January 26, 1915, and Ordinance No. 24693, approved December 9, 1915, for the grading of Meyer Boulevard against and upon the tract of land belonging to complainant, Felix H. Swope, described as follows, to-wit: "That part of the South $\frac{1}{2}$ of the N. E. $\frac{1}{4}$ of the S. W. $\frac{1}{4}$ of Section 3, Township 48, Range 33, lying west of the west line of Indiana Avenue, as established by Ordinance No. 16863, approved August 29, 1913, in Kansas City, Missouri,"
40 be and the same is hereby canceled, set aside and for naught held.

2. That special tax bill numbered 3, for the sum of \$6558.00, dated on or about the 21st day of November, 1916, issued by Kansas City, Missouri, to McMillan Contracting Company, pursuant to Ordinance of Kansas City, No. 21831, approved January 26th, 1915, and Ordinance No. 24693, approved December 9, 1915, for the grading of Meyer Boulevard against and upon the tract of land belonging to complainant, Felix H. Swope, described as follows, to-wit: "That part of the south $\frac{1}{2}$ of the N. W. $\frac{1}{4}$ of the S. E. $\frac{1}{4}$

of Section 3, Township 48, Range 33, lying between the west line of Swope Parkway and the east line of Indiana Avenue, as established by Ordinance No. 16863, approved August 29, 1913, and north of the center line of an abandoned road formerly known as Sixty-fourth Street in Kansas City, Missouri," be, and the same is hereby canceled, set aside and for naught held.

3. That special tax bill numbered 2, for the sum of \$6693.40, dated on or about the 21st day of November, 1916, issued by Kansas City, Missouri, to McMillan Contracting Company, pursuant to Ordinance of Kansas City, No. 21831, approved January 26th, 1915, and Ordinance No. 24693, approved December 9, 1915, for the grading of Meyer Boulevard against and upon the tract of land belonging to complainant, Gertrude M. Brown, described as follows, to-wit: "Part of the N. W. $\frac{1}{4}$ of the S. E. $\frac{1}{4}$ of Section 3, Township 48, Range 33, more particularly described as follows, to-wit: Beginning at the intersection of the east line of Indiana Avenue, as established by Ordinance No. 16863, approved August 29, 1913, with the south line of the north $\frac{1}{2}$ of said quarter quarter section; thence east along the south
41 line of the north $\frac{1}{2}$ of the quarter quarter section aforesaid, to the west line of Swope Parkway, thence north along the west line of said Swope Parkway to a point 125 feet south of the north line of said quarter quarter section, thence west 132.7 feet, thence north to the south line of Sixty-third Street, thence west along the south line of Sixty-third Street to the east line of Indiana Avenue, established as aforesaid, thence south along the east line of said Indiana Avenue to the point of beginning, "be, and the same is hereby canceled, set aside and for naught held.

4. That the said above described tracts of land, and each of them, be and the same are hereby discharged of and declared to be free of any and all liens of, or on account of said tax bills and interest thereon, and, also on account of said Ordinances No. 21831 and No. 24693, and all proceedings taken thereunder, and all assessments attempted to be levied or assessed against said real estate pursuant thereto.

5. That the complainants have and recover of and from the defendants herein, their costs herein expended.

To which finding, judgment and decree, and each and every part thereof, the defendants, and each of them, except.

ARBA S. VAN VALKENBURGH,
District Judge.

Dated July 7, 1921.

43

(Petition for Appeal.)

(Filed in U. S. District Court on January 4, 1922.)

To The Honorable Arba S. Van Valkenburgh, District Judge:

The above named defendants, Fidelity National Bank and Trust Company of Kansas City, a corporation, Standard Investment Company, a corporation, Silas C. Delap, Hunter M. Meriwether and Gilmer Meriwether, feeling themselves aggrieved by the decree made and entered in this cause on July 7, 1921, do hereby appeal from said decree to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, for the reasons specified in the assignment of errors which is filed herewith, and they pray that their appeal be allowed and that citation issue as provided by law, and that a transcript of the record, proceedings and papers upon which said decree was based, duly authenticated, may be sent to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

And your petitions further pray that the proper order be made touching the security to be required of them to perfect their appeal.

BOWERSOCK & FIZZELL
MILLER, CAMACK, WINGER &
REEDER
FRANK P. BARKER
MAURICE H. WINGER
HUNTER M. MERIWETHER
CLARENCE S. PALMER
Attorneys for defendants

Allowed Jan'y 4/22

Arba S. Van Valkenburgh,
Judge.

44

Assignment of Errors.

(Filed in U. S. District Court on January 4, 1922.)

Come now Fidelity National Bank and Trust Company of Kansas City, a corporation, Standard Investment Company, a corporation, Silas C. Delap, Hunter M. Meriwether and Gilmer Meriwether, defendants above named, and respectively state that the order and decree made and entered in the above entitled cause on July 7, 1921, cancelling the tax bills involved in this action, is erroneous and unjust to said defendant for the following reasons:

1. The court erred in not finding and holding that the provisions of Section 28 of Article 8 of the Charter of Kansas

City Missouri, had been complied with in the matter of the suit required by that Section to be filed in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, and in all other matters required by that Section.

2. The court erred in not finding and holding that the judgment in the suit filed in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, under the provisions of said Section 28, was and is res adjudicata as to the propriety and reasonableness of the benefit district fixed by Ordinance Number 21831, as to the method of apportionment and as to all other matters that were or might have been litigated therein.

3. The court erred in ruling that the benefit district was arbitrary and unreasonable.

4. The court erred in ruling that the assessment was arbitrary and unreasonable.

45 5. The court erred in holding that the tax bills involved in this action exceeded the special benefits received by the lands in question.

6. The court erred in holding that the tax bills unreasonably exceeded the benefit or any possible benefit to the lands in question.

7. The court erred in holding that the improvement in question was in its nature a general public improvement, rather than a local improvement.

8. The court erred in holding that the method of apportionment within the benefit district was arbitrary and unreasonable.

9. The court erred in decreeing that the tax bills were null and void and that the land in question be released from said tax bills.

10. The court erred in making any finding as to the relation between the amounts of the tax bills in question and the values of the lands in controversy, for the reason that there was no competent evidence as to such values.

11. The court erred in holding the amounts of the tax bills in question to be unreasonable or confiscatory for the reason that there was no competent evidence as to the values of the lands in controversy.

12. The court erred in making any finding as to the extent of the special benefits received by the respective tracts, for

the reason that there was no competent evidence as to such benefits, and erred in admitting any evidence on that issue.

13. The court erred in determining the validity of the tax bills in question upon the relation between the amount of each tax bill and the extent of the special benefit to the respective tract covered by such bill.

Wherefore said defendants pray that said order and decree be reversed and that an order be entered denying the relief prayed for in the bill of complaint herein.

**BOWERSOCK & FIZZELL
MILLER, CAMACK, WINGER
& REEDER
FRANK P. BARKER
MAURICE H. WINGER
HUNTER M. MERIWETHER
CLARENCE S. PALMER.**
Attorneys for Defendants.

46

Order Allowing Appeal.

Now on this 4th day of January, 1922, there having been presented to me the petition of Fidelity National Bank and Trust Company of Kansas City, a corporation, Standard Investment Company, a corporation, Silas C. Delap, Hunter M. Meriwether and Gilmer Meriwether, defendants herein, praying that they be allowed an appeal to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit from an order and decree made and entered herein on July 7, 1921.

It Is Ordered that an appeal to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit from said order and decree be and the same is hereby allowed and that a certified copy of all records, proceedings and papers herein be forthwith transmitted to said United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, upon the same defendants giving bond, conditioned as required by law, in the sum of Five Hundred (\$500.00) Dollars.

ARBA S. VAN VALKENBURGH,
District Judge.

48 (Election as to printing of record.)

(Filed in U. S. District Court on January 4, 1922.)

Come now Fidelity National Bank and Trust Company of Kansas City, a corporation, Standard Investment Company, a corporation, Silas C. Delap, Hunter M. Meriwether and Gilmer Meriwether, defendants in the above entitled cause, by their attorneys, and hereby file their election to have printed under the supervision of the Clerk of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the transcript of the record in the appeal of said defendants from the order and decree of the District Court, made and entered in the above-entitled cause on July 7, 1921.

BOWERSOCK & FIZZELL
MILLER, CAMACK, WINGER &
REEDER

FRANK P. BARKER
MAURICE H. WINGER
HUNTER M. MERIWETHER
CLARENCE S. PALMER

Attorneys for Defendants.

Allowed Jan'y 4/22

Arba S. Van Valkenburgh, Judge.

50 (Bond on Appeal.)

(Filed in U. S. District Court on January 6, 1922.)

Know All Men By These Presents that we, Fidelity National Bank and Trust Company of Kansas City, a corporation, Standard Investment Company, a corporation, Silas C. Delap, Hunter M. Meriwether and Gilmer Meriwether, as principals, and Henry C. Flower, as surety, are held and firmly bound unto Felix M. Swope and Gertrude M. Brown in the full and just sum of Five Hundred (\$500.00) Dollars, to be paid to the said Felix M. Swope and Gertrude M. Brown, their heirs, legal representatives or assigns, to which payment well and truly to be made we bind ourselves, our heirs, legal representatives, successors and assigns, jointly and severally by these presents.

Sealed With Our Seals and ated this 4th day of January, 1922.

Whereas, lately at the April, 1921, term of the United States District Court for the Western Division of the West-

ern District of Missouri, in a suit pending in said court where-
 in Felix M. Swope and Gertrude M. Brown were complain-
 ants, and Fidelity National Bank and Trust Company of
 Kansas City, a corporation, Standard Investment Company,
 a corporation, Silas C. Delap, Hunter M. Meriwether
 51 and Gilmer Meriwether were defendants, an order and
 decree was rendered against said defendants, cancell-
 ing and setting aside certain special tax bills therein describ-
 ed, and said defendants have obtained an appeal and filed a
 copy thereof in the office of the Clerk of said court to reverse
 the order and decree aforesaid, and a citation directed to said
 complainants, citing and admonishing them to be and appear
 in the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth
 Circuit at the City of St. Louis, Missouri, sixty days from
 and after the day of said citation:

Now, the condition of the obligation is such that if said Fi-
 delity National Bank and Trust Company of Kansas City, a
 corporation, Standard Investment Company, a corporation,
 Silas C. Delap, Hunter M. Meriwether and Gilmer Meriwether
 shall prosecute said appeal with effect and answer all dam-
 ages and costs if they fail to make good their appeal, then the
 above obligation to be void; otherwise to remain in full force
 and effect.

FIDELITY NATIONAL BANK
 AND TRUST COMPANY OF
 KANSAS CITY, A
 CORPORATION, Principal.

By J. M. Moore

STANDARD INVESTMENT
 COMPANY, A CORPORATION.

Principal.

By S. C. Delap, President.

S. C. Delap, Principal.

Hunter M. Meriwether, Principal.

Gilmer Meriwether, Principal.

Henry C. Flower, Surety.

Attest:

A. H. Smith

Secretary Cash.

Seal

Attest:

H. M. Meriwether

Secretary.

Seal

The above bond is hereby approved and ordered to be filed and made a part of the record in this cause, this 6th day of January, 1922.

ARBA S. VAN VALKENBURGH,
Judge.

53 (Notice of lodgment of Condensed Statement of Testimony in office of Clerk.)

(Filed in U. S. District Court on February 13, 1922.)

To The Above Named Plaintiffs, or to Scarritt, Jones, Seddon & North, Their Attorneys of Record:

You are hereby notified that defendants have prepared and filed in the office of the Clerk of the above named court, a condensed statement of the testimony introduced at the trial of the above entitled cause, pursuant to Equity Rule 75-B, and that on Monday, the 27th day of February, 1922, at 10 o'clock A. M. defendants will ask the judge of the above named court to approve said statement, and that on said day defendants will apply for an order making said statement a part of the record in this cause, for the purposes of the appeal from the judgment herein, to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

BOWERSOCK & FIZZELL
MILLER, CAMACK,
WINGER & REEDER
CLARENCE S. PALMER

Attorneys for Defendants.

Received copy of the above and foregoing notice this 13th day of February, 1922.

SCARRITT, JONES, SEDDON &
& NORTH

Attorneys for Plaintiffs.

55 Condensed Statement of Testimony.

(Filed in the U. S. District Court on February 13, 1922.)

Prepared by Appellants in accordance with Equity Rule No. 75-b.

This suit was instituted on the 13th day of October, 1919, in the District Court of the United States for the Western Division of the Western District of Missouri, for the cancel-

lation of certain special tax bills issued by Kansas City, Missouri.

Thereafter at the November 1920 term of said court and on the 28th day of January, 1921, at 10:00 o'clock a. m., the above entitled cause came on for hearing before the Honorable Arba S. Van Valkenburgh, Judge of said court, and was tried in conjunction with two other cases brought for the cancellation of similar special tax bills, to-wit: B. Haywood Hagerman v. McMillan Contracting Company and Fidelity National Bank and Trust Company, Number 207; and Walter L. Abernathy and Carrie S. Abernathy v. McMillan Contracting Company and Fidelity National Bank and Trust Company, Number 163. All parties agreed that the three cases should be tried together and that the evidence offered should bear upon the issues of each case, so far as applicable.

The plaintiff in the above entitled cause were represented by Elliott H. Jones, of Scarritt, Jones, Seddon & North, their counsel. In the case of Walter L. Abernathy, et al. v. McMillan Contracting Company, et al, Messrs. O. H. Dean, 56 H. M. Langworthy and Roy B. Thomson, of Warner, Wean, Langworthy, Thomson & Williams, represented the plaintiff. In the case of B. Haywood Hagerman v. McMillan Contracting Company, et al, plaintiff was represented by A. S. Marley, his counsel. Messrs. Justin D. Bowersock, Robert B. Fizzell and Guy Vernon Head, of Bowersock & Fizzell, and Messrs. Maurice H. Winger and Frank P. Barker, of Miller, Camack, Winger & Reeder, and Clarence S. Palmer, represented the defendants in all three cases.

Thereupon the following proceedings were had:

Plaintiffs to sustain the issues on their part, offered and introduced evidence, oral and documentary, as follows:

Section 28 of Article VIII of the Charter of Kansas City, Missouri, was introduced in evidence by the Complainants, and is set forth here in full, as follows:

57 Section 28. Grading, Etc.—When too Heavy Burden on Benefit District, as Limited in Section 3 of this Article—Benefit Limits May be Determined by Ordinance. When in grading or regrading any street, avenue, highway, or part thereof, a very large or unusual amount of filling in or cutting or grading away of earth or rock be necessary, necessitating an expense of such magnitude as to impose too

heavy a burden on the land situate in the benefit district as limited in Section three of this article, and when in grading or regrading, constructing or reconstructing any street, avenue, highway or part thereof, one or more bridges, viaducts, tunnels, subways, cuts or approaches on, along, over or under the same is or are required or needed, the cost of grading or regrading such street, avenue, highway, or part thereof, including the cost of constructing or reconstructing such bridges, viaducts, tunnels, subways and approaches, or any of them, may be charged as a special tax on parcels of land (exclusive of improvements) benefited thereby, after deducting the portion of the whole cost, if any, which the city may pay, and in proportion to the benefits accruing to the said several parcels of land, exclusive of improvements thereon, and not exceeding the amount of said benefit, said benefits to be determined by the Board of Public Works as hereinafter provided, and the limits within which parcels of land are benefited shall in all such specified instances be prescribed and determined by ordinance. If the Common Council shall find and declare in the ordinance providing for the doing of the work above described that a very large or unusual amount of filling in or cutting or grading away of earth or rock is necessary, necessitating an expense of such magnitude as to impose too heavy a burden on the land situate in the benefit district as limited in Section three of this article, or that in grading or regrading, constructing or reconstructing any street, avenue, highway, or part thereof, one or more bridges, viaducts, tunnels, subways, cuts or approaches on, along, over or under the same is, or are required or needed, the finding and declaration in said ordinance shall be final and conclusive as to all such matters.

Public Works Shall Be Provided for by Ordinance—Proceedings in Circuit Court Against Owners—Petition to contain, What.—The Public Work described above shall be provided for by ordinance, and the city may provide that after the passage of the ordinance and after an approximate estimate of the cost of the work shall have been made by the Board of Public Works, the city shall file a proceeding in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, in the name of the city, against the respective owners of land chargeable under the provisions of this section with the cost of such work. In such proceeding the city shall allege the passage and approval of the ordinance providing for the work, and the approximate estimate of the cost of said work; and shall define and set forth the limits of the benefit district, prescribed by the ordinance,

within which it is proposed to assess property for the payment of said work. The prayer of the petition shall be that the court find and determine the validity of said ordinance, and the question of whether or not the respective tracts of land within said benefit district shall be charged with the lien of said work in the manner provided by said ordinance.

Process—What Parties May Offer in Evidence—Service of process in such proceeding shall be governed by the provisions of Section eleven (11) of Article thirteen (XIII) of this Charter, relating to service of notice and summons in proceedings for the ascertainment of benefits and damages for the condemnation of land for parks and boulevards. In such proceedings, the city shall have the right to offer evidence tending to prove the validity of said ordinance, and said proposed lien against the respective lots, tracts and
59 parcels of land within said benefit district sought to be charged with such lien; and the respective owners of lots, tracts and parcels of land within said benefit district shall have the right to introduce evidence tending to show the invalidity or lack of legality of said ordinance, and said proposed lien against the respective lots, tracts, and parcels of land owned by each respective defendant; and the court shall have the right to determine the question of whether or not the said lots, tracts and parcels of land owned by each defendant should be charged with such lien.

Trial—Judgment—The trial of such proceedings shall be in accordance with the Constitution and Laws of the State, and the court shall render judgment either validating such ordinance, and proposed lien against the lots, tracts and parcels of land within said benefit district or against such lots, tracts or parcels of land within said benefit district or against such lots, tracts, or parcels of land as the court may find legally chargeable with the same, or the court may render judgment that such ordinance or proposed lien are, in whole or in part, invalid and illegal.

Appeal—What Court Shall Determine—Any appeal taken from such judgment must be taken within ten days after the rendition of such judgment, or if a motion for a new trial be filed therein, then within ten days after such motion may be overruled or otherwise disposed of; but in all other respects the rules covering such appeal shall be the same as provided by Section eighteen (18) of Article thirteen (XIII) of this Charter.

No Appeal, or After Determination of, City May Enter Into Contract, Etc.—If no appeal shall be taken, or after the determination of such appeal, the city may enter into a contract with the successful bidder to whom such work may be let; and, after the work under such contract shall have been fully completed, the estimate of cost thereof, and the apportionment of the same against the various lots, tracts and parcels of

land within the benefit district, shall be made by the
60 Board of Public Works according to the assessed value thereof, exclusive of improvements, with the assistance of the City Assessor as provided in Section three of this article, and all of the provisions of Section three of this article relating to the apportionment of special assessments, and the levy, issue and collection of special tax bills as in grading proceedings as in said section specified, shall apply to special tax bills issued pursuant to this section, except that said tax bills may be made payable in not to exceed ten annual installments; the number of installments, and the times when payable to be determined by the Common Council on the recommendation of the Board of Public Works, such determination to be determined in the ordinance of the Common Council in which said work is authorized and the proceedings thereof instituted.

Meaning and Intent of This Section—Nothing in this section stated shall in anywise affect, modify or change the provisions of the previous sections of this article, or in any manner affect or change the proceedings and remedies therein set forth for the doing of public work and the payment therefor by the issue of special tax bills; the intention of this section being to provide an independent and separate method of public improvements made under the provisions of this section.

61 Section 3 of Article VIII of the Charter of Kansas City, Missouri, which is referred to in Section 28 of Article VIII, supra was also offered in evidence, and is in words and figures as follows:

62 Section 3. Improvements and Repairs—Resolution of Board of Public Works—What it Shall State.—All proceedings to improve streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks and public highways of every character, and parts thereof, within the city, by grading, re-grading the same, paving or repaving the same, with any material, macadamizing or re-macadamizing or oiling the same, constructing or reconstructing the same, curbing or re-curbing the same, guttering or re-

guttering the same, or repairing the same, constructing bridges, viaducts, tunnels, subways or cuts along or under the same and the maintenance and repair of any or all of such improvements during a stated term of years, and by sodding, re-sodding and the planting or re-planting of trees and maintaining them for a term of years along the same, or along any part thereof, excepting boulevards under park commissioners, or a proceeding for constructing or reconstructing public, district or joint district sewers, shall be begun by the adoption of a resolution by the Board of Public Works, which resolution shall state the nature of the improvement and when the same is to be paid for in whole or in part in special tax bills, the method of making assessments to pay therefor.

Hearing, Notice Of.—After the adoption of any such resolution the Board of Public Works shall, by order, fix a day upon which a hearing in respect to such improvement shall be had, which day shall be within thirty days after the date when such order is made, and shall cause to be published for ten days in the newspaper at the time doing the city printing, and if there is no such paper, then in any other newspaper published in the city, a notice directed to the property owners interested in the improvement without naming them, which notice shall recite the substance of the resolution
63 and that a hearing will be had by the said board at their office concerning the proposed improvement, and the date upon which the hearing shall be had.

Property Owners To Present Views—Paving.—On the date fixed for such hearing any and all property owners interested in such improvement may, by written petition, or otherwise, present their views in respect to the proposed improvement to the said board, and the said board may adjourn the hearing from time to time. After such hearing, if the said board shall determine that it is not for the public interest that the proposed improvement, or a part thereof, be made and paid for, either out of the general fund or by any method of assessment, they shall make an order to that effect, and thereupon the proceedings for the improvement, or part thereof determined against by such order, shall stop and shall not be begun again until the adoption of a new resolution.

Remonstrance.—In case the improvement or part thereof consists of paving or re-paving, macadamizing or re-macadamizing the roadway of a street, avenue, alley or part thereof, which shall not have been found and declared to be used and occupied for business purposes, as hereinafter specified,

and the resident owners of the city owning a majority of the front feet of all the lands belonging to such residents and fronting on the street, avenue, alley or part thereof to be paved or macadamized, shall file with the said board, on or before the day fixed for such hearing, a remonstrance against such paving or macadamizing, the power of the board to make the improvement shall cease for the period of six months from the date of filing of such remonstrance, after the lapse of which period the proceeding may be begun by the adoption of a new resolution.

Finding And Declarations Of Common Council, Benefit Of.—In case the proposed improvement consists of paving or re-paving, macadamizing or re-macadamizing as aforesaid, then, in that event, upon the unanimous recommendation of the Board of Public Works, if each house of the Common Council shall, by ordinance, find and declare a vote of two-thirds of the members-elect of each house that the

64 street, avenue, alley, public highway, or part thereof, on which the proposed improvement is to be made is used or occupied for business purposes, and that the improvement has been unanimously recommended by the Board of Public Works, such finding and declaration shall be final and conclusive for all purposes, and no special tax bills that may be issued to pay for the work shall be held invalid or affected for the reason that the work for which they may have been issued was not unanimously recommended by the Board of Public Works, or that such street, avenue, alley, public highway or part thereof was not in fact used or occupied for business purposes, and the improvement shall proceed regardless of any remonstrance.

Improvements Arrested, Proceedings.—After the expiration of the respective periods during which an improvement may be arrested, as aforesaid, a proceeding may be begun and carried forward for the improvement so determined against or remonstrated against as though no former proceedings had been begun. If no such determination against the improvement is made, or if only a part of the proposed improvement be determined against by said board, the said board shall adopt and perfect plans and specifications for the proposed improvement not determined against, and for an improvement of the same general nature, including, as they deem proper, provisions for the maintenance thereof for a stated period, and in case a macadam or gravel street roadway pavement is provided for, there may be included as an essential part of

maintenance thereof specifications for the rolling and oiling of such pavement at intervals during a stated period.

Advertising For Bids—Contract Confirmed By Ordinance.—After the passing of such resolution and the adoption of such plans and specifications, the Board of Public Works shall advertise for bids for the doing of the work by publication for not less than five days, and shall let the contract to the lowest and best bidder therefor, and shall cause the contract so let to be formally executed by the contractor and by said board on behalf of the city, and the same, before it shall be binding and effective, shall be ratified, approved and confirmed by an ordinance of the said city, as hereinafter specified, and when so ratified, approved and confirmed shall in all respects be considered and held to have been authorized by the city.

Board May Rescind Before Confirmation Of Contract—Completion Of Work—Time Extended.—The Board of Public Works, at any time before any contract is so ratified, approved and confirmed, may rescind by an order entered on the records of said board, the action of said board in signing said contract in behalf of the city, and thereupon all proceedings had in relation to such proposed improvement shall be null and void. The city shall have power, by ordinance, for any good cause, to extend the time of the beginning or of the completion of the work under any such contract, and an ordinance of the city purporting to extend the time therefor shall be conclusive evidence of the existence of good cause for such extension. But all such ordinances for extensions must have endorsed thereon the approval of the Board of Public Works; and said board shall not endorse said approval until the City Engineer shall file with said board his verified certificate stating the reasons for granting such extension, and that said extension is made in good faith for the reason therein specified, and for none other.

When Cost Paid By Special Tax Bills.—The ordinance ratifying, approving and confirming the contract as above provided for shall also provide for and authorize the improvement, and shall state the nature of the improvement, and this may be done by a reference to the plans and specifications therefor, and such ordinance shall state how the cost thereof shall be paid; that is, whether the cost thereof is to be paid by the issuance of special tax bills, or out of the general fund, or whether by one method or the other, in whole or in part, and if by the issuance of special tax bills, how the assessments therefor shall be made and levied.

The said board shall endorse their approval on the ordinance. The Common Council may amend such ordinance by altering the limits of a proposed benefit district in all cases where the dimensions and boundaries of such district are not specifically defined by this Charter, but may not make any other amendment, and shall pass or reject the same.

Assessment, How Made.—When the cost of the whole or any part of the improvement referred to in this section is to be paid by special tax bills evidencing assessments against lands, such assessments shall be made, levied and assessed according to one of the methods in this Article prescribed. Such method shall be specified in the resolution of the Board of Public Works and also in the ordinance confirming the confirming the contract for doing the work. In making assessments to pay for work other than for grading or re-grading, and other than for constructing district sewers and joint district sewers, the Board of Public Works shall compute the cost thereof and apportion the same among the several tracts or parcels of land to be charged therewith, and charge each lot or parcel of land with its proper share of such cost according to the frontage of such land on the street, avenue, alley or highway, or part thereof, named in the contract for the doing of the work. In making assessments for special tax bills to pay for grading or re-grading any street, sidewalk, avenue or public highway, or part thereof, the City Assessor shall, on demand of the Board of Public Works, cause an assessment to be made of the value of all the lands to be charged with the cost of such grading or re-grading, exclusive of the improvements thereon, and shall deliver such assessment to the Board of Public Works, who shall compute the cost of such grading or regrading and apportion

such cost among the several lots or parcels of land to
67 be charged, according to the value thereof, fixed by the City Assessor as aforesaid, and charge each lot or parcel of land with its proper share of such cost.

Grading Cost, How Apportioned.—When the work of grading or regrading streets, avenues or public highways is to be paid for in special tax bills, the cost shall be apportioned and paid as follows: The cost of all grading, including the grading of sidewalks, shall be charged as a special tax on all lands on both sides of the street, avenue or public highway, or part thereof, graded within the following limits, viz: In case the land fronting on the street, avenue or public highway, or part thereof, graded, be laid off in lots or blocks, property so laid off from the line of the street, avenue or

public highway, or part thereof, graded, back to the center line of the block or blocks, shall be so charged, whether fronting on the street, avenue or public highway or not; nevertheless, the Common Council shall have power by ordinance to prescribe that such lands shall not be charged beyond the alleys in such blocks, if deemed just and equitable, and in case any land fronting on such street, avenue or public highway, or part thereof, graded, be not laid off into lots or blocks, then the land not so laid off, and the land in the rear thereof on the line of the street, avenue or public highway, or part thereof, graded, back one hundred and fifty feet, shall be so charged, whether fronting on the street or not; and land liable for such grading shall be charged according to the value thereof, exclusive of improvements thereon, as herein provided; and in case of question on the part of the assessor or Board of Public Works as to whether any lands fronting on the street, avenue or public highway, or part thereof, be laid off into lots or blocks, or not, within the meaning of this section, the common council shall, on the request of the assessor or Board of Public Works, in making out special tax bills and charging the lands for such grading, determine

68 whether or not, any particular land or lands fronting on the street, avenue, public highway, or part thereof, graded, to be laid off or not into lots or blocks within the meaning of this section, and such determination shall be conclusive on all parties interested for all purposes. The cost of all work on any sidewalk, including curbing and guttering along the side thereof, exclusive of the grading of the same, shall be charged as a special tax upon the adjoining lands according to the frontage thereof on the sidewalk. The cost of all work mentioned in this section of this article done on spaces fronting on any other street, avenue, alley or public highway, shall be deemed part of the costs of work done on other spaces under the same ordinance and contract, and be charged and paid for accordingly.

Tax Bills Against Corner Lots—Contracts For Different Kinds Of Work.—In making out special tax bills against corner lots for work on sidewalks, other than grading, and for work of curbing, they shall be charged for work on both fronts and on the outside corners. A single contract may be let and entered into to do various kinds of work when payment is to be made therefor in special tax bills, and when any kind of work shall be fully completed, tax bills therefor may be issued; but in case of a general contract for repairs, as provided in Section 16 of this Article, tax bills may be issued from time to time as separate jobs of repairing may be done.

63 B. W. Gantt, being duly sworn testified: That he was deputy City Clerk of Kansas City, Missouri and as such identified Ordinance of Kansas City, Missouri No. 21831, the original of which ordinance was marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 and introduced in evidence.

Said Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1 is substantially as follows:

70

(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1.)

Ordinance No. 21831

An Ordinance To Grade Meyer Boulevard From The West Line Of Swope Parkway To The East Line Of The Paseo And To Condemn Easements To Support Embankments Or Fills, Describing The Nature Of The Improvement, Providing How The Cost Thereof Shall be Paid, And Prescribing The Limits Within Which Private Property Is Deemed Benefited By The Proposed Improvement, And Assessed And Charged To Pay Damages Caused By Said Grading, And By The Condemnation Of Said Easements, And Assessed And Charged To Pay The Cost of Said Improvement.

Whereas, The Board of Park Commissioners has, by Resolution No. 1762, adopted on the 11th day of December, 1914, recommended to the Common Council of Kansas City that Meyer Boulevard from the west line of Swope Parkway to the east line of The Paseo, be graded to the full width thereof, and to the established grade of the same, and that easements to support embankments or fills be condemned, and

Whereas, The Board of Public Works, by its Resolution under Entry No. 73992, on the 11th day of December, 1914, has joined in said recommendation, Now, Therefore,

Be It Ordained By The Common Council Of Kansas City:

Section 1. That the boulevard or highway known and designated as Meyer Boulevard from the West line of Swope Parkway to the east line of The Paseo, be graded to the full width thereof and to the established grade of the same.

Section 2. That as the proposed grading of said Meyer Boulevard, or part thereof, to the established grade for the full width thereof will cause certain embankments or fills to be made leaving abutting property below the proposed grade of said boulevard or highway, there is hereby condemned in said abutting property easements or right to support said embankments or fills so far as may be necessary to bring the said boulevard or highway to the required grade, and by allowing

the material of which said embankments are made to fall upon the abutting land at the natural slope so that the surface of the boulevard or highway may be graded to the full width thereof. The areas of land in which said easements are condemned are shown in the plat forming part of the plans hereinafter referred to in Section 3 hereof, prepared and on file in the office of the Board of Park Commissioners, showing a profile of the portion of said Boulevard or highway proposed to be graded and indicating thereon approximately the amount of the encroachment of the embankment upon the abutting property, which said plat is hereby referred to and identified. Just compensation for the easements herein condemned shall be assessed, collected and paid according to law.

Section 3. Said work and improvements shall be of the nature described and specified in, and shall be in accordance with, the plans and specifications, adopted, perfected and approved by the Board of Public Works, on the 11th day of December, 1914, by Resolution under its entry Number 73991, and by the Board of Park Commissioners of Kansas City, Missouri, on the 11th day of December, 1914, under Resolution No. 1761, which said plans and specifications are now on file in the office of said Board of Park Commissioners. Said improvement is hereby provided for and authorized.

71 Section 4. Whereas, private property may be disturbed or damaged by the grading herein provided for and authorized and by the condemnation of the easements herein provided for, and the owners thereof lawfully entitled to remuneration or damages under the constitution of this state have not waived all right or claim thereto, it is ordered that proceedings to ascertain and assess all such damages or remuneration be begun and carried on as provided by Article VII of the Charter of said City; and the Common Council prescribes and determines the limits within which private property is deemed benefited by the proposed grading and improvement herein provided, and within which said property may be assessed or charged to pay such remuneration or damages, including the taking and damaging of private property for public use for or in the acquiring of said easements, to be as follows, to-wit:

(Here Follows Designation Of The Limits Of The Benefit District As Shown In Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 12)

Section 5. The Common Council hereby finds and declares that in the grading of said boulevard or highway a very large or unusual amount of filling in, or cutting or grading away of

earth or rock is necessary, necessitating an expense of such magnitude as to impose too heavy a burden on the land situate in the benefit district as limited in Section 3 of Article VIII of the Charter of Kansas City.

Section 6. The cost of grading said boulevard or highway as provided herein, shall be charged as a special tax on parcels of land (exclusive of improvements) benefited thereby after deducting the portion of the whole cost, if any, which the city may pay, and in proportion to the benefits accruing to the said several parcels of land, exclusive of improvements thereon, and not exceeding the amount of said benefits, said benefits to be determined by the Board of Public Works and after said work shall have been fully completed, the cost thereof shall be estimated by the said Board of Public Works and shall be apportioned by said Board of Public Works against the various lots, tracts and parcels of land within the benefit district, according to the assessed value thereof, exclusive of improvements, as provided in Section 28, of Article VIII of the Charter of Kansas City aforesaid; and the limits within which parcels of land are benefited as aforesaid, and within which it is proposed to assess property for the payment of said work and improvement, are hereby prescribed and determined to be the same limits as are hereinbefore, in Section 4 of this Ordinance, prescribed and determined as the limits within which private property is deemed benefited by the proposed grading of said boulevard or highway, all in pursuance of Section 28 of Article VIII of the Charter of Kansas City, aforesaid.

Section 7. Payment of the cost of all of said work shall be made in Special Tax Bills evidencing special assessments made and levied against each lot or parcel of land chargeable therewith respectively, and set forth in Section 6 of this Ordinance. Said Tax Bills shall be payable in ten (10) annual installments according to law, the first of said installments to become due and collectible as provided in Section 25 of Article VII of the Charter of Kansas City aforesaid, in the case of Tax Bills payable in installments, and the remaining installments shall be due and collectible, one each year thereafter, on the 30th day of June of each year until all said installments are paid.

72 The Common Council hereby finds and declares that its action herein has been recommended by the Board of Public Works and also by the Board of Park Commissioners. The improvement provided for herein the Common Council deems necessary to have done, but the passage of this Ordinance

nance and the doing of such work shall not render Kansas City liable to pay for such work, or any part thereof, otherwise than by the issue of Special Tax Bills, and except as herein provided.

Section 8. The Board of Public Works shall make an approximate estimate of the cost of the work herein provided for, and after the passage of this Ordinance, and after such approximate estimate of the cost of said work shall have been made by said Board, a proceedings separate from the proceedings provided for in Section 4 of this Ordinance, shall be filed in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, in the name of the City, against the respective owners of land chargeable under the provisions of Section 28 of Article VIII of the Charter of Kansas City aforesaid, with the cost of said work, for the purpose, and in the manner prescribed in said Section 28 of Article VIII of the Charter of Kansas City, Missouri, and as provided in this Ordinance.

Section 9. The Common Council hereby finds and declares that its action herein has been recommended by the Board of Park Commissioners of Kansas City, Missouri, and by the Board of Public Works, and that the said Boards have recommended to the Common Council that the above mentioned boulevard or highway be graded to the full width thereof as herein provided for and that easements to support embankments or fills be condemned as herein provided for and that payment for all said work be made in Special Tax Bills as herein provided for; and the action of said Board of Park Commissioners and the Board of Public Works in determining that said work shall be done and that the payment for same be made in special tax bills is hereby ratified and confirmed.

Section 10. All Ordinances, or parts of Ordinances in conflict with this Ordinance, are, insofar as they conflict with this ordinance, hereby repealed.

73 Mr. Gantt also identified Resolution of the Board of Park Commissioners of Kansas City, Missouri No. 1762, and the original of said Resolution was offered in evidence as Plaintiffs' Exhibit 2.

Said Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 is substantially as follows:

74 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 2.)

Resolution No. 1762

A Resolution To Grade Meyer Boulevard From the West Line Of Swope Parkway To The East Line Of The Paseo, And

Recommending The Condemnation Of Easements To Support Embankments Or Fills, Describing The Nature Of The Improvement And Providing How The Cost Thereof Shall Be Paid.

Be It Resolved By The Board of Park Commissioners of Kansas City, Missouri.

Section 1. That Meyer Boulevard from the west line of Swope Parkway to the east line of The Paseo, be graded to the full width thereof and to the established grade of the same. Said work and improvement to conform in all respects to plans and specifications for said work adopted, perfected and approved on the 11th day of December 1914, by the Board of Public Works under its entry Number 73991, and by the Board of Park Commissioners on the 11th day of December 1914, under Resolution No. 1761, which said plans and specifications show the location and description of the proposed public improvement as a whole, and are now on file in the office of said Board of Park Commissioners.

Section 2. That as the proposed grading of said Meyer Boulevard, or part thereof, to the established grade for the full width thereof will cause certain embankments or fills to be made, leaving abutting property below the proposed grade of said boulevard or highway, Common Council is hereby recommended to condemn in said abutting property, easements or right to support said embankments or fills so far as may be necessary to bring the same boulevard or highway to the required grade and by allowing the material of which said embankments are made to fall upon the abutting property at the natural slope so that the surface of the boulevard or highway may be graded to the full width thereof. The areas of land in which said easements are condemned, are shown in the plat forming part of the plans heretofore referred to in Section 1 hereof, prepared and on file in the office of this Board, showing a profile of the portion of said Boulevard or highway proposed to be graded and indicating thereon approximately the amount of encroachment of the embankments upon the abutting property. Just compensation for the easements herein recommended to be condemned to be assessed, collected and paid according to law.

Section 3. Payment of the cost of all of said work shall be made in special tax bills evidencing special assessments made and levied against each lot or parcel of land chargeable therewith, respectively, according to law, and inasmuch as in the grading of said boulevard or highway a very large or un-

usual amount of filling in, or cutting, or grading away of earth or rock is necessary, necessitating an expense of such magnitude as to impose too heavy a burden on the lands situate in the benefit district as limited in Section 3 of Article VIII of the Charter of Kansas City, Missouri, the Board of Park Commissioners recommends to the Common Council that a special benefit district, within which benefit district private property may be assessed for the payment of said work and improvement, be prescribed, determined and established, all as provided by Section 28 of Article VIII of the Charter of Kansas City; and that said tax bills shall be payable in ten (10) annual installments according to law, the first of said installments to become due and collectible as provided in Section 25 of Article VIII of the Charter of Kansas City, in the case of tax bills payable in installments, and that the remaining installments shall be due and collectible, one each year thereafter, on the 30th day of June of each year until all said installments are paid, all as provided in the Charter of Kansas City.

Section 4. The Board of Park Commissioners of Kansas City, Missouri, does hereby recommend to the Common Council of said city to provide for ordinance for the doing of said work, and for the condemning of easements to support embankments or fills and that payment of the whole thereof be made in special tax bills and that the Common Council by ordinance order said work to be done.

76 Section 5. That a verified copy of this resolution be delivered to each house of the Common Council as notice to said Common Council of the action and recommendation of this Board.

In Testimony Whereof, I, T. C. Harrington, Secretary of the Board of Park Commissioners of Kansas City, Missouri, have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Board this 11th day of December 1914.

T. C. HARRINGTON

(Seal)

Secretary.

Of the Board of Park Commissioners of
Kansas City, Missouri.

I, E. J. McDonnell, Secretary of the Board of Public Works of Kansas City, Missouri, do hereby certify that said Board of Public Works at a regular meeting thereof held on the 11th day of December 1914, by resolution recorded under its Entry No. 73992 did adopt the foregoing resolution of said

Board of Public Works; and that the President and Secretary of said Board of Public Works were duly authorized and instructed to attach the approval of said Board of Public Works to a copy of said resolution.

E. J. McDONNELL

73992

Secretary.

Of the Board of Public Works of Kansas
City, Missouri.

R. L. Gregory,

(Seal)

President.

Of the Board of Public Works of Kansas
City, Missouri.

State of Missouri,

County of Jackson,
Kansas City—ss.

I, J. A. Bermingham, City Clerk of Kansas City, Missouri, hereby certify that the annexed and foregoing is a true and correct copy of a Resolution No. 1762, adopted by the Board of Park Commissioners on the 11th day of December 1914, and by the Board of Public Works on the 11th day of December 1914, as the same appears on file in my office.

In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of Kansas City aforesaid, this 17th day of February, A. D. 1920.

J. A. BERMINGHAM,

(Seal)

City Clerk.

77 Mr. Gantt also identified Ordinance of Kansas City, Missouri, No. 9525, and the original of said ordinance was admitted in evidence by the court over the objections of the Defendants made at the time as to the relevancy of said ordinance, as Plaintiffs' Exhibit 3.

The material portions of said Ordinance are as follows:

78

Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 3.

Ordinance No. 9525.

An Ordinance to open and establish a public parkway along Flora, Lydia and Woodland Avenues, 64th Street and other lands in the Westport, Southwest and Swope Park Districts in Kansas City, Missouri.

Whereas, The Board of Park Commissioners of Kansas City, Missouri, has selected and designated certain lands here-

inafter described, to be acquired and used for parkway purposes and has recommended to the Common Council of Kansas City, Missouri, the acquisition and establishment of the same as and for a public parkway, accordingly to law, therefore,

Be It Ordained By The Common Council of Kansas City:

Section 1. That a public parkway be, and the same is hereby opened and established along Flora, Lydia and Woodland Avenues, 64th Street and other lands in the Westport, Southwest and Swope Park Districts of Kansas City, Jackson County, Missouri, comprising and including the following described lands situated in Kansas City aforesaid, to-wit:

(Here follows description of land taken)

Section 2. The private property to be taken as aforesaid, shall be paid for by special assessments upon real estate and just compensation therefor shall be assessed, collected and paid as provided in Article XIII of the Charter of Kansas City, Missouri, as existing and now in force.

The Special assessments to be made in payment for the private property taken or damaged in pursuance hereof, shall be paid in twenty (20) equal annual installments, such installments to be payable at such time, in such manner and with such interest as is provided in Section Twenty-one (21) of Article XIII of the Charter of Kansas City, Missouri, for the payment of installments of assessments made payable in more than one installment.

79 Section 3. The Common Council determines and prescribes the limits within which private property shall be deemed benefited by the improvement herein proposed and be assessed and charged to pay compensation therefor as follows, to-wit:

(Here follows description of benefit district as shown on plaintiff's Exhibit #13)

Section 4. The Common Council finds and declares that the action of the Common Council herein has been recommended by the Board of Park Commissioners of Kansas City, Missouri, as provided by law, and that said Board of Park Commissioners has selected and designated the land described in Section One of This Ordinance to be acquired and used for parkway purposes and has recommended to said Common Council the acquisition and establishment of the same as and

for a public parkway, and has further recommended that if the Common Council should determine that said lands to be acquired as aforesaid, should be paid for by special assessments upon real estate, said assessments shall be made payable in twenty (20) equal annual installments, as provided in Section Two of this ordinance.

Section 5. That ordinance No. 4472 approved March 30th, 1910, and all ordinances or parts of ordinances in conflict herewith, are, insomuch as they conflict with this ordinance, hereby repealed.

Passed Jul. 31-1911, Frank D. Askew, Speaker Lower House of the Common Council

Passed Aug. 7-1911 R. L. Gregory, President, Upper House of the Common Council.

Approved Aug. 9-1911 Darius A. Brown, Mayor.

Attest:

Wm. Clough,
City Clerk.

(Seal)

80 Mr. Gantt also identified Resolution of the Board of Park Commissioners of Kansas City, Missouri, No. 10363, the original of which resolution was admitted in evidence by the court over the objections of Defendants made at the time as to the relevancy of said resolution as Plaintiffs' Exhibit 4.

The material portions of said exhibit are as follows:

81 Plaintiffs' Exhibit Number 4.

Resolution No. 10363.

A Resolution Selecting And Designating Certain Land in The Westport, Southwest And Swope Park Districts in Kansas City, Missouri, For Parkway Purposes.

Be It Resolved By The Board Of Park Commisisoners of Kansas City, Missouri:

Section 1—That the following described land situated with- in the Westport, Southwest and Swope Park Districts of Kansas City, Jackson County, Missouri, be and the same is hereby selected and designated as and for a public parkway, under and in pursuance of Article Thirteen (XIII) of the

charter of Kansas City, Missouri, said land being described by metes and bounds as follows, to-wit:

(Here follows same description of lands as set out in Ordinance Number 9525.)

The Board of Park Commissioners does hereby recommend to the Common Council of Kansas City, Missouri, the establishment of a public parkway to include all the land within the above described metes and bounds, excepting the use and easement for a double track street railway of the track, or tracts, now occupied and used by the Metropolitan Street Railway Company, The Interurban South Side Railway, a corporation, and the Old Kansas City Memphis and Mobile Railroad Company, now known as the Kansas City and Westport Belt Railway Company, their successors and assigns, within the boundary lines above described.

That all private property within said metes and bounds, as above stated and specified and herein before described, saving only the exceptions hereinbefore specified and excluded, be acquired for parkway purposes by purchase, condemnation or otherwise as said Common Council may deem best.

82 Section 2. In case that the Common Council determines that said land be acquired as aforesaid, shall be paid for by special assessments upon real estate, the Board of Park Commissioners hereby recommends that said assessments shall be made payable in twenty (20) equal annual installments, to be payable at such times, in such manner and with such interest as provided in Section Twenty-one (21) of Article Thirteen (XIII) of the Charter of Kansas City, Missouri, for the payment of installments of assessments made payable in more than one (1) installment.

Section 3. That resolution No. 9154 adopted March Twenty-eighth (28th) 1910, and all resolutions, or parts of resolutions, in conflict with this resolution, insofar as they conflict, are hereby rescinded.

Section 4. That a certified copy of this resolution be delivered to each house of the Common Council of Kansas City, Missouri, as notice to said Common Council of the action and recommendation of this Board.

OFFICE OF THE BOARD OF
PARK COMMISSIONERS
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI.

I, Frank P. Gossard, Secretary of the Board of Park Commissioners, of Kansas City, Missouri, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing is a true and perfect copy of a certain resolution of said Board, known and designated as "Resolution No. 10363", as the same appears of record in the office of said Board and that said resolution was adopted by said Board of Park Commissioners at a regular meeting thereof held on the 10th day of July, 1911.

In Testimony Whereof, I, Frank P. Gossard, Secretary of the Board of Park Commissioners of Kansas City, Missouri, have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Board this 15th day of July, A. D. 1911.

FRANK P. GOSSARD,
Secretary of the Board of Park Commissioners of Kansas City, Missouri.

83 Mr. Gantt also identified Ordinance of Kansas City, Missouri, No. 16850, the original of which ordinance was admitted by the court in evidence over the objections of the defendants made at the time as to the relevancy of said ordinance, as Plaintiffs' Exhibit 5.

Said Exhibit 5 is substantially as follows:

84 Plaintiffs' Exhibit Number 5.

Ordinance No. 16850

An Ordinance To Name The Parkway In The Westport, Southwest And Swope Park Districts, Heretofore Opened And Established By Ordinance No. 9525, Approved August 9, 1911.

Whereas, the Board of Park Commissioners of Kansas City, Missouri, has by resolution named a parkway in the Westport, Southwest and Swope Park Districts in Kansas City, Missouri, opened and established under Ordinance No. 9525, approved August 9, 1911, and has recommended to the Common Council to concur therein by Ordinance, and

Whereas, it is necessary for the convenience of improving the parkway, and house numbering, on said parkway to establish a name or names for said parkway, therefore,

Be It Ordained By The Common Council Of Kansas City:

Section 1

That all that portion of the Parkway (along 64th Street), opened and established under said Ordinance No. 9525, from

the east line of Wornall Road to a line one hundred and twenty (120) feet West of and parallel with the east line of the Northwest quarter ($\frac{1}{4}$) of the Southwest quarter ($\frac{1}{4}$) of said Section No. Four (4) and South of the South line of Sixty-third (63rd) Street, (except that portion of said parkway) (along the South prolongation of Rockhill Road) as described under said Ordinance No. 9525, lying north of a line seventy (70) feet north of and parallel with the south line of the North half ($\frac{1}{2}$) of the Northeast quarter ($\frac{1}{4}$) of the Southeast quarter ($\frac{1}{4}$) of Section No. Five (5), Township No. Forty-eight (48) North, Range No. Thirty-three (33) West, 85 and all that portion of said parkway (on certain lands near Sixty-fifth (65th) Street, as described under said Ordinance No. 9525, from a line two hundred forty-seven and three tenths (247.3) feet West of and parallel with the East line of the Southwest quarter ($\frac{1}{4}$) of the Southeast quarter ($\frac{1}{4}$) of the Southeast Quarter ($\frac{1}{4}$) of said Section No. Four (4), to the East Line of the southwest quarter ($\frac{1}{4}$) of the Southeast quarter ($\frac{1}{4}$) of section No. Three (3), Township No. Forty-eight (48) North, Range No. Thirty-three (33) West, be and the same is hereby named and shall hereafter be known and designated as Meyer Boulevard; and

Section 2. The Common Council finds and declares that the action of the Common Council has been recommended by the Board of Park Commissioners of said City as provided by law.

Section 3. All Ordinances or parts of Ordinances in conflict with this Ordinance, are, inasmuch as they conflict with this Ordinance, hereby repealed.

Passed
Jul 21 1913
F. J. Shinnick Speaker
Lower House of the
Common Council

Passed
Jul 28 1913
Peter Michaels Act
President Upper House
of the Common Council.

Approved
Aug. 1 1913
Henry L. Jost,
Mayor.

Attest:
J. A. Bermingham
City Clerk.
(Seal)

86 Plaintiffs also offered in evidence Resolution of the Board of Park Commissioners No. 381, identified by Mr. Gantt, the admission of which in evidence was objected to on behalf of the Defendants as irrelevant to any issue in the case. Said resolution was admitted in evidence by the court as Plaintiff's Exhibit 6, which, omitting the formal and immaterial portions, is as follows:

87 Plaintiffs' Exhibit Number 6.

Resolution No. 381

A Resolution To Name The Parkway In The Westport, Southwest And Swope Park Districts In Kansas City, Missouri, Opened And Established Under Ordinance No. 9525, Approved August 9, 1911.

Whereas, the parkway, opened and established under Ordinance No. 9525, approved August 9, 1911, and entitled "An Ordinance to open and establish a public parkway along Flora, Lydia and Woodland Avenues, 64th Street and other lands in the Westport, Southwest and Swope Park Districts in Kansas City, Missouri", has not been named, and

Whereas, it is necessary for the convenience of improving the parkway, and house numbering, to establish a name or names for said parkway, therefore,

Be It Resolved By The Board Of Park Commissioners Of Kansas City, Missouri:

Section 1

That all that portion of the Parkway (along 64th Street), opened and established under said Ordinance No. 9525, from the east line of Wornall Road to a line one hundred and twenty (120) feet west of and parallel with the east line of the northwest quarter ($\frac{1}{4}$) of the southwest quarter ($\frac{1}{4}$) of said Section No. Four (4) and south of the south line of Sixty-third (63) Street, (except that portion of said parkway (along the south prolongation of Rockhill Road) as described under said Ordinance No. 9525, lying north of a line seventy (70) feet north of and parallel with the south line of the north half ($\frac{1}{2}$) of the northeast quarter ($\frac{1}{4}$) of the southeast quarter ($\frac{1}{4}$) of Section No. Five (5), Township No. Forty-eight (48) north, Range, No. Thirty-three (33) west, and all that portion of said parkway (on certain lands near Sixty Fifth (65) and Sixty-sixth Streets, as described under said Ordinance

88 No. 9525 from a line two hundred forty-seven and three tenths (247.3) feet west of and parallel with the east

line of the southwest quarter ($\frac{1}{4}$) of the southeast quarter ($\frac{1}{4}$) of said Section No. Four (4), to the east line of the southwest quarter ($\frac{1}{4}$) of the southeast quarter ($\frac{1}{4}$) of Section No. Three (3), Township No. Forty-eight (48) north, Range No. Thirty-three (33) west, be and the same is hereby named and shall hereafter be known and designated as Meyer Boulevard; and

.

Section 2. A plat showing the lines of the parkway herein named and the boundaries thereof marked "Exhibit A", is hereby approved by this Board and made a part of this resolution, and a copy of the same shall accompany a certified copy of this resolution to be delivered to each House of the Common Council of Kansas City, Missouri as notice to said Common Council of the action and recommendation of this Board.

Office of the Board of Park Commissioners
Kansas City, Missouri.

I, T. C. Harrington, Secretary of the Board of Park Commissioners, of Kansas City, Missouri, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing is a true and perfect copy of a certain resolution of said Board, known and designated as "Resolution No. 381", as the same appears of record in the office of said Board, and that said resolution was adopted by said Board of Park Commissioners at a regular meeting thereof held on the 23 day of June, A. D. 1913.

In Testimony Whereof, I, T. C. Harrington, Secretary of the Board of Park Commissioners, of Kansas City, Missouri, have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Board, this 1st day of July, A. D. 1913.

(Signed) T. C. HARRINGTON,
Secretary of the Board of Park Commissioners of Kansas City, Missouri

(Seal)

89 On cross-examination Mr. Gantt identified Ordinance of Kansas City, Missouri No. 24693, the original of which Ordinance was admitted in evidence as Defendants' Exhibit A, which exhibit is substantially as follows:

Form approved

Jay M. Lee

A. C. C.

An Ordinance Providing For And Authorizing The Work Of Grading Meyer Boulevard From The West Line Of Swope Parkway To The East Line Of The Paseo, Stating The Nature Of The Improvement, How The Cost Thereof Shall Be Paid And How The Assessments Therefor Shall Be Made And Levied, And Ratifying, Approving And Confirming A Contract Therefor With The McMillan Contracting Company.

Be It Ordained By The Common Council Of Kansas City:

Section 1.—That Meyer Boulevard from the west line of Swope Parkway to the east line of The Paseo, be graded to the full width thereof, and to be established grade of the same.

Section 2. That the said work and improvement shall be of the nature described and specified in and shall be done in accordance with the plans and specifications adopted, perfected and approved by the Board of Park Commissioners on the 11th day of December 1914, by Resolution No. 1761, and with the terms of the contract and specifications therefore between the McMillan Contracting Company as principal E. E. Tutt and Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland as sureties and the Board of Park Commissioners in behalf of Kansas City, Missouri, dated the 26th day of October 1915, which said plans and specifications are now on file in the office of said Board; that said contract is hereby ratified, approved and confirmed, and that said plans, specifications and contract are hereby made a part of this Ordinance as fully and with the same effect as though set out verbatim. And the said work and improvement shall be made and executed and the contract price paid as herein provided. Said improvement is hereby provided for and authorized.

Section 3.—Payment of the cost of all of said work, after deducting the portion of the whole cost, if any, which the City may pay, shall be made in special tax bills, evidencing special assessments made and levied against each lot or parcel
91 of land chargeable therewith by apportioning such cost among and against the various lots, tracts and parcels of land benefited thereby within the benefit district provided and described in Ordinance No. 21831, approved January 26, 1915, according to the assessed value thereof, exclusive of

improvements, all as provided in Section No. 28 of Article VIII of the Charter of Kansas City, Missouri, and as provided in said Ordinance No. 21831; and the said benefit district within which parcels of land are benefited as aforesaid, and within which it is proposed to assess property for the payment of said work and improvement as aforesaid, and as set forth in said Ordinance No. 21831, is hereby provided and determined to be as follows, to-wit:

(Here follows description of benefit district as shown in Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 12.)

* The improvement provided for herein the Common Council deems necessary to have done, but the passage of this Ordinance and the doing of said work shall not render Kansas City liable to pay for such work, or any part thereof, otherwise than by the issue of special tax bills.

Section 4.—The special tax bills to be issued for the work and improvement herein provided for shall be made payable in ten (10) equal installments according to law; the first installment to become due and collectible as provided in Section No. 25 of Article VII of the Charter of Kansas City, Missouri, in case of tax bills payable in installments, and the remaining installments to become due and collectible one each year thereafter according to law until all of said installments are paid.

Section 5.—All ordinances or parts of ordinances in conflict with this ordinance are, insofar as they conflict with this ordinance, hereby repealed.

This ordinance is hereby recommended this 2nd day of November, 1915.

BOARD OF PARK COMMISSION-
ERS OF KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI
By Cusil Lechtman, President.

92 Attest:

T. C. Harrington
Secretary.

(Seal)

Passed Nov. 15, 1915

Miles Bulger,

Speaker Lower House of the
Common Council

Passed Nov. 29, 1915

J. Leo Ryan,

President Upper House of
the Common Council

Attest: J. A. Bermingham,
City Clerk.
(Seal)

Approved Dec. 9, 1915,
Henry L. Jost, Mayor.

93 There was introduced as Defendants' Exhibit B, after identification by the witness, Resolution of the Board of Public Works of Kansas City, Missouri No. 85155, which is in words and figures as follows:

(Defendant's Exhibit B.)

94 Entry No. 85155

Whereas, under date of October 26, 1915, the Board of Park Commissioners of Kansas City, Missouri, in behalf of said city, executed a contract with the McMillan Construction Company, a corporation, as principal, and the Fidelity Deposit Company of Maryland, and E. E. Tutt, as sureties, for the doing of certain work therein referred to, and

Whereas, by ordinance of Kansas City, Missouri, numbered 24693, approved December 9, 1915, said contract was duly ratified, approved and confirmed, Now Therefore,

Be it Resolved by the Board of Public Works of Kansas City, Missouri:

Section 1. That said ordinance and said contract and the doing of the work thereunder in accordance therewith, be and the same are hereby in all respects approved and recommended by this Board.

Section 2. That the president and secretary of this Board are hereby authorized and directed to endorse the approval of this Board on said ordinance.

We, the undersigned, respectively president and secretary of the Board of Public Works of Kansas City, Missouri, hereby certify that the above and foregoing resolution was duly adopted and entered of record under Entry No. 85155, in the office of said Board this 10 day of December, 1915.

Witness our hands:

Attest:

THOS. F. CALLAHAN,
Secretary.

(Seal)

A. E. GALLAGHER,
President.

95 SEAMAN RUSSELL, being duly sworn and examined on behalf of Plaintiffs, testified:

That he is Information Clerk for the Board of Public Works of Kansas City, Missouri, and as such identified Volume 92 of the Grading Record on file in the office of the Board of Public Works, which Volume at Pages 209 to 212 inclusive shows the apportionment of the tax bills for the grading on Meyer Boulevard, the assessed value of the various tracts in the benefit district and the appraisalment made by the City Assessor.

Said Pages 209 to 212 inclusive of Volume 92 of the Grading Record in the office of the Board of Public Works were introduced in evidence by the Complainants and are substantially as follows:

96 Assessment Roll.

Assessment of Lands, Apportionment of Special Tax and Register of Special Tax Bills for Grading Meyer Boulevard, from the west line of Swope Parkway to the east line of The Paseo.

McMILLAN CONTRACTING
COMPANY, Contractors.

These tax bills are payable in Ten annual installments.

(a)

Ordinance No. 24693

(b)

Approved December 9th, Sent to City Assessor Nov. 16, 1915. 1916.

No. of cu. yds. earth 305062.24 Recd. from City Assessor

No. of cu. yds. rock 24101.94 Nov. 21, 1916.

Cost per cu. yd. earth 25½ cts. Total Assessment, \$378,955.00

Cost per cu. yd. rock 80 cts. Rate .25778497

Total Cost \$97,688.90.

No. Bill	Tract Number	Value of Land	Owner's Name	Apportionment of Tax Total	Installment
1	1	435	Methodist Church	112.10	
2	2	25,965	Gertrude M. Brown	6,693.40	669.34
3	3	25,440	Felix H. Swope	6,558.00	655.80
4	4	3,920	Thos. H. Swope Estate	1,010.50	101.05
5	5	5,760	Thos. H. Swope Estate	1,484.80	148.48
6	6	29,000	Thos. H. Swope Estate	7,475.80	747.58
7	7	26,320	Stella Swope, et. al.	6,784.90	678.49
8	8	29,250	Felix Swope	7,540.20	754.02
9	9	9,435	Thos. Swope Estate	2,432.20	243.22
10	10	30,360	Thos. Swope Estate	7,826.40	782.64

11	11	48,535	Evanston Park Rty Co.	12,511.60	1251.16
12	12	11,930	Thos. H. Swope Estate	3,075.40	307.54
13	13	24,000	Thos. H. Swope Estate	6,186.90	618.69
	14 14	24,920	Carrie S. Abernathy	6,424.00	642.40
97	15 15	24,570	Carrie S. Abernathy	6,333.80	633.38
	16 16	6,020	Granite Land Co.	1,551.90	155.19
17	17	6,525	Fred B. Heath, et. al.	1,682.00	168.20
18	18	9,750	Richard W. Hocker	2,513.40	251.34
19	19	18,480	Dudley Harper, et. al.	4,763.90	476.39
20	20	6,460	Geo. W. Menke	1,665.30	166.53
21	21	3,320	Mary R. Jacobs	855.80	85.58
22	22	3,015	Laure M. Parker	777.20	77.72
23	23	4,425	Dudley Harper, et. al.	1,140.70	114.07
24	24	1,120	Dudley Harper, et. al.	288.70	28.87

Board of Public Works.

Kansas City, Mo., Nov. 14, 1916.

To the City Assessor: 95682

You are hereby required to make and return to this Board an assessment of the value of all lands exclusive of improvements, within the limits prescribed and determined by Ordinance No. 24693, approved December 9th, 1915, under the provisions of Section 28, Article 8, of the Charter of Kansas City, for the purpose of charging the same with the cost of grading Meyer Boulevard, from the west line of Swope Parkway to the east line of The Paseo, as provided by said Ordinance No. 24693, directing the grading of said Boulevard, as required by said Ordinance and by Sections 3 and 28, of Article 8, of the Charter of Kansas City aforesaid.

Attest:

THE BOARD OF PUBLIC WORKS
OF KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI

(Seal)

By. L. Oppenstein, President.

J. Pearce Kane, Secretary.

I, Robert S. Stone, City Assessor of Kansas City, aforesaid, certify that the lands mentioned in the foregoing statement or roll, have been by me fairly and legally assessed, and that my report thereof in the column headed "Value of land fixed by the City Assessor," is correct, I having

made such assessment as directed by the Board of Public Works.

Witness my hand this 18th day of November, 1916.

No. 95903.

ROBERT S. STONE, City Assessor.

Board of Public Works

Kansas City, Missouri.
November 21, 1916.

No. 95903.

The Board of Public Works hereby certify that it has apportioned the cost of the work of grading Meyer Boulevard, from the west line of Swope Parkway to the east line of The Paseo, as provided by Ordinance No. 24693, approved December 9th, 1915, among the several lots and parcels of land to be charged therewith and charged each lot or parcel of land with its proper share of said cost; and that the foregoing is the correct apportionment of such cost, according to the values of said lots and parcels of land.

Attest:

THE BOARD OF PUBLIC
WORKS OF KANSAS CITY,
MISSOURI,

J. Pearce Kane, Secretary.

By L. Oppenstein, President.
Kansas City, Missouri.
November 23rd, 1916.

Received this day the above mentioned Special Tax Bills amounting to the sum of Ninety Seven Thousand Six Hundred and Eighty and 90/100 Dollars, the same being in full of all claims against the City of Kansas City on account of the above mentioned work.

McMILLAN CONTRACTING
COMPANY, Contractors.
By Fidelity Trust Company, Assignee.
By Lester W. Hall,
Vice President.

99 MAURICE CAREY, being duly sworn and examined on behalf of the Complainants testified that he is Chief Clerk in the office of the City Treasurer of Kansas City, Missouri, and as such identified the Land Tax Books on file in the City Treasurer's office for the years 1915, 1916 and 1917, which books show the assessed value of property in Kansas City, Missouri for said years as fixed by the County Assessor for purposes of general taxation.

Said books were offered in evidence by the Complainant as to the particular tracts in controversy in this suit, to the admission of which evidence the Defendants objected on the ground that said evidence was incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial and as having no bearing upon any issue in the case. Said books were admitted in evidence by the court over the defendants' objection as to the particular tracts in controversy.

The assessed valuations of each tract in controversy as shown by said Land Tax Books for the year 1915, 1916 and 1917 so admitted in evidence by the court are as follows:

100 Assessment for Purposes of General Taxation of Tracts in Benefit District for 1915, 1916 and 1917.

Tract Number	Owner	1915	1916	1917
2	Gertrude M. Brown	\$4750	\$4750	\$5000
3	Felix H. Swope	4470	4470	4320
8	Felix H. Swope	6240	6240	6240
11	Evanston Park Realty Co.	12,480	12,480	12,480
14	Carrie Singer Abernathy	6400	6400	6400
15	Carrie Singer Abernathy	6000	6000	6000

101 Mr. Bowersock: If the testimony in regard to the assessed values of these lots is admitted we desire to offer from these same books the assessed values of all property in the benefit district.

The Court: Very well, I think that ought to be done.

Said Land Tax Books were, thereupon, admitted in evidence as to all the tracts in the benefit district; the assessed

valuations of said tracts as shown by said books for the years 1915, 1916 and 1917 so admitted in evidence are as follows:

Assessment for Purposes of General Taxation of Tracts
102 in Benefit District for 1915, 1916 and 1917.

Tract Number	Owner	1915	1916	1917
2	Gertrude M. Brown	\$4750.	\$4750.	\$5000.
3	Felix H. Swope	\$4470.	\$4470.	\$4320.
8	Felix H. Swope	\$6240.	\$6240.	\$6240.
14	Carrie Singer Abernathy	\$6400.	\$6400.	\$6400.
15	Carrie Singer Abernathy	\$6000.	\$6000.	\$6000.
4	Thos. H. Swope, Jr.	\$ 780.	5 & 6	\$ 680.
5 & 6	Thos. H. Swope, Jr.	\$9390.	\$10170.	\$9390.
7	Margaret Swope Miller, Sarah Swope and Stella Swope	\$6240.	\$6240.	\$6240.
9 & 10	Thos. Swope, Jr.	\$10350.	\$10350.	\$10350.
11	Evanston-Park Realty Co.	\$12480.	\$12480.	\$12480.
12 & 13	Thos. Swope, Jr.	\$10360.	\$10360.	\$10360.
16	Granite Land Co.	\$ 1500.	\$ 1500.	\$ 1500.
17	Frederick B. Heath James C. Leiter, Geo. A. Leiter, Gustave W. Bachman,	\$ 1500.	\$ 1500.	\$ 1500.
18.	Richard W. Hoeker	\$ 3000.	\$ 3000.	\$ 3000.
19	Nannie R. Harper et al	\$ 4860.	\$ 4860.	\$ 4850.
20	William V. Wherrett	\$ 1600.	\$ 1600.	\$ 1600.
21	Cora A. Garry, et al	\$ 750.	\$ 750.	\$ 750.
22	Laura M. Parker	\$ 750.	\$ 750.	\$ 750.
23 & 24	Nannie R. Harper et al	\$ 8600.	\$ 8600.	\$ 8600.

103 CHARLES D. WOODWARD being duly sworn and examined on behalf of the Complainants testified as follows:

My name is Charles D. Woodward; I live in Kansas City, Missouri, my profession being that of an engineer. I practice with the firm of Tuttle, Ayres, Woodward Engineering Company, and am a member of that firm. I have been in that business about fourteen years.

I have made some measurements and investigations and tabulations in reference to the grading proceedings on Meyer Boulevard involved in this case. I have taken the plat prepared at the City Engineer's office and reduced it to half scale,

This (Plaintiff's Exhibit 12) is a blue-print reduction or half scale plat of the original plan for grading Meyer Boulevard from the west line of Swope Parkway to the east line of Paseo. The scale indicated at the bottom of the exhibit marked under the work "profile" correctly indicates the scale of this map and the scale of the original drawing of which it is an exact duplicate. This map (Exhibit 12) shows the street line, the lines of the boulevard as contemplated to be graded at that time, the ownership lines and the lines of the benefit district to be assessed for the improvement. The exhibit also shows in colors the division of the tax assessed against the different tracts according to the areas of certain portions of certain tracts. The north boundary line of the benefit district is the south line of 63rd Street; the south line of the benefit district is the north line of 67th Street; the east line of the benefit district is the center line of Swope Parkway; the west line of the benefit district is the west line of the east half of the east half of the northwest quarter of the southeast quarter of Section 4, Township 48, Range 33, from 65th Street to a point 1079 feet south of the center of 65th street. It is the northerly
104 prolongation of the east line of the Paseo south of Meyer Boulevard. On the map some of the streets are outlined and some are not; for instance 67th Street is marked through, Prospect Avenue is marked through, 65th Street is marked partially through. This indicates, I think, the condition at the time of the grading proceeding. At any rate this is the condition shown on the original plat of which this is a copy. I am not certain whether 65th Street had actually been opened from Brooklyn to Prospect as indicated on the map.

The large heavy line shown on the map through the entire benefit district is intended to outline Meyer Boulevard from points where it is to be graded. The distance along the center line of Meyer Boulevard from the east line of Prospect to the west line of Swope Parkway is 5560 feet, or in other words approximately a mile in length. The width of the Boulevard as improved running east from Brooklyn is 220 feet up to a point approximately 800 feet west of Swope Parkway and widens to a width of 500 feet and continues east at that width through Swope Parkway. At the extreme right hand part of the map appear the words "Swope Park". Those words represent the location of the entrance to Swope Park immediately to the east of the widened part of Meyer Boulevard,—in other words, the Boulevard leads directly into the Park.

The distance from Meyer Boulevard to the southernmost point of the Abernathy tract is 530 feet—that is the nearest point that the Abernathy tract reaches toward the improvement is approximately 530 feet. The distance from the Boulevard along Prospect Avenue to 63rd Street is approximately 1820 feet. The distance from Meyer Boulevard to the southernmost part of the Abernathy tract on the west side of the Abernathy tract is approximately 690 feet. The distance from Meyer Boulevard to 63rd Street, that is, to the northernmost part of the Abernathy tract on Brooklyn Avenue is approximately 1980 feet.

105 The southeast corner of tract 11 (the Hagerman tract) is approximately 250 feet of the north line of Meyer Boulevard. The southwest corner of Tract 11 is approximately 480 feet north of the north line of Meyer Boulevard. The southwest corner of Tract 8 is approximately 250 feet north of the north line of Meyer Boulevard and the southeast corner is 208 feet north of the north line of Meyer Boulevard. The northeast corner of Tract 11 is approximately 1540 feet north of the north line of Meyer Boulevard. The northwest corner of Tract 11 is approximately 1770 feet north of the north line of Meyer Boulevard.

The southwest corner of Tract 3 is 208 feet north of the north line of Meyer Boulevard and the southeast corner of Tract 3 is 248 feet north of the north line of Meyer Boulevard. The southeast corner of Tract 2 is 728 feet north of the north line of Meyer Boulevard. The southwest corner of Tract 2 is 868 feet north of the north line of Meyer Boulevard. The northeast corner of Tract 1 is 1358 feet north of the north line of Meyer Boulevard. The northwest corner of Tract 2 is 1498 feet north of the north line of Meyer Boulevard.

The distance from the intersection of Meyer Boulevard and Brooklyn Avenue to Ninth Street and Grand Avenue in Kansas City, which is the location of the Post Office and Federal Building, is 6.7 miles, on a straight line, and 7.6 miles by the shortest traveled line.

On this blue print the numbers marked in large figures represent the numbers of the various tracts lying within the benefit district according to their tax bill number. The figure "T" followed by figures representing dollars and cents represent the amount of the tax bills assessed against each of these

tracts. The "A" refers to that portion of each tract
106 lying within 150 feet of Meyer Boulevard and the
amount following the letter "A" is to the amount of
the tax against each tract as the area of that portion of the
tract lying within 150 feet of Meyer Boulevard is to the area
of the entire tract. The letter "X" refers to that portion of
each tract lying within 150 feet of 63rd Street and the amount
following the letter "X" is to the amount of the tax against
each tract as the area of that portion lying within 150 feet of
63rd Street is to the area of the entire tract. The yellow lines
on each side of the Boulevard indicate lines parallel with the
Boulevard lines 150 feet distance from the Boulevard. The
line just south of 63rd Street is a line 150 feet south of and
parallel to the south line of 63rd Street.

Mr. Langworthy: Q. Now, I wish you would take the total amount of the tax according to your estimate was assessed against the 150 feet immediately south of 63rd Street along the entire northern area of the benefit district and compare the total amount of that tax to the total amount of the tax assessed against the land immediately south of Meyer Boulevard for a distance of 150 feet?

At this point defendants objected to the admission of such testimony on the ground that it had no bearing on the issues involved in the case. This objection was by the Court overruled and the witness permitted to answer.

A. The total amount of the tax assessed against the 150 foot strip lying immediately south of and adjoining the south line of 63rd Street is approximately \$6594.00. The total amount of the tax assessed against the 150 feet lying immediately south of and adjoining Meyer Boulevard is approximately \$6060.00. The tract of 150 feet just south of 63rd Street and the tract of 150 feet just south of Meyer Boulevard are approximately the same in area. The tract 150 feet south of Meyer Boulevard has slightly the greater area. The approximate total area of the land lying on both sides of
107 Meyer Boulevard from Brooklyn to Swope Park and
extending back 150 feet from the Boulevard line is 37 $\frac{1}{2}$
acres.

The total area of Tracts 14 and 15 inclusive of streets is 36.4 acres. Therefore, the total area of all the land lying on both sides of the Boulevard extending back 150 feet is slightly more than the total area of Tracts 14 and 15.

The total tax assessed against all of the property along both sides of the Boulevard extending back for a distance of 150 feet is \$12,696.00.

The total tax assessed against Tracts 14 and 15 is \$12,758.00, so that Tracts 14 and 15 have a less area than the land adjacent to the Boulevard on both sides, extending back 150 feet, but the tax assessed against Tracts 14 and 15 is greater than the tax assessed against said area.

Complainants thereupon offered in evidence the computation or compilation made by witness. This compilation was admitted in evidence by the Court over the defendants' objections as Exhibit 14.

It is in words and figures as follows:

108 Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 14.

Frank Tuttle	Telephone
Albert T. Ayers	Home-Main 87
Charles D. Woodward	Bell-Main 5004

Tuttle-Ayers-Woodward Engineering Co.
Civil Engineers.
305-306-307 Reliance Building
214 East 10th Street
Kansas City.

Mr. Roy Thompson,
Scarritt Building,
City

Feb. 13, 1920.

We have prepared the following table which together with blue prints herewith enclosed sets forth the results of our investigation of the Meyer Boulevard Grading from The Paseo to Swope Parkway:

Tax Bill No.	Amount of Tax Bill on		Area of Tracts Front- ing on Blvd. Acres	Area of Portion of the Tracts Within 1500 ft. of Blvd. Acres	Rate of Tax Per Acre on Tracts Fronting on Blvd.	Amount of Tax on 150 Ft. Strip if Proportional to Acreage Basis
	Tracts North of Meyer Boulevard.	Tracts South				
1.	\$ 112.10					
2.	6693.40					
3.	6558.00					
4.	1010.50		2.56	1.33	\$394.73	\$ 524.99
5.	1484.80		3.92	3.31	378.78	1253.75
6.		\$7475.80	22.72	4.67	329.04	1536.62

7.	6784.90					
8.	7540.20					
9.	2432.20		6.43	4.53	378.26	1713.51
10.		7826.40	25.79	4.53	303.47	1374.70
11.	12511.60					
12.	3075.40		10.29	4.44	298.87	1327.00
13.		6186.90	20.80	4.44	297.45	1320.67
14.	6424.00					
15.	6333.80					
16.	1551.90					
17.	1682.00		4.47	2.15	376.29	809.02
18.	2513.40		7.63	2.21	329.41	728.00
19.		4763.90	13.28	4.36	358.73	1564.05
20.	1665.30					
21.	855.80					
22.	777.20					
23.	1140.70		3.10	0.76	367.97	279.66
24.		288.70	0.83	0.76	347.83	264.35

Totals

—\$71147.20	26541.70	121.82	37.49		\$12,696.32
-------------	----------	--------	-------	--	-------------

109 Mr. Langworthy: I don't know whether I have formally offered this plat in evidence. I want to offer it together with all notations shown thereon.

Mr. Winger: That is the copy referred to in Ordinance #21831?

Mr. Langworthy: Yes.

Said plat was thereupon admitted in evidence by the Court as Plaintiff's Exhibit 12, and the same is made a part of this record and is filed herewith.

Mr. Langworthy: I also desire to offer in evidence Exhibit 13, which is a map of Kansas City, Missouri, for the year 1915. This is issued by the Board of Park Commissioners of Kansas City, Missouri, George E. Kessler, Landscape Architect. And I desire to call the Court's particular attention to the boulevards, which are marked in green showing the manner in which the boulevards throughout the city all flow into this Meyer Boulevard, which is the boulevard involved in this proceeding.

The Court thereupon admitted in evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit 13, said map of Kansas City, Missouri, issued by the Board of Park Commissioners. Said Exhibit is made a part of this record and is filed herewith.

Mr. Langworthy: Now, if the Court please, we haven't done it yet, but it is merely a matter of mathematical drawing. We introduced in evidence this morning Ordinances showing the benefit district which was used at the time the property was condemned for Meyer Boulevard, and, for convenience of the Court, we will ask Mr. Woodward to indicate on this map here the exact boundaries of these ordinances. It is a mere matter of putting it on the map and we will have that done. I think that is all I want to ask Mr. Woodward.

Mr. Woodward further testified that he is familiar with the division of the city into various park districts, and
110 that Meyer Boulevard between Brooklyn and Swope Park is located in the Swope and Southwest Park Districts, two-thirds of it being in Swope Park District and approximately one-third in the Southwest Park District.

On Cross-Examination Mr. Woodward testified as follows:

All the information shown on Exhibit 12 was on the original plat except that shown in yellow. I have added the information shown in yellow. The blue-print itself is an exact duplication.

The figures and letters just inside the exterior lines of the Boulevard represent the actual cut and fill proposed to be made at those points. The fill is indicated by the letter "F" the cut by the letter "C". The figures are in feet and decimals thereof. The grade of Meyer Boulevard from Brooklyn to Swope Parkway is substantially as shown on the plat.

111 Brooklyn and Swope Parkway are practically on the same level but the grade of the Boulevard dips down, at Prospect about 8 feet and then starts to rise again to Swope Parkway. It is practically a plane from Brooklyn to Prospect and from Prospect to Swope Parkway.

There is a profile on the lower margin of the map to indicate the grade on the north and south roadway of the Boulevard. The upper heavy line is the north roadway and the lower line is the south roadway. The roadways are 150 feet apart and the profiles are considerably different. The width of the entire Boulevard is 220 feet and the space between the roadways is perhaps 70 feet.

The dotted lines on each side of the outline of the Boulevard in white indicates the toe of the slope from the embankment made to bring the proposed Boulevard to grade, that is to say, this dotted line appearing north of the Boulevard in

Tracts 17 and 18 represents a fill at those points and that was about the toe of the slope or bottom of the slope of the proposed fill. The same is true of the dotted line just south of the Boulevard. Of the property along the north side of the Boulevard approximately 2600 of the 5500 feet is below grade. Of the property on the south side of the Boulevard approximately 3200 feet is below grade. This appears from the profile shown at the bottom of the plat.

The names on this Exhibit 12 appear just as they were shown on the original plat; they are exact copies. Those names are the names of the owners of the tracts and in some cases of the lessees.

All of the distances and areas and amounts to which I have testified have been taken from the measurements on the map and are merely computations.

112

Redirect Examination

By Mr. Langworthy:

Q. Mr. Woodward, just one or two more questions: do I understand that Meyer Boulevard from Brooklyn to Swope Park has now been graded the entire width of the boulevard. That is, between these lines indicated here the entire width of the boulevard? What I am getting at, what I want to know is, whether it has been graded, just a roadway itself, or whether it is graded for the entire width of the boulevard?

A. Graded for its entire width.

Q. Graded for its entire width; now then, I wish [to] you would state to the Court, beginning at Brooklyn or beginning at the extreme west point of Meyer Boulevard in this benefit district, state to the Court, if you can, the width of the actual roadway or road which is paved and in use on each side of the boulevard?

Mr. Bowersock: I think we are going to object to that as being entirely irrelevant.

Mr. Langworthy: It seems to me very material, because it will show a very large part of this grading was not a roadway or street at all, but grading for a park, because between these two roadways provision was made for a very large roadway or park and I think it is material for Your Honor to know what the determining issues before you are as to what part of this grading was taken for a roadway or park and what part was taken for a boulevard. We claim it was really an extension of Swope Park.

The Court: Very well. He may answer, subject to the objection.

To which last action and ruling of the Court, the Defendants, and each of them, by their counsel, at the time duly excepted, and still except.

Q. I wish you would state those figures to the Court, if you will, Mr. Woodward?

113 A. In that portion of the boulevard having a width of 220 feet, which is the greater part of its length, the roadways on both the north and south sides are 40 feet inside of the property line and these roadways are macadam, having a width of about thirty feet, which leaves, approximately eighty feet at the present time between the roadways.

Q. Do I understand that the distance between the property line and the roadway proper is about forty feet?

A. Forty feet.

Q. And then the roadway, which is about thirty feet wide?

A. About thirty.

Q. And for the parkway in between the two roadways, the width of that is about eighty feet?

A. About eighty feet.

Q. And then roadway thirty feet and then the distance to the other side? A. Yes sir.

Q. What is there between the park line and roadway, this distance of forty feet you have mentioned?

A. Both the parkways and the center parkway are now in alfalfa.

Q. In other words between the two lines of the yellow where it is 220 feet wide you have a roadway along the south line about thirty feet in width and a roadway along the north line about thirty feet in width? A. Forty.

Q. Forty; and the remaining part is just grass and alfalfa?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Now then, how is it with respect to that part of the boulevard that is five hundred feet in width just before it reaches Swope Park? There is how much taken up in roadways and how much taken up in grass or parkway?

114 A. As these roadways coming from the west approach Swope Park and in about 700 feet west of Swope Parkway they diverge, swinging out away from each other around an oval egg-shaped piece perhaps 350 feet in width and then converge again at Swope Parkway. This center parkway perhaps being 500 feet east and west and nearly 350 feet north and south.

Q. How much ground, measured, if you are able to give it, is there between the roadways just before they enter Swope Park as they widen out here at this wider part of the boulevard?

A. At their widest part I didn't measure it. My opinion is that it is at least 800 feet apart.

Q. Now what I want to get at, if you can state it, is approximately the number of acres embraced between the parkways where they separate and come around this oval egg-shaped piece you have testified to? A. Three or four acres.

Q. There is three or four acres embraced between the roadways in this wider part of the boulevard just before you enter Swope Park? A. That would be my opinion.

Q. Now are the driveways themselves of the same width at this point where they enter this part of the boulevard 500 feet in width?

A. The same width, yes; approximately 30 feet.

Q. 30 feet all the way clear up to the entrance to Swope Park? A. Yes sir.

Q. Mr. Woodward, could you state to the Court how many acres beginning now at the west end of the boulevard; that is, the west end of the benefit district, can you state to the Court how many acres there are embraced within the boundary lines of Meyer Boulevard that are in alfalfa or in grass as distinguished from the part that is actually used for roadways?

A. I would say there were perhaps twelve or fifteen acres.

Q. Twelve or fifteen acres of that number that are in grass or alfalfa? A. Yes sir.

115 Q. Now can you state the total area that is graded by Meyer Boulevard within this benefit district?

A. I have just been guessing at this, I better do a little figuring.

Q. I want you to give it as near accurate as you can?

A. Total area graded is approximately 32 acres and the total area of the roadways is approximately 9 acres, so I would have to correct my statement as to the area in alfalfa and grass and say that that area is perhaps about 23 acres instead of 12 to 15.

116 On Re-cross Examination Mr. Woodward testified as follows:

My figures as to the size of the roadways and as to the spaces between the roadways are based upon my knowledge of the conditions and the ground and are not taken from the map. This map shows the roadways according to the pro-

posed plan for improvement which was not followed in construction. The roadways are in the same position as planned except that the inner 10 feet or so of the roadways has not been constructed. Where the plan was for a roadway of 40 feet in width the inner 10 feet has been left off to be added when the traffic so warranted. The entire roadway might be paved for traffic and the entire space between the roadways could be paved if the traffic so demanded. Up to date, however, there has not been as much paving of the highway as the original plans called for.

Thereupon Complainants offered in evidence certain extracts from the official public report of the Board of Park Commissioners for the year 1914. This was admitted in evidence over the objection of the defendants.

At page 32 and at pages 42 to 46 inclusive of said report.

The extracts admitted are shown. At page 32 of said report appears the following.

"From the Paseo east into the 65th Street entrance to Swope Park, this width is 220 feet and its improvement as planned carries two roadways with a central parking between, thus diversifying the line. This great east and west reach receives practically all of the north and south lines of Boulevards and parkways. Every one of these lines of boulevards and parkways throughout the entire system are really merely connections between Swope Park on the southeast and the business district of the city on the northwest."

At pages 42 to 46 of said report appears the following:

117

"Swope Park

Since 1896, the year in which Mr. Swope's munificence secured to Kansas City its great outlying playground, the community has spent a very considerable sum in the development of this property. Its 1332 acres, however, requires so long a time and so great means that comparatively little has really been accomplished.

With this, however, the property has been constantly increasing in favor of the public and used to such a very great extent that material further improvement becomes essential with every year.

Today the northwesterly area of the park is well provided with roadways, with great picnic groves and the bluegrass meadows characteristic of this section of the country. It

has even with those comparatively limited improvements become so attractive in all its forms of recreation and good appearance that the Kansas City public with every opportunity makes most liberal use of this as a playground.

The presence of the Zoological Park within this property has established in its northern district a center to which everyone comes. Its roadway system to that point is excellent. The Zoo is serving as a tremendously attractive feature. With it there should be an aquarium display as well as the animals and birds, becoming a part of the Zoo group of buildings already in place. In addition to this there should be provision for a possible botanical garden with its display of outdoor as well as indoor plants. This will in time require a group of fine conservatories aside from the propagating houses now serving from Swope Park the entire park system.

118 The temporary nine-hole golf course along 67th Street has proven an exceedingly valuable factor in the property's use. The presence of the Shelter Building and its surrounding great gardens, the temporary Refectory Building and the extremely valuable picnic shelter building have all centered practically all of the use of the place in the northern and western section. One minor feature of astonishing importance in the improvement of the property has been in the picnic use of the place. This use has been very greatly facilitated and made comfortable with the existence on the picnic spots of the outdoor cook stoves, giving opportunity for picnic parties to eat their own cooking at these points. The development of the Lagoon in the natural depression of the lowlands east of Blue River has begun to establish another great play center on that district of the northern section of the park. This is made directly accessible so far by a pedestrian bridge across the Blue, and the athletic field, together with the Polo field, boat house and general play field have proven exceedingly attractive. The later development and practical completion this year of the new 18-hole golf course on the hills and within the forest on the eastern boundary, further develops the easterly play fields of this great park.

Every additional area brought into use accentuates the necessity for further means of access. Primarily, of course, this calls for roadways and upon their completion the necessary pathway leading from the street railway terminus to all of the play centers.

In connection with these necessities, your particular attention is called to the need of roadway crossings and pathway

crossings over the two steam railways, which together occupy a 100 foot right-of-way through the park, and crossing over the Blue River. The needs in this respect for many years 119 to come will be amply served by two bridges—one across the railroad and the Blue together on a line which is approximately 64th Street, northeastward of the Zoo and tying the northern section of the park with the playfields and The Lagoon on the east and connecting directly thereby with the Blue Ridge Road which enters the park at its northeastern corner. That portion of this bridge which should span the Blue River may and in the judgment of the writer should be in the form of a memorial, which would give at least a small expression of gratitude to the donor of this great property. The second, and perhaps even still more important bridge at this time is the one prepared for across the railroads and the Blue River where these are adjoining on the line of 71st Street. This line is the thoroughfare from the north and west through the park to the south and east and is absolutely essential in order to replace an old iron country bridge which is not hardly sufficient to properly care for the increasingly great travel on that road, in doing this making possible the elimination of a grade crossing of the two railroads which is and always has been extremely dangerous to all who use this crossing.

There are numerous points of extremely great interest in Swope Park deserving of development and use. None of these, particularly south and southeast, will become available until roadways long planned for are built. Each year by a systematic development of particular sections, material improvements should be accomplished. Even then it will require several generations to complete the improvements which might be considered as a completion of this park.

120 The building of the street railway, extending this service from Swope Parkway eastward along 67th Street to the head of the Zoological Park, brings about the need for further improvement at that point. The plans have long provided for a park drive adjoining on the north and parallel with this street railway line. In connection therewith, there is also planned what is known as The Mall—a wide shaded pathway with all its attendant conveniences, seats and minor embellishments, that will naturally and comfortably bring the pedestrians from the gardens and shelter on the west to the Zoo and to less formal gardens and resting place on the bridge to the west of the Zoo which will form the feature of the eastern end of The Mall, as proposed.

From Swope Parkway across the northern boundary of the park for a distance of a fraction over a quarter of a mile there has been completed the boundary park drive with its formal lawn and tree space between that and the distinctive boulevard which serves as the service highway to the abutting private properties on the north. This illustrates one feature of the completion of the boundary surrounding Swope Park. At such time as the City may be able and as quickly as it is possible to supply the funds, the entire boundary line of Swope Park should be similarly improved—not necessarily with double roadways, but with a fine highway dividing the private from the public properties throughout and wherever the topographical conditions of the boundary line make it possible. While necessarily this cannot be accomplished immediately and all at one time, yet there should be consistent effort in the direction of the acquisition of some rights-of-way. The great park properties of the country are all somewhat remote. Because of this, private lands on their boundaries are only slowly developed. The neglect of fine completion of the public ground on the boundaries of these great parks has, therefore, invariably led to an indifference or very poor development of the private lands on their boundaries. This should not happen with Swope Park. The boundaries should be given constant and early attention.

Respectfully submitted,

GEORGE E. KESSLER,

Landscape Architect."

122 Mr. Woodward stated on Redirect Examination that according to the map of Kansas City, identified as Exhibit 13 there are in Kansas City approximately 30 or 35 miles of boulevards which would naturally lead into Meyer Boulevard and which have to depend upon, as their shortest line, Meyer Boulevard to get into Swope Park and beyond.

CARRIE SINGER ABERNATHY, being duly sworn and examined on behalf of the Complainants testified as follows:

My name is Carrie Singer Abernathy. I am the owner of the two tracts of land referred to on this plat as Tracts 14 and 15, at 63rd Street and Prospect Avenue in Kansas City, Missouri, containing approximately 40 acres. The improvements on the land consist of my home and a stable. The property is also fenced. I have lived on the land ever since 1915 and before that time.

Mr. Langworthy: Mrs. Abernathy, will you state to the Court what use you make of Meyer Boulevard in going to and from your home to the various places that you may go whether to town or otherwise.

Mr. Bowersock: I wish to object to that as being incompetent as to what use she actually makes of the Boulevard, that question is not one that is proper. The question is not what use is actually made but what use may be made or can be made of the Boulevard.

The Court permitted the witness to answer over the said objection.

Mrs. Abernathy then continued: We do not use Meyer Boulevard at all. 64th Street is not through, nor is 65th Street. Brooklyn is paved but has no entrance to 123 Meyer Boulevard. The only entrance to our place comes in on Olive. The house virtually would be on Wabash and the driveway comes in on Olive from 63rd Street and in going to and from town we go out the driveway on Olive and go east on 63rd Street to Prospect and take Prospect to the City. Olive and Wabash are not marked on this plat but they are streets which if put through would come through our place between Brooklyn and Prospect extending north and south. People coming to and from our place, guests for example, and people coming for the purpose of making deliveries come out Prospect, not over Meyer Boulevard. Prospect is in excellent condition and people use Prospect in coming out. They do not come out the Paseo because 63rd Street is impassible from the west, impassible because of the paving. The pavement on 63rd Street has been in bad condition for several years.

Mr. Langworthy: Mrs. Abernathy, did you have any knowledge or notice of a suit brought in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri which is referred to as Cause No. 90628, entitled "In the Matter of Grading of Meyer Boulevard" did you have notice of that.

Mr. Bowersock: You mean legal notice? We object to that question.

Mr. Langworthy: I am asking her whether she had any actual notice.

Mr. Bowersock: I object to that as being immaterial.

The Court: Overruled; proceed.

Thereupon the witness proceeded as follows:

I had not, I had no notice. I was not given any notice of any proceedings had by the Board of Public Works with reference to the assessment or the placing of an assessed value on my property for the purposes of this proceeding or for the purposes of apportioning the assessment against my property. I did not know anything about the City

124 Assessor making an assessment assessing the value of my property for the purpose of this proceeding.

The south 20 acres of my tract is in timber and I think has temporary buildings for the stock. In the summer time there is a corn plot on the west 20 acres. In a general way the property is used for farm and pasture purposes, other than that part occupied by my residence. It is unplatted property and has no improvements on it except the residence and out-buildings in connection with the residence. This is generally true of the property out in that neighborhood. It is just open vacant property. Especially is this true of the property between my property and Meyer Boulevard.

On Cross-Examination Mrs. Abernathy testified as follows:

I have lived out on this tract something over fifteen years, on the same property. We were among the first people to purchase out there. We purchased of Mr. Harper who owned a good deal of property out there at that time. We were familiar with the land when it was bought and both Mr. Abernathy and myself were very much interested in it. We did not have the pick of all the ground out there but we had a chance to buy the corner property and then later were able to secure the other 20. By the corner property I mean the cleared 20 acres southwest of the corner of Prospect and 63rd Street. We first bought the tract on Prospect, just 20 acres. That was our pick of the ground out there. Then later we bought the other 20 acres.

The house we live in is toward the north of the east 20. The house stands in about the center of the north 10 acres of the tract. There is nothing at all on the south 10 acres of south of what would be 65th Street. 64th Street is the dividing line of the 10 acres. South of 64th Street there is just vacant land. North of 64th Street is our house

125 and the lawn around the house. The west 20 acres is all timber except for a little cleared at the south end of it. We are not farming the property at all except to keep a little stock and a little garden. The house is a large stone house with red tile roof.

64th Street is not yet open. Prospect Avenue is paved in front of our property down to Meyer Boulevard. Brooklyn was paved by the property owners some years ago, but since Meyer Boulevard was cut through we cannot get down possibly, there is no entrance onto Meyer Boulevard from Brooklyn, and there is no entrance from 65th Street west into Meyer Boulevard. You can't get through from Brooklyn, you can get through only on 63rd Street. As our ground is now being used the entrance to our driveway is on 63rd Street, considerably west of Prospect, approximately at 63rd Street and Olive.

Thereupon Complainants offered in evidence a certain contract between the Fidelity Trust Company on the one part and The Standard Investment Company and H. M. Merriwether, S. C. Delap and Gilmer Merriwether on the other part.

This contract was admitted in evidence over the Defendants' objections as Plaintiffs' Exhibit 15. It is in words and figures as follows:

126 Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 15

Agreement

This Agreement made and entered into this 11th day of December, 1915, by and between the Standard Investment Company, a corporation, Gilmer Meriwether, Hunter M. Meriwether and S. C. DeLap, parties of the first part, and Fidelity Trust Company, a corporation, party of the second part, witnesseth:

Whereas, the Standard Investment Company has purchased certain special tax bills to be issued by Kansas City, Missouri, for the grading of Meyer Boulevard from the west line of Swope Parkway to the East line of the Paseo, in Kansas City, Missouri, from the contractor, McMillan Contracting Company, a corporation, organized under the laws of Illinois, and authorized to do business in Missouri, at Ninety (90) cents on the Dollar, and One Thousand (\$1,000.00) Dollars in addition thereto, and

Whereas, the Fidelity Trust Company is willing to finance its grading contract upon certain terms and conditions hereinafter set forth.

Now Therefore, it is mutually agreed as follows:

1. The parties of the first part will have the contractor make a written assignment of the tax bills to be issued for

the doing of said work to the Fidelity Trust Company and will have said assignments accepted by the proper City Authorities.

2. The party of the second part will furnish to the contractor from time to time as the work progresses sums of money not to exceed in the aggregate, however, Sixty (60) per cent of the total contract price of the work to be done, said money to be used in paying the payrolls and necessary labor and material bills for the doing of said work. All such money will only be furnished upon the notes of the contractor who shall pay interest to the Fidelity Trust Company at such rates as may be agreed upon between the contractor
127 and the Fidelity Trust Company, such rates of interest, however, not to be less than six (6) per cent.

3. The parties of the first part will look after the doing of said work and oversee the payrolls so that the money furnished by the Fidelity Trust Company will be properly used in paying for the work contemplated by the contract, and will look after the progress of the work generally to see that the contractor complies with the ordinances and contract under which the work is being done, and if necessary, will assist the contractor in getting extensions of time upon its contract.

4. The parties of the first part hereby guarantee the prompt payment of all notes and interest thereof executed by the contractor to the Fidelity Trust Company representing money loaned under the terms of this agreement to enable the contractor to carry on the work aforesaid.

5. The parties of the first part will see that the tax bills are properly issued by the City authorities and are delivered to the Fidelity Trust Company when the work has been completed, and thereupon the party of the second part will pay to the contractor the balance due under his contract with the Standard Investment Company for the purchase of said tax bills, after charging said contractor with all previous advancements and interest, said balance not to be paid to the contractor, however, until he has assigned said tax bills in blank upon the bills themselves.

6. At the time of the assignment and delivery of the tax bills to it, the party of the second part will pay to the Standard Investment Company, without any interest, one-half of the difference between the par value of the bills received and the amount paid for them in accordance with the contract of purchase, except on the tax bills issued against property now

owned by Thomas H. Swope. It is understood that Thomas H. Swope has a contract with the Contractor by the terms of which he has the option of taking up the tax bills issued against the property belonging to him at this time in the benefit district prescribed in said proceeding at 95 per cent of the face of said tax bills, provided he exercises his option within ten days from the date of the issuance of said tax bills. If said Thomas H. Swope exercise his option, said Fidelity Trust Company will only pay to the Standard Investment Company, without any interest, one-half of the difference between 95 per cent of the face of the tax bills issued against property now belonging to Thomas H. Swope and the amount paid for said tax bills in accordance with the contract of purchase. In determining the amount paid for said tax bills, the sum of One Thousand (\$1000.00) Dollars which is paid to the contractor for said tax bills in addition to the payment of 90 per cent of the face of said tax bills shall be pro rated in accordance with the total face value of the tax bills issued and the face value of the tax bills issued against property now owned by Thomas H. Swope.

7. If there is any loss in collecting such tax bills so as to reduce the returns received by the Fidelity Trust Company from the tax bills to less than the face of said tax bills and 6 per cent interest per annum thereon, then the parties of the first part will stand one-half of such loss and shall refund to the Fidelity Trust Company one-half of the difference between the face of the tax bills so purchased with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum and the amount actually received by the Fidelity Trust Company therefor. In case any law suits are brought to collect said tax bills, or any of them, or involving their validity in any manner, said parties of the first part shall be responsible for one-half of all costs and fees of whatever nature, including attorneys fees, which the Fidelity Trust Company may incur by reason of such suits, and such costs and fees may be taken into consideration in determining whether or not the returns received by the Fidelity Trust Company from the tax bills are less than the face of said tax bills and 6% interest per annum thereon. If not less, after deducting all such attorney's fees and expenses, the parties of the first part shall not be liable for any part of such fees and expenses. An actual sale of these tax bills by the Fidelity Trust Company by which it realizes the face of said tax bills and 6 percent interest per annum thereon shall discharge the parties of the first part

from any obligation to stand any portion of any loss which may eventually result from the collection of said tax bills. The sale or transfer of said tax bills, or any of them, to the Concordia Loan & Trust Company of Missouri, a corporation, or to the Land Credit Trust Company, a corporation, all of the stock of which companies is owned by the Fidelity Trust Company, shall not be considered an actual sale so far as the parties hereto are concerned. The pledging of said tax bills, or any of them, by the Concordia Loan & Trust Company of Missouri, or the Land Credit Trust Company, as security for the debentures issued against them shall not be considered by the parties hereto as an actual sale of these tax bills. Any loss sustained by either the Concordia Loan & Trust Company of Missouri or the Land Credit Trust Company in the collection of said tax bills shall be considered between the parties hereto as a loss sustained by the Fidelity Trust Company.

In Witness Whereof, the parties have hereunto subscribed their names to this agreement the day and year first above written.

STANDARD INVESTMENT
COMPANY,

By S. C. DeLap (Signed)
President.

Attest:

H. M. Meriwether, (Signed)
Secretary.

H. M. Meriwether
S. C. DeLap
Gilmer Meriwether
Fidelity Trust Company
By Henry C. Flower, (Signed)
President.

Attest:

W. F. Comstock, Secretary.

130 WALTER DOBBS being duly sworn and examined on behalf of the Complainants, testified as follows:

My business is that of commercial photographer. I am with the Acme Photo Company at the present time. I have taken certain photographs along Meyer Boulevard between Brooklyn and Swope Parkway at Mr. Thomson's request. These photographs were taken about a year ago. The photograph

marked Exhibit 16 is made from just south of Meyer Boulevard looking east at a point about Brooklyn, I would judge. Exhibit 17 is made from the same point approximately except that it is looking northeast instead of east. Exhibit 18 is looking east from a point just west of Prospect Avenue on the south side of Meyer Boulevard. Exhibit 19 is looking almost north, a little east, from a point just west of Prospect Avenue on the south side of Meyer Boulevard. Exhibit 20 is looking east on Meyer Boulevard from between the drives about a block or a block and a half west of Swope Park entrance. It shows the entrance to Swope Park. Exhibit 21 is taken from the entrance of Swope Park looking west. It shows the roadways as they curve around as they come toward the entrance to Swope Park. Exhibit 22 is made from a point about two blocks north and west of the entrance of Swope Park looking northwest, showing a point near the center of the photograph which is what I believe is golf links or golf course, wherever that is. It is taken from the north of Meyer Boulevard, probably two blocks north and west of Swope Park about the same distance as near as I can remember. Exhibit 23 is taken from a point a little further north from Exhibit 22 looking southwest. These photographs correctly represent what they purport to represent.

Complainants thereupon offered in evidence the photographs referred to by the witness and they were admitted in evidence as Exhibits 16 to 23 inclusive, and are hereto attached and made a part hereof.

131 On Cross-Examination Mr. Dobbs testified as follows:

Mr. Thomson picked out the locations from which to take these photographs; he was with me at the time. He picked out the locations and the directions in which to point the camera. From some of the pictures you can tell something about the cuts and fills along the boulevard. Exhibit 17 is taken from a point above the level of Meyer Boulevard. It is taken on a bank just south. From the shady parts in the picture I can tell something about the height of the bank. Also from Exhibit 18. It is clear that the bank is about 8 feet above the boulevard, or perhaps 6 or 7 feet. The poles shown in the pictures are trolley poles on Prospect Avenue. The camera is up as high as the white line on the poles. In Exhibit 18 the dark place at the right of the shelter house as it appears in the picture is a cut. I would judge that it is a cut of about 4 feet. There is nothing in the picture to indicate whether the cut is 4 feet or 6 feet or 10 feet.

132 GARRETT ELLISON being duly sworn and examined on behalf of the Complainants, testified as follows:

I have lived in Kansas City, Missouri, 55 years. For the last 35 years of that time I have been actively engaged in the real estate business. I have been familiar with real estate and real estate values in and around Kansas City for a number of years. I have recently examined and gone over the benefit district provided for in this proceeding, and the property generally in that vicinity. I have further made a study of the situation as it exists out there, and as it has existed during the past few years.

In a general way it may be said that 95% or more of the population of Kansas City is north of Meyer Boulevard as compared with the portion of the population south of the Boulevard. About 98% of the area of the City is north of the Boulevard; perhaps also 98% of the population. About the same percentage of the population lies north of 63rd Street.

With regard to the improvements on the tracts in the benefit district as shown in Exhibit 12 I would state that on Tract 14 is the Abernathy home; on Tract 1 is a church and parsonage. The property is all vacant with these exceptions. No houses or improvements have been built in this district since Meyer Boulevard was graded and put in shape for use, which was in 1915 or 1916. The use to which Meyer Boulevard had been put since it has been graded and paved is as the Main entrance to Swope Park. The travel over Meyer Boulevard to Swope Park is the outlet largely of the boulevards running north and south through the City. The traffic is very largely from the City at large practically, all from the City at large. On Sunday afternoons and Holidays as well as on days during the week large numbers of people go to Swope Park and there is a continuous procession east and west on this boulevard. Swope Park, as we all know, is the great play-ground of Kansas City. It is a very large park containing approximately 1200 acres. It was donated to Kansas City by Thomas Swope a good many years ago, about 1896. Meyer Boulevard is the main entrance to Swope Park from the City. Entering the Park the road diverges, one road going on the west to the shelter house and the other continuing east down towards the band stand and play grounds. There are two public golf links within the Park; there are driveways all around through it. It is a large park to which the people naturally go on Holidays as a public play-ground.

The section south of the Boulevard away from the City would naturally use the Boulevard more than the property north of it. The Boulevard is primarily an entrance from the City at large to Swope Park. The property east of Brooklyn Avenue to Swope Park and south of the Boulevard would naturally use the Boulevard in going to and from the city more than the property north of it.

Mr. Langworthy: Q. Now, referring to the tracts north of the Boulevard which do not abut on the Boulevard, I call your attention particularly first to Tracts numbered 14 and 15 known as the Abernathy tract. I wish you would state to the Court whether in your opinion that tract received any special benefit as distinguished from general benefits received by the community at large by virtue of the improvement consisting of the grading of Meyer Boulevard. I want you in answering the question to distinguish between the improvement benefit arising from the condemnation, confining it only to the benefit, if any, arising from the actual grading of Meyer Boulevard.

134 Mr. Bowersock: I object to that as calling for the conclusion of the witness and as being contrary to the provisions of the Charter as to the method of determining benefits.

Mr. Langworthy: Well, if I can show there were no special benefits received by this property, that they didn't amount to 5c and were assessed for \$12,000 it seems to me it is of some importance to Your Honor in determining whether or not that benefit district is an unreasonable benefit district.

The Court: I will hear the evidence. The objection is overruled. You may answer it.

To which last action and ruling of the Court the defendants and each of them by their counsel at the time duly excepted.

A. The benefit accruing from Meyer Boulevard to Tracts 14 and 15 is largely a general benefit. There may be a very slight local benefit, but it would be very small. The property would have brought very little more after this improvement than before, if any. Before this improvement was made there were two ways of reaching Swope Park, one going from Swope Parkway to 63rd Street. 63rd Street was a heavily traveled thoroughfare at that time, but since Meyer Boulevard was graded that traffic has very largely left it and gone to Meyer Boulevard. However, that is partly accounted for by the fact that 63rd Street at present is badly out of repair. But

immediately after the building of Meyer Boulevard the car traffic left 63rd and went over to Meyer Boulevard.

The same rule applies in my judgment to Tract 11 as to Tracts 14 and 15. That is, after the improvement the property would not have sold on the market for any appreciable amount more because of the grading. The same situation also applies to Tract No. 8 and Tracts 2 and 3. I think the benefit from Meyer Boulevard to those tracts, that is the special benefit, was very slight.

135 Swope Parkway is a street 150 feet wide east of Tracts 2 and 3, with a double street car tract in the center and a paved roadway on either side, with sidewalks and curbing. Prior to the opening of Meyer Boulevard, Swope Parkway was the leading thoroughfare to Swope Park. It was graded and paved and was used by people going through the Park. After Meyer Boulevard was completed the traffic over Swope Parkway very largely left it and went to Meyer Boulevard; probably 75 or 80% of vehicle traffic left Swope Parkway. Of course the street car traffic was not affected. In my opinion the opening of Meyer Boulevard had a detrimental effect on the two tracts which fronted on Swope Parkway, that is, it had a detrimental effect on their selling value. The grading of Meyer Boulevard would, I think, be a serious damage to the property abutting on Swope Parkway inasmuch as traffic was taken off of Swope Parkway. I think in time the frontage of Swope Parkway would become business property. Tracts 2 and 3 lend themselves very nicely to some large development. The sale of property on Swope Parkway south of Meyer Boulevard from the south line is developing now and is business property as is reflected in the prices asked for the property. If it were possible to convert the Swope Parkway frontage of Tracts 2 and 3 into business property that would have a damaging effect on the balance of Tracts 2 and 3 for residence purposes for the reason that business always hurts residence property. If any advantage was gained by reason of converting Swope Parkway and the frontage of these tracts into business you would get an equally detrimental effect and the balance of the tracts would be less desirable for residence purposes and sell for less money.

The lessening of traffic on Swope Parkway would not in my opinion damage Tracts 2 and 3 very much as residence property.

136 Mr. Langworthy: Mr. Ellison, will you state what in your opinion was the extent of the special benefit re-

ceived by property abutting on the Boulevard by virtue of and as a result of the improvement consisting of the grading of Meyer Boulevard.

Upon objection made by the defendants to the admission of the testimony called for by the question the Court ruled as follows:

The Court: It seems to me he can inquire as to comparative actual benefits as to these different tracts and these different locations.

Mr. Bowersock: Mr. Ellison, was all the property abutting on the Boulevard equally benefited whether below grade or above grade or on grade?

Witness: No, sir.

Mr. Bowersock: Then I object to a general statement on the part of the witness as to what benefit the property abutting the Boulevard received.

The Court: He can take the question of grade into consideration in making his answer. He can testify as to the general rule subject to general conditions which may exist as to a specific piece of property.

Witness: A. The major part of the property facing or abutting on the Boulevard in a general way received the greater part of this benefit from the grading of the Boulevard. Then the property next to that was the property south. The nearer to the Boulevard the greater the benefit. Next to that the property north and the further you reside north the less the special benefit.

The Court: Q. Now, Mr. Ellison, how would that be affected if property fronting on the Boulevard was in a disadvantageous position with respect to grade?

Witness: A. Of course, where some of these grades, 137 these cuts and fills are very heavy the property is practically worthless. Where the cut, for instance in the 23rd Street Traffic-way is 50 feet, in that case I testified that that property is ruined, its value taken away, and in that case we allowed the property owner the full value. No such cuts or fills exist on Meyer Boulevard as I refer to on the 23rd Street Trafficway.

The Court: Are there any such cuts and fills as would seriously influence your view as to the benefit accruing?

Witness: A. Of course the grading of the Boulevard would make the corners more valuable on the Boulevard and there is a great deal wider space graded than there is within the limits of the Boulevard itself. They graded back on either side quite a ways, just how far back I don't know.

Mr. Langworthy: As a matter of fact, just taking these pictures to refresh your recollection isn't the property on both sides of the Boulevard practically of the same depth throughout its entire length?

Mr. Bowersock: I object to that. The profile shows what the cuts and fills are and the photographs do not.

The Court: Well, I think the best evidence of that is the mathematical situation as shown by the plat.

Witness: I don't think the plat shows the exact condition there from the fact it shows the condition there at the time that the grade was contemplated, but in grading through there they graded and filled beyond the limits of the Boulevard.

Mr. Bowersock: I certainly object to any testimony of that kind.

The Court: I have before me what the plans and specifications were and I want also to hear what the actual situation is there as bearing upon the situation of the land after this improvement. As to how the contractor left the land, the presumption is he did the work pursuant to his contract.

138 Witness: Well, Your Honor, he did go back a good deal more, he graded back from those lots for a considerable distance. In driving along the Boulevard from Brooklyn to the Pasea all the property seems apparently very close to grade. Back from the Boulevard there are places where it is below grade. To the north it is above grade. When I drove by there immediately after the grading of the Boulevard I found that someone had graded back for a long distance on either side, but abutting the lines of the Boulevard the property is left practically all on the grade of the Boulevard.

Mr. Bowersock: I object to that as not referring to any lot specified or named in the petition or any lot covered by these proceedings or applied to any lot with which any comparison can be made.

The Court: Of course I don't think the court can pass on a situation of that kind except by some specific description of the property to be graded or platted.

On Cross-Examination Mr. Ellison testified as follows:

Tracts 2 and 3 are principally residence property. It is all residence property at the present time with a tendency for some business to come in on Swope Parkway. If business should come in on Swope Parkway that would tend to injure the rest of the property as residence property.

This property north of Meyer Boulevard and up to 63rd Street is at the present time beautiful land for residence purposes and is high and beautifully located.

Prior to the construction of Meyer Boulevard traffic on Swope Parkway near the entrance to the Park was very congested. Swope Parkway was the main entrance to Swope Park. The opening of Meyer Boulevard has very materially decreased the traffic on Swope Parkway.

The land south of Meyer Boulevard, say for example 139 that in parcels 6 and 10 slopes to the south towards 67th Street. Tracts 13 and 19 also slope to the south. 67th Street all along is lower than Meyer Boulevard, quite a little lower. South of 67th Street the property is built up and the streets are improved. The land south of 67th Street has been platted and is considerably occupied by homes. The residences there are medium priced until you get down to 67th Street and Swope Parkway where there is a business center.

Mr. Bowersock: Now you testified you thought a major part of the benefits, as I remember it, the greater part of the benefit to the property there from the building of Meyer Boulevard was to the property next to the boulevard?

Witness: Yes sir.

Mr. Bowersock: This plat, Mr. Ellison, at about the middle of Tract 6 shows a fill on Meyer Boulevard of 26 feet.

Witness: Those cuts and fills at the present time aren't apparent from the Boulevard.

Mr. Bowersock: If there is a fill of 26 feet or of 22 feet or 17 feet there can you run a street through Tract 6 up into Meyer Boulevard as a practical matter?

Witness: If those facts exist all through that tract, it would be difficult. You could run them of course.

Mr. Bowersock: The plat shows here in Tract 13 that there is a cut of 16, 17 and 18 feet along there for a considerable distance of two or three hundred feet.

Witness: That is largely graded out now. I don't know the conditions of course under which it was graded down. I don't know whether the owner of the lot paid for the grading or not. When the street was opened up however it was in that condition. There is a very severe grade from 67th Street up to Meyer Boulevard.

Mr. Bowersock: If you had to go from Tract 10 down 140 to 67th Street onto what is now Swope Parkway and over to Meyer Boulevard the distance from Tract 10 to Meyer Boulevard would be practically as far as the distance from Tract 14 to Meyer Boulevard wouldn't it?

Witness: The difference between those two tracts is this, that people residing on Tract 10 go north and west to the City the same as 14. 14 wouldn't come to Meyer Boulevard at all while 10 would. If 63rd Street were in good condition as it was for a long time I think people would go west to the Paseo instead of East to Prospect. The condition of the streets makes a difference of course in the route which people will travel.

The property along Meyer Boulevard is all susceptible of being divided up into fine residence property when it is properly graded and platted.

Plaintiffs thereupon offered in evidence a certified copy of all record entries in Cause No. 90627, in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri.

The evidence was objected to by the defendants as being immaterial to any issue in the case but the objection was overruled and the certified copy admitted as Plaintiffs' Exhibit 24, which is substantially as follows:

141

Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 24.

Be It Remembered that on the 33rd day of the regular January Term, 1915, of the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, at Kansas City, the same being the 17th day of February, 1915, the following proceedings were had and made of record before Hon. Thomas J. Seehorn, Presiding Judge of Assignment Division in the cause entitled.

Assignment Division

In the matter of the proceedings under ordinance of Kansas City, Missouri, No. 21831, approved January 28, 1915, entitled: "An Ordinance to grade Meyer Boulevard from the West line of Swope Parkway to the East line of The Paseo, etc."

No. 90627.

Now comes Kansas City, Missouri, by its Assistant City Counselor, Jay M. Lee, and files with the Court a certified copy of the aforesaid Ordinance; also a map or plat descriptive of said proceedings.

Thereupon, it is ordered by the Court that this proceeding be and now is assigned to Division numbered Nine (9) of this Court, for further hearing herein.

On the 33rd day of the January Term, 1915, the same being February 17th, 1915, the following further proceedings were had and made of record in Division Number Nine, in said cause No. 90627.

Now, on this 17th day of February, 1915, in this the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, at Kansas City, in Division No. 9, comes Kansas City, Missouri, by its Assistant City Counselor, Jay M. Lee, and shows to the Court that its Mayor has caused to be filed in this court a certified copy of the aforesaid Ordinance No. 21831, approved January 26, 1915, together with a statement by map containing a correct description of the several lots or parcels of private property within the benefit limits prescribed by said Ordinance, and the court thereupon makes the following order herein, to-wit:

To All Persons Whom It May Concern, Greeting:

Whereas, a certified copy of an ordinance of Kansas City, Missouri, numbered 21831, approved January 26, 1915, entitled: "An ordinance to Grade Meyer Boulevard from the West line of Swope Parkway to the East line of The Paseo and to condemn easements to support embankments or fills, describing the nature of the improvement, providing how the cost thereof shall be paid, and prescribing the limits within which private property is deemed charged to pay damages caused by said grading, and by the condemnation of said easements, and assessed and charged to pay the cost of said improvement," was by the Mayor of Kansas City, Missouri,

caused to be filed and presented to this Division No. 9 of the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, at Kansas City, the general object and nature of said Ordinance being to provide for the grading of the aforesaid Meyer Boulevard from the west line of Swope Parkway to the east line of The Paseo, to the established grade thereof and for the condemnation of easements to support embankments or fills, as specified in said ordinance, and providing that said proposed improvement shall be paid for in special tax bills against the lands chargeable therewith according to law, as provided by the Charter of Kansas City, and particularly as provided in Section 28, Article VIII of said Charter, and for the ascertaining and assessing of damages and benefits that may arise from said proposed improvement; and that private property may be disturbed or damaged by said proposed improvement and the owner or owners thereof and parties interested may be entitled to remuneration or damages; and that the limits prescribed and determined by said ordinance within which private property is deemed benefited by said proposed improvement and may be assessed to pay said remuneration are as follows, to-wit:

(Here Follows Description of Benefit District As Shown in Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 12)

Now, therefore, all and each of you are hereby notified that the 8th day of March, 1915, is the day, and the courtroom of Division No. 9 of this Court in the County Court House in Jackson County, Missouri, at Kansas City, in the place hereby fixed by said Court for the ascertaining and assessing of the damages and benefits that may arise from said proposed improvement, and from the condemnation of said easements, and that unless before the day set for the hearing as aforesaid, or before the day to which said cause may be postponed or continued, you file with the Clerk of said Court your claims or claims for damages, containing a description of the property claimed to be damaged and the interest of the claimant therein, you and each of you shall be forever precluded from making any claim for remuneration on account thereof, and that property assessed with benefits to pay such remuneration will be sold if the assessment is not paid.

The Court further orders that this order be published in each issue of The Daily Record, the newspaper at the time doing the city printing, for ten (10) days, the last insertion to be not more than one (1) week prior to the day herein fixed for said hearing, and a copy of this order be served as by the Charter of said city provided, on each and every resident of

the city owning or having an interest in the real estate fronting on that part of the aforesaid Meyer Boulevard proposed to be graded under these proceedings.

On the 46th day of the January Term, 1915, the same being March 5th, 1915, the following further proceedings were had and made of record in Cause No. 90627.

144 Comes now Thomas H. Swope, as owner of property affected by this proceeding, and files herein his claim for damages.

And comes R. W. Hoeker as owner of property affected by this proceedings, and files herein his claim for damages.

On the 1st day of the March Term, 1915, the same being March 8th, 1915, the following further proceedings were had and made of record in Cause No. 90627.

Now on this 8th day of March, 1915, in this the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, at Kansas City, in Division numbered Eight (8), comes the said Kansas City by its City Counselor, and come all persons and parties concerned herein.

And the said Kansas City now files and submits to the Court proof of lawful publication and personal service of the orders of the Court herein made on the 17th day of February, 1915, and the Court finds that same were made as the law requires and deems no further notice herein advisable.

And for good cause shown, it is ordered that this proceeding be, and it now is adjourned to Monday, the 15th day of March, 1915, at 9:30 o'clock in the morning of said day, at the aforesaid court room, to empanel a jury herein.

On the 7th day of the March Term, 1915, the same being March 15th, 1915, the following further proceedings were had and made of record in Cause No. 90627.

Now on this 15th day of March, 1915, in this the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, at Kansas City, in Division numbered Nine (9), comes the said Kansas City by

its City Counselor, and comes all persons and parties
145 concerned herein;

Thereupon, the Court duly chooses as the board of commissioners herein, G. V. Musser, J. A. W. Eames, James H. Rout, J. A. Minor, Lee Koehler and C. H. Whitehead, six good and lawful men, disinterested freeholders in the said Kansas City, well qualified, who now appearing in Court, are duly sworn and empaneled as the board of commissioners herein.

And the Court directs the said Board of Commissioners to examine personally all property claimed to be damaged by the proposed grading as well as that to be assessed with benefits in this proceeding before making its report, and to return into court at the aforesaid courtroom on Monday, the 24th day of March, 1915, at 9:30 o'clock in the morning of said day; to which time and place, for good cause shown, it is ordered that this proceeding be and it now is adjourned, for trial.

On the 11th day of the March Term, 1915, the same being March 19th, 1915, the following further proceedings were had and made of record, in cause No. 90627.

Comes Nannie B. Harper, Rachael Z. Furnish and Elizabeth H. Furnish and file herein their claims for damages.

On the 19th day of March Term, 1915, the same being March 29th, 1915, the following further proceedings were had and made of record in cause No. 90627.

Now on this 29th day of March, 1915, in this the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, at Kansas City, in Division Numbered Nine (9), comes the said Kansas City, by its City Counselor, and come all persons and parties concerned herein; and comes also the board of commissioners herein.

146 The trial of this cause is now had before the Court, and said board of commissioners, and all the claims for damages, the proofs and evidence, the instructions of the Court, the arguments of counsel, and all matters are fully heard.

Thereupon, the Court directs the said board of commissioners to return into Court at the aforesaid courtroom on Saturday, the 24th day of April, 1915, at 9:30 o'clock in the

morning of said day, and to then and there render and deliver to the Court its report and verdict herein.

And for good cause shown, it is ordered that this proceeding be and now is adjourned to Saturday, April 24, 1915, at 9:30 o'clock in the morning of said day, at the aforesaid courtroom, for a verdict.

On the 41st day of the March Term, 1915, the same being April 24th, 1915, the following further proceedings were had and made of record in Cause No. 90627:

Now on this 24th day of April, 1915, in this the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, at Kansas City, in Division numbered nine (9), comes the said Kansas City, by its City Counselor, and come all persons and parties concerned in this proceeding; and comes the board of commissioners herein.

And the said Board of Commissioners now renders and delivers to the Court its report and verdict herein, which report and verdict is now filed.

On the 44th day of the March Term, 1915, the same being April 28th, 1915, the following further proceedings were had and made of record in Cause No. 90267:

Comes now Thomas H. Swope, defendant herein, and files his motion to set aside the verdict of the board of commissioners filed herein and grant a new trial hereof; also his motion in arrest of judgment.

147 On the 45th day of the March Term, 1915, the same being April 29, 1915, the following further proceedings were had and made of record in Cause No. 90627:

Comes Now R. W. Hooker, defendant herein, and files his motion to set aside the verdict of the board of commissioners herein and grant a new trial hereof.

On the 6th day of the May Term, 1915, the same being May 15th, 1915, the following further proceedings were had and made of record in Cause No. 90627.

Now on this 15th day of May, 1915, in this the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, at Kansas City, in Division numbered nine (9), comes the said Kansas City, by its City Counselor, and come all persons and parties concerned herein.

And the motion of defendant Thomas H. Swope to set aside the judgment rendered herein, and grant a new trial hereof, is by the court taken up, heard, considered and sustained, for the reason the verdict of the board of commissioners herein was against the evidence and the damages allowed inadequate; to which ruling of the Court the said Kansas City now duly excepts and objects.

And the motion of the said Thomas H. Swope in arrest of judgment, is now by the Court taken up, heard, considered and overruled; to which ruling of the Court the said Thomas H. Swope now duly excepts and objects.

And the motion of defendant, R. W. Hocker, to set aside the verdict herein rendered and grant a new trial hereof, is now by the Court taken up, heard, considered and sustained, for the reason the verdict of the board of commissioners herein was against the evidence, and the damages allowed inadequate; to which ruling of the court the said Kansas City now duly excepts and objects.

148 Thereupon, it is ordered by the Court that the verdict of the Board of Commissioners rendered herein on the 24th day of April, 1915, be, and the same is set aside and held for naught.

And for good cause shown, it is further ordered that this proceeding be and it now is adjourned to Saturday, the 22nd day of May, 1915, at 9:30 o'clock in the morning of said day, at the aforesaid courtroom, to empanel a board of commissioners herein.

And comes B. T. Whipple, and files his affidavits.

On the 12th day of the May Term, 1915, the same being May 22nd, 1915, the following further proceedings were had and made of record in Cause No. 90627.

Now on this 22nd day of May, 1915, in this the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, at Kansas City, in Divi-

sion numbered Nine (9), comes the said Kansas City by its City Counselor, and come all parties and persons concerned herein.

Thereupon, the Court duly chooses as the board of commissioners herein, William A. Wilson, Frank Updegraff, S. H. Hogsett, George H. Devol, John T. Sears and C. A. Cowan, six good and lawful men, disinterested freeholders in the said Jackson County, well qualified, who now appearing in Court, are duly sworn and empaneled as the Board of commissioners herein.

And the Court directs the said board of commissioners to examine personally all property claimed to be damaged by the proposed grading, as well as that to be assessed with benefits in this proceeding before making its report, and to return into Court at the aforesaid courtroom on Wednesday, the 2nd day of June, 1915, at 9:30 o'clock in the morning of said day, to which time and place, for good cause shown, it is ordered that this proceeding be and it now is adjourned, for trial.

149 On the 20th day of the May Term, 1915, the same being June 2nd, 1915, the following further proceedings were had and made of record in Cause No. 90627.

Now on this 2nd day of June, 1915, in this the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, at Kansas City, in Division numbered Nine (9), comes the said Kansas City by its City Counselor, and come all persons and parties concerned herein; and comes also the board of commissioner herein.

And for good cause shown, it is ordered that this proceeding be and it now is adjourned to Monday, the 14th day of June, 1915, at 9:30 o'clock in the morning of said day, at the aforesaid courtroom, for trial.

On the 30th day of the May Term, 1915, the same being June 14th, 1915, the following further proceedings were had and made of record in Cause No. 90627.

Now on this 14th day of June, 1915, in this the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, at Kansas City, in Division numbered Nine (9), comes the said Kansas City by its City Counselor, and come all persons and parties concerned herein; and comes also the board of commissioner herein.

And a trial of this cause is now had and before the said Board of Commissioners and the Court, and all the claims for damages, the proofs and evidence, the instructions of the Court, the arguments of counsel, and all matters are fully heard.

And the Court thereupon, directs the said Board of Commissioners to return into Court at the aforesaid courtroom on Monday, the 21st day of June, 1915, at 9:30 o'clock in the morning of said day, and to then and there render and deliver to the Court its report and verdict herein.

150 And for good cause shown, it is ordered that this proceeding be and it now is adjourned to Monday, June 21, 1915, at 9:30 o'clock in the morning of said day, at the aforesaid courtroom, for a verdict.

On the 35th day of the May Term, 1915, the same being June 21st, 1915, the following further proceedings were had and made of record, to-wit: Cause No. 90627.

Now on this 21st day of June, 1915, in this the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, at Kansas City, in Division numbered Nine (9), comes the said Kansas City by its City Counselor, and come all persons and parties concerned herein, and comes also all persons and parties concerned herein, and comes also the board of commissioners herein.

And the said board of commissioners now renders and delivers to the Court its report and verdict in this proceeding, which report and verdict is duly filed.

On the 38th day of the May Term, 1915, the same being June 24th, 1915, the following further proceedings were had and made of record in Cause No. 90627.

Now comes Thomas H. Swope, defendant herein, and files his motion for a new trial hereof, also his motion in arrest.

On the 46th day of the May Term, 1915, the same being July 10th, 1915, the following further proceedings were had and made of record in Cause No. 90627.

Now on this 10th day of July, 1915, in this the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, at Kansas City, in Division numbered Nine (9), comes the said Kansas City by its City Counselor, and come all persons and parties concerned herein.

151 And the motion of Thomas H. Swope, defendant herein, to set aside the verdict of the jury herein on the 21st day of June, 1915, and grant a new trial thereof, is by the Court taken up, heard, considered and overruled, to which ruling of the Court the said Thomas H. Swope now duly excepts and objects.

And the motion of the said Thomas H. Swope in arrest of Judgment herein, now by the Court taken up, heard, considered and overruled, to which ruling of the Court the said Thomas H. Swope now duly excepts and objects.

On the 47th day of the May Term, 1915, the same being September 11th, 1915, the following further proceedings were had and made of record, in Cause No. 90627.

Now on this 11th day of September, 1915, in this the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, at Kansas City, in Division numbered Nine (9), comes the said Kansas City by its City Counselor, and come all persons and parties concerned herein.

And all motions to grant a new trial hereof; all motions in arrest of judgment herein having been by the Court overruled and excepted to, and no cause to the contrary now appearing, it is considered, adjudged and decreed by the Court that the verdict of the Board of Commissioners filed herein on the 21st day of June, 1915, be, and the same hereby is in all things confirmed and approved; and said verdict is by the Court adjudged to be binding and conclusive upon each and all of the persons and parties concerned in this proceeding, and upon each and all of the persons and parties holding under
152 them, or either or any of them.

It is further ordered by the Court that said verdict be entered upon the records of this court, which is now here done, in the words and figures following, to-wit:

No. 90627.

Report of Commissioners

In the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri,

Division No. 9.

In the Matter of Grading of Meyer Boulevard

From the West Line of Swope Parkway to the East

Line of the Paseo.

The undersigned, freeholders of Kansas City, State of Missouri, having been heretofore duly appointed Commissioners

to estimate whether any, and if any, how much damage will be caused claimants herein by reason of the grading of said Meyer Boulevard in said City, as provided by Ordinance of Kansas City, No. 21831, entitled: "An Ordinance to grade Meyer Boulevard from the west line of Swope Parkway to the east line of The Paseo, and to condemn easements to support embankments or fills, describing the nature of the improvement, providing how the cost thereof shall be paid, and prescribing the limits within which private property is deemed benefited by the proposed improvement, and assessed and charged to pay damages caused by said grading, and assessed and charged to pay the cost of said improvement", and to provide for the payment of such damages, if any, by the assessment of benefits, submit this report:

Having first been duly sworn to perform the duties justly and impartially and to make a true report; and having examined personally each piece of property described on the plat offered in evidence, and all property claimed to be damaged by the proposed grading of said boulevard, we find the actual damage to each piece of property, for which a claim for damages has been filed, either for and on account of said proposed grading, or for or on account of the proposed easement, does not exceed the peculiar benefits to said property by reason of the proposed grading, and we, therefore, report no allowance of damages to any piece of property.

WM. A. WILSON,
GEORGE H. DEVOL,
FRANK UPDEGRAFF,
SAMUEL H. HOGSETT,
JOHN T. SEARS,
ARTHUR C. COWAN.

Five (5) days service.

It is now, therefore, considered, adjudged and decreed by the Court, that no person or party recover any damages on account of the grading of said Meyer Boulevard from the west line of Swope Parkway to the East line of The Paseo, and the condemnation of necessary easements, under this proceeding; that all parties and persons be, and they hereby are forever precluded from making any other or further claims for such damages.

It is further ordered that the Board of Commissioners be allowed five days service herein and discharged; that Kansas City, Missouri, pay all costs of this proceeding.

State of Missouri,
County of Jackson—ss.

I, James B. Shoemaker, Clerk of the Circuit Court, within and for the County and State aforesaid, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and complete copy of all record entries in the Matter of the proceedings under ordinance of Kansas City, Missouri, No. 21831, approved January 26, 1915, entitled: "An Ordinance to Grade Meyer Boulevard from the west line of Swope Parkway to the east line of The Paseo, etc.", as the same appears of record in my office, in Condemnation Records No. 9 at Pages No. 335-355-392-395-401-404-414-436-438-440-439-546-553-595-605-606-622 and No. 10 at Page No. 28.

154

In Witness Whereof, I hereunto set my hand and affix the seal of said Circuit Court, at office in Kansas City, this 12th day of April, A. D. 1917.

JAMES B. SHOEMAKER, Clerk.
By.....Deputy.

155 J. C. PETHERBRIDGE, being duly sworn and examined on behalf of the Complainants testified as follows:

I am one of the Assistant City Counselors of Kansas City, Missouri, and as such handle the condemnation and grading proceedings that come under the jurisdiction of the Board of Public Works. I have been Assistant City Counselor for over eight years and during all of that period have personally conducted proceedings for the grading of streets as provided under Section 3 of Article VIII of the Charter, that is the ordinary grading proceedings. I have also conducted proceedings under Section 28 of Article VIII of the Charter. I have filed probably as many as a thousand proceedings under Section 3 of Article VIII. During that same period probably 10 or a dozen or probably more proceedings have been conducted under Section 28 of Article VIII. I have handled quite a number of these myself and a few have been handled by the attorney for the Park Board. All of the big heavy grading cases are conducted under Section 28.

The Charter provides that in cases where the grading and cutting away of earth and rock is so great as to impose too heavy a burden upon the ordinary district as provided in Section 3 the Council may upon recommendation of the Board of Public Works provide for the enlarged district under Sec.

tion 28. This is done only where there is a heavy grading as there was in the Sixth Street Grading case. In that case there was at one point a cut away of about 41 feet. Sixth Street was graded from old Bluff Street to Broadway by taking off 40 feet on the south side of the bluff in some places; in other places the cut was not so great. The 23rd Street Trafficway proceedings are all through but the grading has not yet been done. The contract for the grading of
 156 23rd Street has not yet been let but when it is the tax bills will be spread over a large district created under Section 28 of Article VIII. My recollection is that the taxing district provided for in connection with the 23rd Street grading is the same as the taxing district provided for in the condemnation of land for that proceeding. The same plan was followed or contemplated in connection with the grading of McGee Street from Admiral Boulevard to 8th Street and in connection with the grading of 8th Street from Grand Avenue to Oak.

The plan followed in the grading of Main Street just south of Union Station was the old plan under Section 3 of Article VIII where the taxing district extended back approximately 150 feet. That was a great mistake. In that proceeding the property was almost confiscated and ever since that time the City has used this other plan. That was one of the largest grading projects ever undertaken by the City. The depth of the cut there at the highest point was 76 feet. The street was graded for a distance of three or four blocks.

On Cross-examination Mr. Petherbridge testified as follows:

In all of the proceedings taken by the City under Section 28 of Article VIII the title and form of the petition in the Circuit Court suit has been substantially the same. I don't mean the exact wording but I do mean that we get them up and file them in the same form. This proceeding was one of the first ones prepared. In all the subsequent proceedings under Section 28 we have followed the same form substantially.

This was one of the first proceedings. We had this sad experience on the Main Street cut to which reference has been made; that was a tremendous cut out there, a
 157 tremendous tax on the abutting property and after making a study of the situation we concluded after thoroughly investigating matters that that was inequitable, that the people living south and the people living north got

the benefit of the grading of that street as a main thoroughfare through the town, and we concluded that when other grading cases came on we would endeavor to adopt this other form of taxation because it was more equitable and the newer form has been followed in the big cases.

HERBERT V. JONES being duly sworn and examined on behalf of the Complainants testified as follows:

I have lived in Kansas City 25 years and have been engaged in the real estate business here 20 years. I have tried to keep in touch with the general situation as to real estate activities and am familiar with real estate values and the values of property generally. I have just served two terms as President of the Real Estate Board of Kansas City and am now chairman of the City Planning Commission. The duties of that commission are rather varied. We are making a study of the entire city in reference to zoning it for business, industrial and residence areas. We also have referred to us all of the plats contemplated for filing. The Commission is an official commission provided for by ordinance and appointed by the Mayor. I have had occasion from time to time to become familiar with various public projects that have been inaugurated here, such as trafficways and the condemnation of land for memorial purposes and for parks and boulevards and have served as City witness for the Park Board
158 in a number of these projects. I was one of the City's witnesses in the last condemnation proceeding to condemn land for Memorial Park. I have served on condemnation juries at times.

I have made a study of the benefit district provided for the grading of Meyer Boulevard from Brooklyn to Swope Park and have been over the property itself. The traffic over the boulevard is very largely from the City at large. Swope Park is the public play-ground of the City and on the days when the public is using that play-ground Meyer Boulevard is congested. Swope Park contains an extensive system of drive-ways, walks, lakes, lagoons, ball grounds, tennis courts and zoological museum and groves. As many as fifty to seventy-five thousand people probably frequent Swope Park on a single day Sundays and Holidays.

The other boulevards of the City empty into Meyer Boulevard. I think that without question the property within Swope Park receives special benefit by reason of the grading of Meyer Boulevard. (this testimony was admitted in evi-

dence over the objection of defendants made at the time). I think there is no question but that Swope Park is the greatest beneficiary by far in this entire proceeding. I think the entire purpose of the proceeding is to establish a connection between other parts of the city and Swope Park.

I think that considerable of the benefit from the grading of Meyer Boulevard accrued to the property lying south of Meyer Boulevard because the boulevard afforded an outlet to that property to the commercial district of the City. I think that Tracts 14 and 15 receive very little if any special benefit. They have an outlet on Prospect Avenue and on 63rd Street. It would not be the natural tendency of anyone to start away from the City in order to get to it.

From the corner of 63rd Street and Prospect Avenue
159 to the Paseo along 63rd Street is a distance of about one mile or perhaps three quarters of a mile. The distance from the corner of 63rd Street and Brooklyn to the Paseo is about half a mile. The Paseo is one of the main boulevard thoroughfares that leads to the downtown district.

I think the special benefits, if any, which accrued to Tract 11 from the grading of Meyer Boulevard were very remote. I would say that Tract 2 received absolutely no benefit from the grading. Tract 2 has a frontage on 63rd Street and Swope Parkway and at one time Swope Parkway was the main thoroughfare to the Park. After the establishment of Meyer Boulevard it became almost a side street. The same is true with respect to Tract 3 except that the effect has not been so marked. I should imagine that the south end of Tract 3 may have received some benefit from the improvement because it is close to the entrance of Swope Park, but as you go north the benefit rapidly disappears. I think that the special benefits, if any, received by Tract 8 would be small.

It would be rather difficult to state the exact amount of benefit to these tracts in dollars and cents, but I would say that the amount assessed against the property is not at all commensurate with the benefits received. By this I mean that the benefits are far less than the amount of the tax.

Q. Are you able to say as a real estate man after this improvement, consisting of the grading of Meyer Boulevard, was completed these Tracts 14 and 15, or either of them, could have been sold on the market for substantially any more money than they could have before?

A. I don't think so.

Q. Is that true of the other tracts referred to here, Tracts 2, 3, 8 and 11? A. Yes, I think that is true.

160 Q. What, in your opinion, is the situation as to whether Sixty-third Street as a street has been improved or injured by the putting through of Meyer Boulevard?

A. I think Sixty-third Street has been injured.

Q. Has it, in your opinion, really put it into a class of a side street?

A. That is practically what it is now.

Q. Whereas before was it on one of the principal thoroughfares leading from the southwest part of the city over towards Swope Park?

A. Yes, formerly traffic in that part, in that section went across Sixty-third Street and then to the park.

Q. Isn't it true that since Meyer Boulevard has been put through that the traffic that formerly went over Sixty-third Street almost altogether, if not entirely, goes over Meyer Boulevard to the park?

A. That is my judgment, yes.

Q. I want to ask you about the property fronting on Sixty-third Street for a distance back from the street line of 150 feet and I call your attention to that property as compared with property fronting on the boulevard of the same depth; I wish you would state in your opinion how the special benefits, if any, to the property fronting on Sixty-third Street resulting from this improvement compared to the special benefit, if any, resulting to the property fronting on the boulevard?

Mr. Bowersock: I made the same objection to this comparative testimony.

The Court: Well, I will hear the evidence.

To which last action and ruling of the Court, the Defendants, and each of them, by their counsel, at the time duly excepted, and still except.

A. I would say the property facing on Sixty-third Street 150 feet in depth is not enhanced in value at all by this
161 proceeding, whereas on Meyer Boulevard it certainly created a market for it as is evidenced by the fact that it has been platted and sold.

Q. When I asked you about the property lying south of the boulevard awhile ago I don't believe I asked you how far south of the boulevard, in your judgment, was the property specially benefited by reason of the proposed improvement; can you state that to the Court?

A. I think all the property south of this improvement that was accessible to the use of it.

Q. Well, can you give us some kind of idea as to how far that would extend, as to whether it would be blocks or miles or can you give us some idea about that?

A. Well, probably at least to Seventy-fifth Street; south of that it might go over to South Paseo and then come into Meyer Boulevard a little further down.

Since the improvement has been made the property abutting on the Boulevard has been platted and streets provided for. I have these plats here with me.

Whereupon the Complainants offered in evidence the plats referred to and over the objections of the defendants they were admitted in evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibits 25, 26, 27, which exhibits are hereto attached and made a part of this record.

The special benefits accruing to the property either north or south of the Boulevard naturally decrease as you get away from the improvement I think.

On Cross-Examination Mr. Jones testified as follows:

Most of the property lying north of Meyer Boulevard is high, slightly ground and all unplatted. The greater part of it is fine residence property. Of the property in the benefit district south of the Boulevard at Prospect the land is about on a level. At 67th Street it is probably higher than 162 Meyer Boulevard. As you go east it gradually slopes off toward 67th Street. The elevation of the various tracts varies in comparison with the Boulevard. There is quite a little of the property from 10 to 20 feet below the Boulevard. The property south of 67th Street is platted and built up. Part of it is made up of rather small unpretentious houses.

163 This is the part immediately south of Tract 6. Further west in Glenheim addition some very substantial houses are being built. This adjoining Prospect just east and west of Prospect Avenue.

In certain instances the tendency in Kansas City is now for the best residences rather to recede from the publicity of the boulevard, however, along Ward Parkway and the other great boulevards through the Country Club District are some of the handsomest homes, and the property along Linwood Boulevard and Armour Boulevard is of much greater value than on the

streets farther back. It is true, however, that along Ward Parkway and the other Country Club boulevards, the residences have been very carefully restricted and the residences back from the boulevards a block or two are in many instances larger and more pretentious than those on the Parkway itself. The highest priced property in the Country Club District is along Ward Parkway.

The establishment of Ward Parkway has, of course, benefited all of the property out there. It is of benefit to it specially as different from the benefit to other property in other parts of the city.

In the same manner the Abernathy tracts received a special benefit from the establishment of The Paseo, a different benefit from what might have been gained by the residence of my brother Mr. Elliot Jones, out northeast. All property in the immediate neighborhood of all of these Boulevard improvements in Kansas City has in most instances been especially benefited by those improvements.

These plats of Park Gate addition which have been offered in evidence were submitted to the City Planning Commission. We had the City Engineer and our engineer go over the plats and they said that the grades of the streets running into Meyer

164 Boulevard would not be prohibitive. That is the grades up Askew Avenue, and Bales Avenue, would not be prohibitive. We would not approve the plat and the Board of Public Works would not have approved it unless provision had not been made for linking up the streets with Meyer Boulevard.

Mr. Palmer: Isn't it a fact that the building of boulevards and the laying out of boulevards in a new district especially in unplatted lands tends to fix the value of the property in the whole district and not just immediately adjoining the boulevard?

Witness: A. That is rather hard to substantiate.

Mr. Palmer: Take Gladstone Boulevard, take Ward Parkway, hasn't it been the tendency of those boulevards to elevate the value of the land on both sides?

Witness: I think the whole boulevard system has certainly justified itself.

On Redirect Examination Mr. Jones testified as follows:

The lots in Park Gate addition which were platted and sold, sold from \$15.00 to \$20.00 a foot, or possibly some of it for

less, where the property was below grade. The property on the side streets ranged from \$8.00 to \$10.00 to \$12.00 per foot. (This evidence admitted over defendants' objection) It is considered that there are about 250 front feet to the acre. \$10.00 a front foot is \$2500.00 an acre; \$20.00 a front foot would be \$5000.00 per acre.

There is an old pond about in the center of Tract 2. The tract is rather low and there has been considerable water there. Leading out from there towards the south are a number of more or less deep gullies. Quite a large portion of this
165 tract is below the grade of 63rd Street and much below the grade of the surrounding territory.

With reference to Tract 11 the northwest corner of it, just at the southeast corner of 63rd and Prospect, is low ground for quite a distance south and east. There is a deep ravine running from 63rd Street in a southwesterly direction to a corner of the property. It is below 63rd Street and a good deal below Prospect. All of the tract is vacant ground.

Hereupon the plaintiffs rested.

And thereupon, to sustain the issues on their part, the defendants offered the following oral and documentary evidence:

Defendants offered in evidence the petition filed in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, in Cause No. 90628 in that Court. This petition was admitted in evidence over the objection of the plaintiffs as Defendants' Exhibit "C". Said Exhibit "C" is substantially as follows:

Defendants' Exhibit "C".

In the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, at Kansas City.

January Term—1915.

In the Matter of the Grading of Meyer Boulevard from the West Line of Swope Parkway to the East Line of the Paseo, Under Ordinance of Kansas City, Missouri, No. 21831, Approved January 26, 1915.

No. 90628.

Petition.

Comes now Kansas City, Missouri, by A. F. Evans, City Counselor, and Jay M. Lee, Assistant City Counselor, and alleges that an ordinance of Kansas City, Missouri, No. 21831,

was duly passed by the Common Council of said City, and was approved by the Mayor of said City on January 26, 1915, that said Ordinance No. 21831 is in words and figures as follows, to-wit:

166 And a certified copy of said ordinance marked Exhibit "A" is filed herewith, attached hereto, and made a part hereof; that by said ordinance provision is made for the work specified in said ordinance to be done, and for the payment for same by special tax bills to be charged as a special tax on parcels of land (exclusive of improvements thereon) benefited thereby, (after deducting the portion of the whole cost, if any, which the city may pay) within the limits of the benefit district prescribed and determined by said ordinance; and the limits of said benefit district within which it is proposed to assess property for the payment of said work, are as hereinbefore defined and set forth, as in Sections 4 and 6 of this ordinance.

Kansas City further states and alleges that plans and specifications for the work specified and provided for in said ordinance were duly approved and adopted by the Board of Public Works and by the Board of Park Commissioners as set forth in said ordinance; and that after the passage of said ordinance an approximate estimate of the cost of said work was made by the Board of Public Works, as provided by law, and duly made of record by said Board on the 9th day of February, 1915, by its Resolution under Entry No. 75143, which said approximate estimate was duly approved and adopted by the Board of Park Commissioners on the 9th day of February, 1915, by its Resolution No. 1855; and a copy of said Resolutions showing said approximate estimate of the cost of said work, are filed herewith, attached hereto, and made a part hereof, marked Exhibits "B" and "C" respectively.

Kansas City also prays the court to find and determine the validity of said ordinance, and the question of whether or not the respective tracts of land within said benefit district shall be charged with the lien of said work in the manner provided by said ordinance; and that the Court make an order appointing a day and place for a hearing on the matters referred to in this petition, and also for an order of publication and service according to law.

KANSAS CITY,
By A. F. Evans, City Counselor,
Jay M. Lee, Ass't City Counselor.

168 Along with said Petition, Defendants offered in evidence the Exhibits which were attached to and filed with the Petition in the Circuit Court proceeding, one of said exhibits being Ordinance of Kansas City, No. 21831, already introduced in evidence, the other being a Resolution of the Board of Public Works of Kansas City, No. 75143. This Resolution was admitted in evidence over the Plaintiffs' objection as Defendants' Exhibit "D". It is substantially as follows:

169 Defendants' Exhibit "D".

Document No. 75143.

February 9, 1915.

The Board of Public Works adopted the following Resolution:

In the matter of the grading of Meyer Boulevard from the west line of Swope Parkway to the east line of The Paseo, under Ordinance of Kansas City, Missouri, Numbered 21831, approved January 26th, 1915.

Whereas, by ordinance of Kansas City, Missouri, Numbered 21831, approved January 26th, 1915, entitled, "An Ordinance to grade Meyer Boulevard from the west line of Swope Parkway to the east line of The Paseo, and to condemn easements to support embankments or fills, describing the nature of the improvement, providing how the cost thereof shall be paid, and prescribing the limits within which private property is deemed benefited by the proposed improvement, and assessed and charged to pay damages caused by said grading, and by the condemnation of said easements, and assessed and charged to pay the cost of said improvement" provision was made for the grading of a portion of Meyer Boulevard and for payments of the cost of said work as set forth in said ordinance, and

Whereas, as required by law, an approximate estimate of the cost of the work provided for in said ordinance has been made by this Board, Now, Therefore,

Be It Resolved By The Board Of Public Works Of Kansas City, Missouri: That it does hereby adopt said approximate

estimate of the cost of said work, said approximate estimate, as completed, being as follows, to-wit:

170	Earth Embankment.....	320,100 cu. yds. at .25	\$80,025.00
	Rock Excavation.....	4,800 " " at .90	4,320.00
	15" Drain Pipe.....	290 Lin. ft. at .65	188.50
	12" " "	820 at .50	410.00
<hr/>			
			\$84,943.50

Ayes: Gallagher, Hays and Webster.

I, F. E. McCabe, Secretary of the Board of Public Works of Kansas City, Missouri, hereby certify that the annexed and foregoing is a true and correct copy of a resolution adopted by the Board of Public Works in the matter of the grading of Meyer Boulevard from the West line of Swope Parkway to the east line of the Paseo, under Ordinance of Kansas City, Missouri, No. 21831, approved January 26th, 1915, as the same appears of record and on file in the records of Official Proceedings of the Board of Public Works, Volume No. 31, at Page 144, in this office.

In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the official seal of the Board of Public Works on the 26th January 1921.

F. E. McCABE,
Secretary, Board of Public Works,
Kansas City, Missouri.

171 Defendants also offered in evidence a Resolution of the Board of Park Commissioners of Kansas City, No. 1855, which was admitted in evidence by the Court over Plaintiffs' objection as Defendants' Exhibit "E". Said Exhibit is substantially as follows:

172 Defendants' Exhibit "E".

Tuesday, Feb. 9, 1915.

No. 1855.—On motion of Mr. Lechtman seconded by President Craver the following resolution was adopted:

Be It Resolved By the Board Of Park Commissioners Of Kansas City, Missouri:

That the approximate estimate of the grading of Meyer Boulevard from the west line of Swope Parkway to the east line of The Paseo, as adopted by resolution of the Board of

Public Works by Entry Number 75143, and as provided for under ordinance Number 21831, approved January 26, 1915, said estimate being in the total sum of \$84,943.50, be and the same is hereby adopted, approved and entered on record in this office the Board of Park Commissioners on the 9th day of February, 1915.

Ayes: Lechtman and Craver. Absent: Dr. Logan.

2 Ayes.

173 Defendants thereupon offered in evidence a certified copy of the record entries in Cause No. 90628, in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri. Their admission was objected to on behalf of the Plaintiffs on the ground that they were not material to any issue in the case and for the additional reason that it appears on the [fact] of the Circuit Court proceedings that the case in the Circuit Court was not of the kind or character authorized under the Constitution or Laws of the State of Missouri.

Said record entries were admitted in evidence by the Court as Defendants' Exhibit "F". Said Exhibit is substantially as follows:

174 Defendant's Exhibit "F"

Be It Remembered that on the 33rd day of the regular January Term, 1915, of the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, at Kansas City, the same being the 17th day of February, 1915, the following proceedings were had and made of record before Hon. Thomas J. Seehorn, presiding Judge of Assignment Division in the cause entitled.

Assignment Division.

No. 90628.

In the matter of the grading of Meyer Boulevard from the west line of Swope Parkway to the east line of The Paseo, under Ordinance of Kansas City, Missouri, No. 21831, approved the 26th day of January, 1915.

Now comes Kansas City, Missouri, by its Assistant City Counselor, Jay M. Lee, and files with the Court a certified copy of the aforesaid ordinance; also a map or plat descriptive of said proceeding.

Thereupon, it is ordered by the Court that this proceeding be and now is assigned to Division numbered Nine (9) of this Court, for further hearing herein.

On the 33rd day of the January Term, 1915, the same being February 17th, 1915, the following further proceedings were had and made of record, to-wit

33rd day in Division 9.

Wednesday, February
17th, 1915.

In the matter of the grading of Meyer Boulevard from the west line of Swope Parkway to the east line of The Paseo, under Ordinance of Kansas City, Missouri, No. 21831, approved January 26, 1915. Division 9. No. 90628.

Now on this 17th day of February, 1915, in this the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, at Kansas City, in 175 Division No. 9, comes Kansas City, Missouri, by A. F. Evans, City Counselor, and Jay M. Lee, Assistant City Counselor, and files its petition alleging the passage and approval of its Ordinance No. 21831, approved January 26, 1915, and that plans and specifications for the work specified and provided for in said ordinance has been duly approved and adopted as set forth in said ordinance, and that after the passage of said ordinance an approximate estimate of the cost of said work was duly made by the Board of Public Works, as provided by law, and duly made of record by resolution, and approved and adopted by the Board of Park Commissioners by resolution, and that copies of said resolution, showing said approximate cost, and of said Ordinance, No. 21831, were filed with and made a part of said petition and praying that the Court find and determine the validity of said ordinance, and the question of whether or not the respective tracts of land within the benefit district named in said ordinance shall be charged with the lien of said work in the manner provided by said ordinance and the Court thereupon makes the following order, to-wit:

To All Persons Whom It May Concern,—Greeting:

Whereas, Kansas City, Missouri, has filed in this Court its petition alleging the passage and approval of its ordinance No. 21831, approved January 26, 1915, and that plans and specifications for the work specified and provided for in said ordinance has been duly approved and adopted by the Board of Public Works and by the Board of Park Commissioners, as

set forth in said ordinance, and that after the passage of said ordinance an approximate of the cost of said work was made by the Board of Public Works, as provided by law, and duly made of record by resolution, and said approximate estimate was duly approved and adopted by the Board of Park Commissioners by resolution; and

Whereas, a copy of said resolution, showing said approximate estimate of the cost of said work was filed with
176 said petition and made a part thereof; and

Whereas, Kansas City filed with said petition, and made a part thereof, a certified copy of said ordinance No. 21831, approved January 28, 1915; and

Whereas, by said ordinance provision is made for the work specified therein to be done, and for the payment for parcels of land (exclusive of the improvements thereon) benefited thereby, (after deducting the portion of the whole cost, if any, which the city may pay) within the limits of the benefit district prescribed and determined by said ordinance; and the limits within such it is proposed to assess property for the payment for said work are as hereinbefore defined and set forth, in Section 4 and 8 of said ordinance; and

Whereas, by its said petition Kansas City prays the Court to find and determine the validity of said ordinance and the question of whether or not the respective tracts of land within said benefit district shall be charged with the lien of said work in the manner provided by said ordinance.

Now, therefore all and each of you are hereby notified that the 29th day of March, 1915, is the day, and the courtroom of this Division No. 9 of said Court, in the County Court House in Jackson County, Missouri, at Kansas City, is the place hereby fixed by said Court for a hearing on the matters set forth in said petition, and when and where evidence may be offered tending to prove the validity or invalidity or lack of legality of said ordinance, and of said proposed lien against the respective lots, tracts and parcels of land within said benefit district sought to be charged with such lien, and when and where the court will determine the question of whether or not the said lots, tracts and parcels of land owned by each defendant should be charged with such lien.

177 And the Court further orders that this order be published in each issue of The Daily Record, the newspaper at the time doing the City printing for Kansas City, Missouri, for four (4) successive weeks, the last insertion to be

not more than one (1) week prior to the day hereinbefore fixed for said hearing.

And the Court further orders that the parties owning or having an interest in the real estate fronting on that part of the aforesaid Meyer Boulevard proposed to be graded under these proceedings, be served within said city with a copy of this order, either by delivering to each of such owners or parties interested at any time before the day fixed herein for the hearing aforesaid, a copy of this order, or by leaving such copy at their usual place of abode with some member of their respective families over the age of fifteen (15) years, and in case of corporation, by delivering a copy to the president or secretary or some managing officer thereof, or to any agent of such corporation in charge of any office or place of business of such corporation, as by the Charter of said city provided.

On the 19th day of March Term, 1915, the same being March 29th, 1915, the following further proceedings were had and made of record in Cause No. 90628:

Now on this 29th day of March, 1915, in this the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, at Kansas City, in Division numbered Nine (9), comes the said Kansas City by its City Counselor, and come all persons and parties concerned herein.

And come Percy Brown and Gertrude P. Brown as owners of property affected by this proceeding and file herein their entry of appearance and answer.

And the said Kansas City now files and submits to the Court proof of lawful publications and personal service
178 of the orders of the Court herein made on the 17th day of February, 1915, and the Court finds that same were made as the law requires and deems no further notice herein advisable.

Thereupon, this cause coming on for trial, it is submitted to the Court upon the proofs and the evidence, and is by the Court taken under advisement.

On the 7th day of May Term, 1915, the same being May 17th, 1915, the following further proceedings were had and made of record in Cause No. 90628:

Now on this day comes Kansas City, by its Assistant City Counselor, Jay M. Lee, and comes defendant Gertrude P.

Brown by her attorney, J. G. Paxton, and come all parties in this proceeding.

And the Court having heard evidence in the case, and the arguments of counsel, and being fully advised and informed in the premises, finds, orders and adjudges that in all respects Ordinance of Kansas City, Missouri, Number 21831, approved January 26, 1915, entitled:

“An Ordinance to grade Meyer Boulevard from the west line of Swope Parkway to the east line of The Paseo, and to condemn easements to support embankments or fills, describing the nature of the improvements providing how the cost thereof shall be paid, and prescribing the limits within which private property is deemed benefited by the proposed improvement, and assessed and charged to pay damages caused by said grading, and by the condemnation of said easements, and assessed and charged to pay the cost of said improvement”, is valid and legal, and that a contract for the doing of the work provided for in said ordinance may be entered into by

179 Kansas City in conforming with said Ordinance and as provided by the Charter and Ordinance of Kansas City; and that the proposed lien of the assessments for the payment of the cost of the work provided for in said ordinance under such contract against the respective lots, tracts and parcels of said land within said benefit district owned by the respective defendants in these proceedings, and each of them respectively, when assessed, apportioned and charged as provided in said ordinance and the Charter of Kansas City, is and shall be a valid and legal lien; and that said lots, tracts and parcels of land within said benefit district owned by said defendants may be charged with such lien respectively.

On the 9th day of the May Term, 1915, the same being May 19th, 1915, the following further proceedings were had and made of record in Cause No. 90628:

Comes Gertrude P. Brown, defendant herein, and files her motion to grant a new trial hereof.

On the 42nd day of the May Term, 1915, the same being June 28th, 1915, the following further proceedings were had and made of record in Cause No. 90628:

Now on this 28th day of June, 1915, in this the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, at Kansas City, in Division

numbered Nine (9), comes the said Kansas City by its City Counselor, and come all persons and parties concerned herein.

And the motion of Gertrude P. Brown for a new trial of this cause, is now by the Court taken up, heard, considered and overruled, to which ruling of the Court the said Gertrude P. Brown duly excepts and objects.

180 It was thereupon agreed between the parties that the reduced blue-print which had been introduced in evidence as Plaintiffs' Exhibit 12 might be used instead of the original plat filed in the Circuit Court proceedings, and that said Exhibit 12 might stand as the plat introduced in that proceeding except as to the yellow marks placed on the reduced plat by Mr. Woodward. It was agreed that Exhibit 12 was filed in the Circuit Court in said Cause No. 90628 with the exception of the yellow marks.

Defendants thereupon offered in evidence the plans and specifications referred to in Ordinance No. 21831. These plans and specifications were admitted in evidence over the objections of the Plaintiffs as Defendants' Exhibit "G".

Said Exhibit is substantially as follows:

181	Defendants' Exhibit "G"		
	Approximate Estimate		
Earth embankment	320,100		Cubic yards
Rock excavation	4,800		Cubic yards
Solid Rock excavation			Cubic yards
Rubble Masonry (Portland Cement Mortar)			Cubic yards
Riprap			Cubic Yards
15" inch pipe	290		Lineal feet
12" inch pipe	820		Lineal feet

Board of Park Commissioners of Kansas City, Missouri.

Resolution No. 6230

Contract for Grading Meyer Boulevard,
from the west line of Swope Parkway to the east line of The
Paseo.

This Contract, made and entered into this 26th day of October, 1915, by and between McMillan Contracting Company as principal and party of the first part, and E. E. Tutt and Fidel-

ity & Deposit Company of Maryland, as sureties, parties of the second part, and Kansas City, party of the third part,

Witnesseth: That Whereas, the said party of the first part is the lowest and best bidder, for making the following city improvements, viz:

Grading Meyer Boulevard from the west line of Swope Parkway to the east line of The Paseo, to the full width and to the established grade of the same,

Now, Therefore, the said party of the first part hereby agrees and binds himself, his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, itself and its successors and assigns, to do and complete the work above mentioned in a substantial and workmanlike manner, within the time provided for in this contract, according to the plans and specifications for said improvement adopted, perfected and approved by the Board of Park Commissioners on the 11th day of December, 1914, by Resolution No. 1761, and on file in the office of said Board, which said plans and specifications are hereto attached and made a part of this contract, and to the satisfaction and acceptance of the Board of Park Commissioners of Kansas City. And the said

182 party of the first part does hereby guarantee that the work herein mentioned shall be completed without further compensation than that provided for in this contract for the first cost of said work, and the acceptance of the work done hereunder and the issue of Special Tax Bills in payment therefor shall not be held to prevent the maintenance of an action on the Contractor's Bond for failure to complete the work in accordance with this contract and the plans and specifications for the same.

In consideration of the completion by said party of all work embraced in this contract in conformity with the specifications hereto attached and stipulations herein contained, Kansas City, party of the third part, hereby agrees to pay to the said first party at the following rate, viz:

For each cubic yard of earth the sum of twenty-five and $\frac{1}{2}$ cents (25 $\frac{1}{2}$ c)

For each cubic yard of rock excavation the sum of eighty cents (80c)

For each cubic yard of solid rock excavation, the sum of

For each lineal foot of fifteen (15) inch pipe, the sum of sixty-five cents (65c)

For each lineal foot of twelve (12) inch pipe, the sum of fifty cents (50c)

For each cubic yard of rip-rap, the sum of.....

For each cubic yard of Rubble Masonry, laid on Portland Cement Motar, the sum of.....

In Witness Whereof, the said parties of the first and second parts have hereunto set their hands and seals respectively, and Kansas City executes this contract by its Board of Park Commissioners.

McMILLAN CONTRACTING CO. (Seal)

By D. E. McMillan, President (Seal)

FIDELITY & DEPOSIT COMPANY
OF MARYLAND (Seal)

By James G. Guinotte, (Seal)
Attorney-in-fact

Attest:

F. G. Tidmarch, Secretary.

..... (Seal)
Kansas City

By Board of Park Commissioners of
Kansas City, Mo.

By Cusil Lechtman, President.

Attest:

T. C. Harrington,
Secretary.

City Comptroller's Office

Kansas City, Mo., Nov. 1, 1915.
The Sureties and Bond aforesaid are hereby approved as sufficient.

M. A. FLYNN, City Comptroller.

Office of Board of Park Commissioners.

Kansas City, Mo., Nov. 2, 1915.

The foregoing Contract and Bond have this day been approved and affirmed by the Board of Park Commissioners, and the President and Secretary were ordered to execute the same

on behalf of Kansas City, in the name of said Board of Park Commissioners.

183 Witness my hand and seal of the said Board of Park Commissioners of Kansas City, Missouri, this 2nd day of November, 1915.

T. C. HARRINGTON, Secretary.

City Clerk's Office.

Kansas City, Mo., Dec. 9, 1915.

The foregoing Contract and Bond have been this day ratified, approved and confirmed by the Common Council of Kansas City by Ordinance No. 24693, approved Dec. 9, 1915.

Attest: J. A. Bermingham, City Clerk.

By Deputy

Board of Park Commissioners of Kansas City, Missouri.

Resolution No. 1761.

Specifications for Grading Meyer Boulevard,

from the west line of Swope Parkway to the east line of The Paseo, According to plans on file in the office of the Board of Park Commissioners of Kansas City, Missouri, as above specified, and to its full width, and to the grade of same.

Excavation. Earth excavations shall be carried down on vertical lines, unless otherwise ordered by the Board of Park Commissioners. All material, however, which may slide or fall into the roadway from the sides of the excavation, prior to the final acceptance of the work, shall be removed and estimated as part of the material in the roadway proper.

Embankments. Embankments shall be made of earth, or rock and earth. Where rock is used in the embankment, sufficient earth and fine material shall be used to thoroughly fill all interstices between the stones, but no rock will be permitted above the line two (2) feet below the finished surface of the lawn space, and twelve (12) inches below the finished surface of the roadway proper.

Embankments shall be carried up with a slope of one and one-half (1½) foot horizontal to one (1) foot vertical, or with such rate of inclination as the Board of Park Commissioners shall deem necessary to maintain the embankment to its re-

quired height, width and shape; and when the estimate for work is made in embankment no material shall be measured or paid for that lies outside of the line above specified.

Adopted and perfected this 11th day of December, 1914.

BOARD OF PARK COMMISSIONERS
OF KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI.

By C. C. Craver, President.

Attest:

T. C. Harrington, Secretary.

Adopted

Dec. 11, 1914.

Board of Public Works
Entry No. 73991

B. L. Gregory, President.

Attest:

E. J. McDonnell, Secretary.

185 Defendant thereupon offered in evidence the Resolution of the Board of Public Works No. 73991 which was admitted in evidence over plaintiffs' objection as Defendants' Exhibit "H". Said resolution is in words and figures as follows:

186 Defendants' Exhibit "H"

Document 73991

December 11, 1914.

The Board of Public Works now perfects, approves and adopts plans and specifications, being Documents numbered 73991, of the Board of Park Commissioners, providing for the grading of Meyer Boulevard, from the west line of Swope Parkway, to the east line of The Paseo, as provided by Resolution No. 1762.

Ayes: Gregory, Buckholz and Gallagher.

187 Defendant thereupon offered in evidence the proof of Publication of the Order of Publication in Cause No.

90628 in the Circuit Court, which was admitted in evidence over Plaintiffs' objection as Defendants' Exhibit "I". Said Exhibit is substantially as follows:

188 Defendants' Exhibit "I"

Order of Publication.

In the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, at Kansas City, Division No. 9.

January Term—1915.

In the Matter of the Grading of Meyer Boulevard from the West Line of Swope Parkway to the East Line of The Paseo, Under Ordinance of Kansas City, Missouri, No. 21831 Approved January 26, 1915.

No. 90628.

Now, on this 17th day of February, 1915, in this the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, at Kansas City, in Division No. 9, comes Kansas City, Missouri, by A. F. Evans, City Counselor, and Jay M. Lee, Assistant City Counselor, and files its petition alleging the passage and approval of its Ordinance No. 21831, approved January 26, 1915, and that plans and specifications for the work specified and provided for in said Ordinance had been duly approved and adopted as set forth in said Ordinance, and that after the passage of said Ordinance, an approximate estimate of the cost of said work was duly made by the Board of Public Works, as provided by law, and duly made of record by resolution, and approved and adopted by the Board of Park Commissioners by resolution, and that copies of said resolution, showing said approximate cost, and of said Ordinance No. 21831, were filed with and made a part of said

189 petition, and praying that the Court find and determine the validity of said ordinance, and the question of whether or not the respective tracts of land within the benefit district named in said ordinance shall be charged with the lien of said work in the manner provided by said ordinance and the court thereupon makes the following order, to-wit:

To All Persons Whom It May Concern—Greeting:

Whereas, Kansas City, Missouri, has filed in this Court its petition alleging the passage and approval of its Ordinance No. 21831, approved January 26, 1915, and that plans and specifications for the work specified and provided for in said ordinance had been duly approved and adopted by the Board of

Public Works and by the Board of Park Commissioners as set forth in said Ordinance, and that after the passage of said Ordinance an approximate estimate of the cost of said work was made by the Board of Public Works, as provided by law, and duly made of record by resolution, and said approximate estimate was duly approved and adopted by the Board of Park Commissioners by resolution; and

Whereas, a copy of said resolution, showing said approximate estimate of the cost of said work were filed with said petition and made a part thereof; and

Whereas, Kansas City filed with said petition, and made a part thereof, a certified copy of said Ordinance No. 21831, approved January 26, 1915, which said Ordinance is in words and figures, as follows, to-wit:

(Here follows Ordinance No. 21831)

190 And, Whereas, by said ordinance provision is made for the work specified therein to be done, and for the payment for same by special tax bills to be charged as a special tax on parcels of land (exclusive of the improvements thereon) benefited thereby, (after deducting the portion of the whole cost, if any, which the city may pay) within the limits of the benefit district prescribed and determined by said ordinance; and the limits within which it is proposed to assess property for the payment for said work are as hereinbefore defined and set forth, in Sections 4 and 6 of said Ordinance; and

Whereas, by its said petition Kansas City prays the Court to find and determine the validity of said ordinance, and the question of whether or not the respective tracts of land within said benefit district shall be charged with the lien of said work in the manner provided by said ordinance.

Now, Therefore, all and each of you are hereby notified that the 29th day of March, 1915, is the day, and the Court room of this Division No. 9 of said Court, in the County Court House in Jackson County, Missouri, at Kansas City, is the place hereby fixed by said Court for a hearing on the matters set forth in said petition, and when and where evidence may be offered tending to prove the validity or invalidity or lack of legality of said ordinance, and of said proposed lien against the respective lots, tracts and parcels of land within said benefit district sought to be charged with such lien, and when and where the Court will determine the question of whether or

not the said lots, tracts and parcels of land owned by each defendant should be charged with such lien.

And the Court further orders that this order be published in each issue of The Daily Record (the newspaper at the time doing the city printing for Kansas City, Missouri,) for four (4) successive weeks, the last insertion to be not more than one (1) week prior to the day hereinbefore fixed for said hearing.

191 And the Court further orders that the parties owning or having an interest in the real estate fronting on that part of the aforesaid Meyer Boulevard proposed to be graded under these proceedings, be served within said City with a copy of this order, either by delivering to each of such owners or parties interested at any time before the day fixed herein for the hearing aforesaid, a copy of this order, or by leaving such copy at their usual place of abode with some member of their respective families over the age of fifteen (15) years, and in case of corporation, by delivering a copy to the President or Secretary or some managing officer thereof, or to any agent of such corporation in charge of any office or place of business of such corporation, as by the Charter of said City provided.

A true copy of the original order.

Witness my hand and seal of said Court this 17th day of February, 1915.

(Seal)

JAMES B. SHOEMAKER,
Clerk of the Circuit Court
of Jackson County, Missouri.
By E. L. Swope, Deputy.

(Personal)

I hereby certify that I executed and served the within order and notice in Kansas City, Missouri, by delivering a copy thereof personally to each of the following owners and parties in interest within named.

On 1st day of March, 1915, to

F. B. Heath, Jas. C. Leiter, Geo. A. Leiter, Gustav V. Bachman, Richard W. Hoeker.

(Service of chief officer of corporation)

I hereby certify that I executed and served the within notice in Kansas City, Missouri, on Evanston Golf Club (Lessee) by delivering a copy of said notice and order to I. H. Hetting-

192 er, he being the President and chief officer of said corporation this 1st day of March, 1915.

(Cannot be found)

I further certify that service cannot be made of the within notice in Kansas City, Jackson County, Missouri, upon the following property owners and parties within named, either by delivering a copy of such notice personally to such property owners and parties, or by leaving a copy at the usual place of abode of such property owners and parties with a member of their respective families over the age of fifteen years.

Nannie R. Harper, Rachel Z. Furnish, Elizabeth H. Furnish, Thos. E. Swope, Jr.

Witness my hand this 4th day of March, 1915.

WM. E. KEHOE,
Police Officer, Kansas City, Mo.

Affidavit of Publication.

State of Missouri,

County of Jackson—ss.

Elbert E. Smith, of Kansas City, Missouri, of lawful age, being duly sworn, says that he is one of the publishers of The Daily Record, a newspaper published daily, except Sundays, in Kansas City, Jackson County, Missouri, and that the notice to property owners, a true copy of which is hereto attached, was duly published in the daily edition of said newspaper for twenty-nine (29) days, beginning February 24, 1915, and in each of the issues thereafter, to and including March 29, 1915.

ELBERT E. SMITH.

Filed March 29, 1915. James B. Shoemaker, Clerk. E. T. Swope.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 29th day of March, 1915, and I certify that I am duly qualified as a Notary Public and that my term expires the 24th day of February, 1917.

HAROLD A. SMITH,
Notary Public in and for Jackson
County, Missouri.

(Attached to said Affidavit of Publication is a printed order of publication, the same as the Order of Publication appearing in this Exhibit.)

193 Defendants thereupon offered in evidence the Answer filed by Gertrude P. Brown in Suit No. 90628 in the Circuit Court, which was admitted in evidence over Plaintiffs' objections as Defendants' Exhibit "J". Said Exhibit is substantially as follows:

194 Defendants' Exhibit "J".

In the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, at
Kansas City.

March Term, 1915.

In the Matter of the grading of Meyer Boulevard.

No. 90628.

Now come Percy Brown and Gertrude P. Brown and enter their appearance herein and state that they are the owners of the North half of the Northwest quarter of the Southeast quarter of Section Three (3), Township Forty-eight (48) and Range Thirty-three (33) in Jackson County, Missouri, except a tract of one acre in the Northeast corner thereof, and that said real estate is contained in the benefit district which is sought to be taxed for the grading of said Meyer Boulevard.

Said parties state that they are the defendants herein and the owners of said property, and that said property does not abut on Meyer Boulevard; that the South line thereof is a quarter of a mile from said boulevard, and the north line thereof is a half mile from said Meyer Boulevard. Said defendants state that their property is not directly benefited by the opening of said boulevard, and is only remotely benefited, as all the other property in Kansas City is. That the property of defendants, above described, lines on one boulevard, to-wit: Swope Parkway, upon which is operated a street car line, and it can derive no particular and special benefit from the grading of said Meyer Boulevard. That the grading of said boulevard will greatly enhance the value of the property abutting on said boulevard, and yet, in the apportion-

195 ment of the cost of said grading, the property of said defendants, fronting on said Swope Parkway, may be assessed at as great a sum as the property on said Meyer Boulevard, and the effect would be that the special tax levied thereunder against the property of defendants may equal, acre for acre, the special tax assessed against the property immediately benefited, to-wit: the property abutting on said Meyer Boulevard.

Defendants further state, that for the reasons, aforesaid, it would be illegal and improper for the court to declare this ordinance valid, and it would also be illegal for the reason that on its face thereof, the charter provision authorizing this proceeding is void, for the reason that it violates the Constitution of Missouri, and the Constitution of the United States. It would be just as legal to provide that because the paving of said Meyer Boulevard was of an unusual width, and the cost of the paving thereof excessive, that the land within half a mile of said boulevard should pay in proportion to its value for the paving of same.

Defendants aver that it is proposed to assess the general benefits for the opening of said boulevard against the property of said defendants, and other property owners in said district, when the same should be assessed against the city at large; all the citizens of which participate in the benefits thereof.

JOHN G. PAXTON,
Attorney for defendants,
Percy and Gertrude P. Brown.

196 Defendants thereupon offered in evidence the motion for a New Trial filed by Gertrude P. Brown in said Cause No. 90628 which was admitted in evidence by the Court over Plaintiffs' objections as Defendants' Exhibit "K". Said Exhibit is, omitting the caption, as follows:

197 Defendants' Exhibit "K"

Motion for New Trial.

In the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, at Kansas City.

May Term—1915.

In the Matter of Grading of Meyer Boulevard from the West Line of Swope Parkway to the East Line of The Paseo, Under Ordinance of Kansas City, Missouri, Numbered 21831, Approved Jany. 26, 1915.

No. 90628.

Now comes the defendant, Gertrude P. Brown, and moves the Court to grant her a new trial herein, for the following reasons, to-wit:

1. The judgment rendered in said causes is against the law.
2. The judgment in said cause is against the evidence.

JOHN G. PAXTON,
Attorney for said Defendant,
Gertrude P. Brown.

198 W. H. DUNN being duly sworn and examined on the part of defendants, testified as follows:

I have lived in Kansas City 30 years and am now superintendent of Parks, Park Department. With the exception of one time when I was out about a couple of years I have been connected with the Park Department 22 years. I am familiar with the proceedings leading up to the improvement of Meyer Boulevard. That was in connection with the work of the Park Board. I was familiar with the establishment of the benefit district for the improvement. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 12 is a plat of the benefit district and is a copy of the original plat prepared under Ordinance No. 21831.

I have been familiar with practically all of the park and boulevard proceedings in Kansas City, having been connected with the Park Board during almost all of its existence.

Mr. Bowersock: Q. I will ask you to state, Mr. Dunn, from your experience with the Park Board, your own opinion as to the considerations warranting, if they did warrant, the establishment of this benefit district.

Mr. Langworthy: I object to that question because this witness is not qualified as an expert, and it really calls for secondary evidence, the consideration which moved the Park Board.

Over said objection the witness was permitted to answer, as follows:

Witness: I should consider the benefit district for the improvement very reasonable and right, that is, from the experience I have had in all of those condemnations and grading and benefit districts other than this. The district is reasonable because this section of the boulevard is through acreage, unplatted property. It is limited on the south by ground
199 that had been laid out in streets and small ownerships.

To a great extent the same is true of the property north of the benefit district. The property in the benefit district being acreage property could more feasibly be made to

conform to the improvement of Meyer Boulevard than if the property were in small sub-divisions and ownerships, where adjustments would have to be made to conform to the streets and grades. Furthermore, as a general proposition, it is a benefit to the property included in the benefit district, as is true with all our park improvements. It seems like a reasonable benefit district.

The ground on each side of Meyer Boulevard is unplatted as to streets and lots. It was unplatted as far south as 67th Street and as far north as 63rd Street. 63rd Street was at the time an open and improved thoroughfare. 67th Street was open but not paved, it was partially graded. The grading of a boulevard is customarily a benefit to the property adjacent to it, and to the property on adjacent streets which are connected with the boulevard. It is a benefit to the entire territory.

Some of the property next to Meyer Boulevard is above the boulevard; some of it is a little below; some of it is on grade. The portion that is above grade is greater than the portion below grade. All of Tract 6 and most of Tract 10 is considerably below the grade of the Boulevard. It has been suggested here that this Boulevard is of unusual width. As to how it compares in width with the other boulevards of the City the following figures will show: The Paseo for its whole length of the City is fully 225 feet wide and wider than that in places. Through the north end of the City from 9th Street to 18th Street the original condemnation was 225 feet wide. Going south from there, after crossing the Terminal tracks 200 it broadens out to from 300 to 400 feet wide. This is from about 20th Street to 25th Street. Then again from 47th Street to the south City limits it is generally 225 feet wide, except in certain locations where it is a great deal wider. At the intersection of Meyer Boulevard and about Brooklyn or Woodland the Paseo is 700 or 800 feet wide. Ward Parkway varies in width from a few hundred to 700 or 800 feet in width. The formal part of Ward Parkway south of 55th Street is 225 feet wide. That is somewhat similar to this Meyer Boulevard improvement. Gillham Road is of variable width, wider in places than Ward Parkway, but all of variable width. The Paseo from 57th Street to 67th Street is 350 feet wide. So 220 feet is not an unusual width for boulevards in Kansas City.

On Cross-Examination Mr. Dunn Testified as follows:

The difference between a parkway and a boulevard may be stated thus: a parkway may include more platted and irregular land than a formal boulevard. Otherwise they are both thoroughfares as we construe them, as is also an alley. We would call this particular thoroughfare (Meyer Boulevard) a boulevard.

I think Mr. Kesler's article in the 1914 Report of the Board of Park Commisisoners correctly states the situation. That article speaking of Meyer Boulevard says: "This great east and west reach receives practically all of the north and south lines of boulevards and parkways. Every one of these lines of parks and boulevards throughout the entire system are really merely connections between Swope Park on the southeast and the business district of the City on the north-west."

Swope Park at the time it was given to the City was wholly outside of the City. Later on there was an approach
201 to it called Swope Parkway. The street car system came out to the Park on that line. The only cross-town street that was accessible for the general population was 63rd Street at the time Swope Park was acquired. Since Meyer Boulevard has been graded 63rd Street has become practically disused. I think this is in great part on account of the pavement on 63rd Street. However, very much traffic would naturally go onto Meyer Boulevard in any case. 65th Street will also be a less important street.

Q. It was argued as desirable, as substantially stated here, was it not, Mr. Dunn, that there should be a connection from all the boulevards north and west to Swope Park and this Meyer Boulevard was selected for that connection, wasn't it?

A. Well, Swope Park was considered worthy of the best lines of approach we could give it.

Q. Yes; so you made this the most worthy thing you could work out, didn't you? A. Tried to.

Certainly one object in constructing the Boulevard was to enable the people of the west part of Kansas City and the North part of Kansas City to reach Swope Parkway. I don't think, however, that this was the principal object. In a sense the Boulevard was intended for the benefit of the other parks and boulevards in Kansas City, and the population of Kansas City north of the Boulevard; however, a boulevard like this could not be put through that class of undivided property without putting in on the market and improving it, giving

benefit to it. What Mr. Kessler says as to Meyer Boulevard being really a mere connection between Swope Park and the business district is true of the whole park system. Of course, Meyer Boulevard in connection with the Paseo constitutes an important artery in that system. It was for this reason that the benefit district was enlarged beyond the district which is ordinarily assessed with the cost of grading or improving a boulevard.

202 The whole improvement of Meyer Boulevard and the Paseo from 47th Street to the south city limits and Brookside Boulevard from Broadway or Wornall Road to Meyer Boulevard and to Swope Park were taken in one condemnation proceeding and a corresponding benefit district was made to pay for it. This benefit district did not comprise two whole park districts but was a special district. It covered generally the property from Broadway to Prospect.

Meyer Boulevard is, of course, a great improvement, an improvement of great general utility, but it is not for the benefit merely of the people who live on the north side of the boulevard, but for the benefit of boulevards that lead to that boulevard from other sections of the City. More especially it was distinctly a benefit to property included in the district in which it was condemned.

Something has been said about the width of the various boulevards in Kansas City the Paseo among them. It is true of the original Paseo from 9th to 18th Streets that parks and sunken gardens and play grounds and other similar improvements of a park nature were constructed in between the driveways. It is also true that toward the southern part of the Paseo partly opposite the Blue Hills Club just north of 63rd Street that there is a wide parkway in between the driveways on the Paseo not yet improved. This parkway is very similar to the parkway between the driveways on Meyer Boulevard. The same is also true on Ward Parkway beyond 53rd Street. It wasn't necessary, of course, in order that the people living in the neighborhood of Meyer Boulevard should have an outlet for their property that these parkways should be provided for between the driveways. That was a part of the general parkway and boulevard system. The boulevards of the City widen out into parkways and narrow into boulevards and driveways throughout the entire City. It is generally true that property abutting on a boulevard receives more special benefits from the building of the boulevard than property a distance away from it. I should say that that is true in this instance.

203 CHARLES C. CRAVER being duly sworn and examined on behalf of defendants, testified as follows:

I was a member of the Board of Park Commissioners of Kansas City at the time the proceedings for Meyer Boulevard were put through. Colonel Lechtman and Dr. Logan were the other members of the Board. I believe that Judge Shannon Douglas was on it the last year. I was on the board which approved this plan for grading Meyer Boulevard. This plat (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 12) is a blue print reduced of the original plat prepared under Ordinance 21831 governing the work.

Mr. Bowersock: Q. What consideration, if any, did the Board give to the establishment of the boundaries of the benefit district shown on the plat?

Mr. Landworthy: I object to that question as immaterial I assume the judgment there would be the judgment he would state but it seems to me the official acts speak for themselves.

Th Court: I think it is perfectly competent for him to state what his notions were. I think that is probably as far as he should go. I don't believe his description of what entered into his official acts is hardly competent. I think he may state what he thinks of that and why.

Mr. Bowersock: If Your Honor please, it seems to me it has this bearing. It is charged that this action is arbitrary and unreasonable. Now if it was the result of consideration by the Park Board of all of the considerations out there going over a considerable period of time and the exercise of judgment on their part rather than an arbitrary act that it seems to me should be competent, that they considered the various elements entering into the situation and reached a result which they thought reasonable.

The Court: Well, I will let that in, subject to the objection.

204 The Witness: A. The first thing in a matter of this sort, of course, is the consideration of the reasonableness of placing a burden of this sort on the abutting property. In this instance so much of the property was below grade and affected so adversely by the grade that we thought best to establish a benefit district. Our judgment was largely influenced by the measure of benefit that the adjacent property would receive and how far that benefit would extend. Of course there is a general benefit spread over the entire City for any improvement of this sort. Furthermore, establishing a benefit district is largely a matter of compromise. In this

instance 63rd Street was considered a reasonable northern boundary for the reason that traffic originating at 63rd Street on the north would naturally flow toward the north and 63rd Street being a street that was travelled and opened at that time was considered a reasonable boundary for the benefit of this district. On the south 67th Street was in contemplation then of being made a traffieway with a street car upon it. That has not occurred as yet, but 67th Street was open at the time though not fully improved.

South of 67th Street we found the property platted into small lots. The property was sold on the installment plan and small indifferent houses constructed there inhabited by a poorer class of people. From the nature of the country south of 67th Street that property could not be so improved as to get the full benefit of a boulevard like this and we thought, therefore, that it was manifestly unfair to extend the district beyond 67th Street, so a compromise was finally reached and a benefit district established such as you find here according to the best of our judgment as to how the property was affected.

The judgment of the Board at that time is still my judgment.

205 Q. The property north of Sixty-third Street is plated for the most part?

A. Yes sir, it is platted, not in small lots though, they are larger lots.

Q. And that south of Sixty-seventh Street is platted in very small lots?

A. Yes sir; and sold on the installment plan, small homes.

The Court: Q. And do I understand you think that is a class of property that would not be benefited by the boulevard?

A. There is a general benefit, certainly, extending.

The Court: Q. Oh, I understand, but I am speaking about special benefits?

A. Oh, we didn't think a sufficient specific benefit to justify the extension of the benefit district beyond Sixty-seventh Street.

Q. Yes; I was trying to get at the reasons there why you thought that distance south of the boulevard, that the extension, special benefit south of the boulevard was less than north of the boulevard. You see you have taken off only about one-half as much on the south as that north and I don't under-

stand your reason for thinking that special benefit didn't extend farther south than Sixty-seventh Street?

A. That property had been divided into small lots, sold to small home owners, sold largely on the installment plan, the class of property that would not benefit to the extent of property that was more subject to a higher class of improvement, for instance.

It would be impracticable for the people living south of 67th Street to go direct to Meyer Boulevard because of the grade leading up to Meyer Boulevard from the south. That property is very much below grade, some of it I think as much as 15 or 18 feet. Furthermore the property south of 67th

Street is a class of property which is served more by 206 street cars than by boulevards, and the street cars are of course on Swope Parkway and on Prospect.

I am in the real estate business and have been for about 20 years. In my opinion the grading of a boulevard of this kind through open, unimproved property affects the property very favorably in value. That benefit is not confined to the property immediately abutting on the boulevard but extends back to a considerable distance on each side, the distance back depending upon the circumstances of the particular case. In my opinion the property both to the north and to the south of the boulevard to the limits of the benefit district itself increased in value by the grading proceedings, especially the property on the north side of the boulevard, which is above grade and a better class of property. The benefit from this improvement is greater upon unimproved property of the character of that within the benefit district than it would be upon property already subdivided into lots and blocks because unimproved property lends itself more to a proper adjustment to the improvement.

On Cross-Examination Mr. Craver testified as follows:

The greater portion of the traffic over this boulevard of course originates from the City at large. That is true of all the boulevards. Travel from all of the boulevards drains into this boulevard and Swope Parkway and from there into the park. Since the opening of Meyer Boulevard it is used very much more for travel into Swope Park than Swope Parkway but this is partially due to the fact that the north part of the Parkway is in bad condition. When the bridge is put across Brush Creek, Swope Parkway will probably be as much and more used perhaps than Meyer Boulevard.

Q. The long and short of it is, Mr. Craver, that this broad entrance to Swope Park with parkways in between was planned so as to make an appropriate entrance to this great public park? That is what the Park Board had in mind, wasn't it? A. That is true.

Q. And so it was this boulevard was graded on practically a level plane all the way from Brooklyn clear up to Swope Park, so as to make the effect of this great entrance just a broad level plane approaching this great park? Isn't that true?

A. That is the policy of all the boulevards, to make them as much on a plane as possible to avoid collisions.

Q. But it was made so especially because of this entrance to this great park? Isn't that true?

A. Not any more so than the building of boulevards in other parts of the city.

Q. So that, as a matter of fact, the public at large received the very large and substantial benefit from this opening and widening of this boulevard, isn't that true?

A. The public at large receives much benefit from all the boulevards established in Kansas City; that is true there.

Q. Confined to this particular boulevard there?

A. And as to this particular one, you have got to take the whole system of it to get that public benefit.

Q. But it is particularly true of this particular boulevard, because this boulevard, more than any other one boulevard in the city, leads into a common meeting ground for all of the people in the city?

A. This and Swope Parkway together, yes sir.

Q. All right; so it is particularly true of this boulevard, and Swope Parkway, the public at large received substantially the entire benefit, or a very large portion of the benefit, received from the opening and grading of this boulevard. Isn't that true?

208 A. More so than any other.

Q. More so than any other boulevard?

A. I think so. Now, of course—

Q. (Interrupting) Then it is true, as I stated, isn't it, that the public at large receives the very substantial benefit from the opening and grading of this boulevard as providing means of access to this great park now? That is true, is it not? A. That is true.

Q. Now you said a moment ago that abutting property is affected favorably by the opening of a boulevard and that is more particularly true of the property abutting immediately on a boulevard, is it not?

A. The favorable effect of property abutting immediately on the boulevard is overcome to quite an extent, and sometimes entirely so, by the added cost of the street improvements for paving, sidewalks, and,—and so on.

Q. You know, as a matter of fact, matter of common knowledge that throughout the city property that abuts on the boulevard sells for more money than property on side streets? That is true, is it not, generally speaking?

A. Yes sir, generally speaking.

Q. So that the grading on this boulevard was of more benefit to the property abutting upon the boulevard than property that might have been two or three, four blocks away?

A. That property which was below grade, as some of this is, I would say absolutely not, could not be as much as the property that lies nice—

Q. (Interrupting) I am talking about property generally. Now if you want to refer later to specific property you may do so, but I am talking generally about property along the boulevard? A. Yes sir.

209 Q. You would say property abutting the boulevard was more greatly benefited than property away from the boulevard? A. Yes sir.

Q. And you could apply that to all property, whether above or below grade, that it was more benefited according to its value.

A. No, no, because I know property next to boulevards in Kansas City that were practically confiscated; they were of very doubtful if—very doubtful value indeed, property that is much below grade.

Q. I think perhaps you don't understand what I mean. Property that is abutting on the boulevard, we will say worth a thousand dollars, is benefited more by the grading of the boulevard than property that may be two or three, four blocks away; isn't that true, although worth a thousand dollars?

A. I want to make myself very plain on that. This property that is five, ten, fifteen feet below grade is almost worthless.

Q. All right; let us talk about—

A. (Interrupting) Now the nice lying property, property that lends itself for residence purposes, nice residence purposes, of course, is benefited more.

Q. Let us not talk about that property, because as a matter of fact there are only two or three places along the whole boulevard, the entire length of this boulevard—mile in length—only two or three places where the property is left substantially below grade, isn't there? A. No, I don't think so.

Q. Close to Park and about Garfield Place is about all there is—I was over there this morning—isn't that true?

A. No, not in my judgment.

Q. Well, a very large portion of this property along the boulevard, very large proportion of it, is either substantially on grade, or slightly above grade, proper distance above grade to make it available for building purposes; isn't that true?

A. Yes sir, most of it is; but not the very large proportion.

Q. Well, leave it that way. I understand your testimony to be that most of it is? A. Yes sir.

Q. Now then, as to that which is in that situation, I understand it to be your opinion that that receives a greater benefit proportionately by reason of the opening of the boulevard and grading of it than property which is situated away from the boulevard? That is true, is it not?

A. That is true.

Q. And it is true that the farther you get away from the boulevard the less the benefit is, special benefit? A. Yes.

Q. Now do you know how far south of Meyer Boulevard the benefit district extended which provided for assessment of damages for the taking of land for Meyer Boulevard?

A. [I] took in the entire district.

Q. In other words, it went clear south to Seventy-fifth Street, did it not? A. Yes, I believe it did.

Q. And went clear south to Seventy-fifth Street on the theory that all of the property clear south to Seventy-fifth Street was benefited by the taking of land for this boulevard?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Now if that property was benefited by the taking of lands for the opening up of this boulevard, why was it not likewise benefited by the grading of this boulevard so it could be opened up and used?

211 A. On the theory that the establishment of an improvement like this in a district is—the mere establishment of an improvement like this in that district, is of distinct benefit to the whole district. Now when you come down to the physical end of it, use of it, daily use, and all that sort of thing, it confines itself to a lesser district and you would have overlapping and all that sort of thing in spreading the benefit assessments for different boulevards over different districts that would be very confusing.

Q. It stands to reason, of course, it would do no good to open up or take the land for this boulevard unless you opened it up and graded it so it could be used? A. Certainly.

Q. If the land was taken and never opened up or used, of course, it would be of no benefit to anyone? A. No.

Q. And if these people clear down to Seventy-fifth Street had paid for the acquiring of the land for that boulevard then it was to their interest and to their special benefit that that should be graded so they could use it?

A. Well, there is a general benefit that attaches to all improvements of this sort in a district, for which they pay a penalty. That is what it is.

Q. It is undoubtedly true that people south of Meyer Boulevard in going from their homes to town, unless they go on the street car, would naturally go over Meyer Boulevard and from there over to the Paseo and from there down town?

A. Oh yes.

Q. That would be the natural way for them to go?

A. Absolutely.

Q. And the natural way for people living north of Meyer Boulevard would be to go down either over the Paseo or Sixty-third or Ward Parkway and go to town in that way? That is true, isn't it?

212 A. Not exactly, no. A man in an automobile don't regard distance, you know, and he seeks the best way to go, the best road, the best street, regardless of two or three or four blocks—

Q. (Interrupting) You don't drive—

Mr. Bowersock: Let him answer.

A. (Continuing) Regardless of two or three, four blocks in riding, so that has got to be taken into consideration.

Q. You don't drive a quarter of a mile out of the way to go down town, do you, if you have got a direct way?

A. Owing to the condition of the streets. If the streets are bad, what is a quarter of a mile? Nothing.

Q. Well, take for instance on Sixty-third Street, fronting on the north, practically a quarter of a mile from Sixty-third south to Meyer Boulevard. On the other hand there is Sixty-Third Street leading into the Paseo and Prospect leading down to Swope Parkway and also Ward Parkway, all of which lead down town; now you don't mean to be understood as saying people generally would take their cars and drive a quarter of a mile south and then a quarter of a mile back north again, being practically half a mile out of their way, you don't mean to say people would do that just for the pleasure of driving over Meyer Boulevard? You don't mean that?

A. For pleasure driving they seek the most favorable way to go.

Q. I am talking about going for business purposes, for pleasure might drive over the whole boulevard system. You don't mean to say they would drive quarter of a mile out of their way to get down town? A. Oh no.

Q. Now you know, as a matter of fact, this property you speak of as being below grade has been platted, do you not?

A. I do, yes sir.

213 Q. And streets have been laid out? A. Yes sir.

Q. And, as a matter of fact, the distance that property is below grade extends only a short distance south, so when that property is graded up it will all be practically on the boulevard?

A. The few feet of it that is so much below grade perhaps is not worth the street improvements it will cost to put it in now.

Q. That part of it that is so situated is comparatively insignificant as compared to the entire amount of property along that boulevard, is it not?

A. With reference to that that is on grade, above grade?

Q. Yes?

A. There is more of it on grade and above grade.

Q. It is comparatively insignificant?

A. No, it is not insignificant, because—

Q. (Interrupting) Well, it has all been platted and lots have all been sold?

A. Oh, you can sell lots ten dollars down and dollar a week—that is the way that property was sold—yes, anyone can.

By The Court:

Q. Mr. Carver, one thing I would like to get clear on: You say it is a benefit, you say it is an improvement, a large improvement to this district benefited, now that is true if it becomes an improvement? A. Oh yes.

Q. A finished product? A. Yes sir.

Q. If you were to just simply take some waste land and never do any more with it, it would never be of any great value to that district? A. Oh no.

Q. Then how can you make the distinction or differentiation between the different steps in doing so from the start until it ripens into a completed improvement? Isn't it of
214 the same benefit and doesn't that necessarily inure as a benefit that comes from the establishment of an improvement of that kind in a district?

A. Yes, Judge, I think that enters into the proposition, but this tax is not put on that property but onto the abutting property.

Q. I know about that feature, I am talking about the benefit, I am talking about the benefit to the district?

A. Why any improvement of this character is certainly a benefit to an extended degree for which they should pay, especially when the cost becomes so heavy upon the abutting property.

Q. That is true, but what I am getting at is, why isn't that also correspondingly true as in the original acquisition where the benefits extended further on out?

A. Simply because got to draw the line somewheres and we drew it there.

Q. In other words, you drew it for arbitrary, for convenience?

A. No; a matter of compromise. I will give you an illustration.

Q. That is the same thing?

A. I will give you an illustration: We established the benefit district for the Pasco from Forty-sixth Street south, which was an expensive improvement, very expensive, and we were two years I will say in getting all the divergent interests together and compromising on the benefit district between Prospect and Troost. We finally did so and I believe it has always been an improvement.

Q. When you speak of compromise, whom did you compromise with?

A. The fellows interested who appeared before the Park Board.

Q. They come in and present their claims and you hear them? A. Yes sir.

Q. And you go over the matter and then reconcile your own divergent ideas as the board?

A. Yes sir; yes, use our best judgment.

215 On Redirect Examination Mr. Craver testified as follows:

The entire matter of fixing the limits of the benefit district is more or less a question of degree.

What has been said with regard to the public using Meyer Boulevard can be made to apply in the same manner to all of the boulevards in the City.

Furthermore, public, as here used, means the public as individuals, and not the public as landlords. The question of benefits and damages in proceedings of this kind refers to property owners and not to citizens in general.

CUSIL LECHTMAN being duly sworn and examined on behalf of defendants testified as follows:

I have lived in Kansas City since 1887 and I was a member of the Park Board of Kansas City when the benefit district for the grading of Meyer Boulevard was established. In my opinion that benefit district was a reasonable district for the doing of this grading.

In considering the benefits of the various boulevard improvements I divided benefit into two classes, one as a sort of a consequential benefit and the other a direct benefit. The consequential benefit could not be controlled because it was the general result of the improvement and did not result from any direct improvement on any particular piece of land, so that in fixing the boundary lines of any benefit district I tried to determine where the direct benefit from the improvement would be. In arriving at this particular grading improvement I considered that 63rd Street was quite a thoroughfare and that a street car line was contemplated on 67th Street. 63rd Street is also almost a direct entrance to Swope Park and I fixed the direct benefit between those two streets. Furthermore the land between 63rd and 67th Streets was not platted and had no improvements at all at that time, whereas the land north of 63rd Street was more or less platted and that south of 67th Street was platted into small lots.

On Cross-Examination Mr. Lechtman testified as follows:

There is no doubt but that this improvement is a general improvement for the benefit of the whole City but the greatest benefit to property is to the close-by property. The Boulevard was not established merely for the benefit of the immediate property owners but also in order to complete the entire boulevard system, but the establishment of such a boulevard is going to cause an immediate benefit to nearby property.

KELLY BRENT being duly sworn and examined on behalf of the defendants testified as follows:

I have lived in Kansas City 35 years and have been in the real estate business during all of that time. I have had experience in the platting and selling of acre property mostly within the last 15 years. I have been in Kansas City during all of the development of the park and boulevard system and am familiar with real estate values here. I am familiar with

the character of the property in the benefit district
 217 shown on plaintiffs' Exhibit 12 and with the character
 of the property north and south of that benefit district.
 In my opinion the benefit district as shown on the plat is a
 reasonable benefit district for paying the cost of that improve-
 ment.

When the boulevard was established all of this ground
 which is in the benefit district was acre property, unplatted
 and undeveloped and it was a great benefit to it to be opened
 up. It is mighty hard to get a thoroughfare like this through
 a territory that is undeveloped. The property south of 67th
 Street is platted into small tracts and developed to such an
 extent in the way of private improvements that it would al-
 most have been impossible for it to have been affected directly
 by the benefit of this boulevard. There is no direct north and
 south connection between the property south of 67th Street
 and Meyer Boulevard, between Prospect Avenue and Swope
 Parkway. Such a connection would only be possible by wind-
 ing roads such as have been made, and very beautifully made,
 in certain portions of the City and most unfortunately this
 ground south of 67th Street has been platted otherwise.

The property north of 63rd Street is platted into tracts of
 varying sizes, most of them in tracts from $\frac{1}{2}$ to $2\frac{1}{2}$ acres,
 for residence purposes. That property is built up and con-
 siderably improved. The property south of 67th Street is
 built up to a considerable extent but with small homes. These
 are my reasons for believing that the property south of 67th
 Street and north of 63rd Street should not be included in the
 benefit district.

The idea is that the boulevard opened up and made pos-
 sible the development of this property which had not already
 been so far developed as to be interfered with by the improve-
 ment. The grading of the Boulevard a block farther south
 than the line which was the center of this acre territory was
 an engineering proposition. But the benefit, in my
 218 judgment was more directly to the acre property no
 matter where the boulevard went thorough it. In my
 opinion all of the property in this benefit district benefited by
 the grading.

I have been asked many times whether as a general rule
 property abutting upon a boulevard of this kind increases in
 value more by the grading than property back from the boule-
 vard. This is a question that attorneys are not as conversant
 with as real estate men. That is one of those questions which

you cannot answer by yes or no. In this particular instance the grading of Meyer Boulevard possibly hurt the abutting property. At other places it very materially would enhance the value of the abutting property. Over 50% of the territory cover by this grading ordinance is way below the grade of the boulevard. By this I mean over 50% of the abutting property and the property on 65th Street would be as much if not more benefited by this grading than that street would be. These general questions are hard to answer.

I think that in this particular case the boulevard is a benefit to the district. Everyone, almost who drives an automobile would, when driving to any section, use the boulevard. If I am going out to the northeast corner of this town I take the boulevard to get there, no matter where I am going. If I am going to Montgall or St. John or Askew or wherever I am going, I go on the boulevard, and after I get into the territory I get off the boulevard and go to the particular place. Any man who drives an automobile would go a quarter of a mile out of his way to get on to one of these boulevards to drive four or five miles after he gets there.

On Cross-Examination Mr. Brent testified as follows:

If I were at 63rd Street and Olive with my automobile I would drive over to Prospect and then south to Meyer Boulevard and then go downtown on the boulevard instead of going to Swope Parkway and downtown that way. Mr. Crittenden and I developed an addition out there and when we were developing this territory we instructed our salesmen to take their customers out Swope Parkway and over to Meyer Boulevard as being the most pleasant way and best way to get to 63rd Street which was a third of a mile further than they would have gone if they could have gone out the other way. We platted both of the additions just north of 63rd Street running from Prospect to Swope Parkway.

Under our method of procedure the City necessarily has to fix certain benefit districts and it is very hard for the Council to know just where to draw the line.

I don't see how Swope Park could have received any direct benefit from this improvement because it is a pleasure ground and not used for commercial purposes. I don't know what sort of benefit it could be considered as receiving. If Swope Park was not a park it probably should be in the benefit district and probably would have been included by the ordinance. Waiving for the moment the fact that Swope Park is a park and considering merely the location of the land included in the

park, that land probably receives as much direct benefit from the building of the boulevard as the other property out there, but if the park had not been there conditions would have been so different. The boulevard might then just have gone on like any other boulevard and the property which now constitutes Swope Park would not have received any more benefit than any other piece of land through which the boulevard passed. I do not think that Swope Park received a direct benefit from this improvement. If the land in the park had been used for commercial purposes it would have been benefited. The boulevard is of course a benefit to the public, indeed, every citizen of Kansas City is individually benefited, and the opening of the boulevard greatly enhances the value of Swope Park as a park. It greatly increases the accessibility of the park but I don't know that it makes the park any better after you get there.

220 With regard to the property south of 67th Street I don't say that a boulevard through platted property does not benefit the property. What I mean is that property already platted, like the property south of 67th Street is not susceptible to personal and individual development in a manner, for example, along the lines in which Mr. Nichols is developing Crestwood or someplace of that kind with winding roads. This acre ground in the benefit district could be and was in a position to be developed differently from that platted property south of 67th Street.

JOHN A. MOORE being duly sworn and examined in behalf of the defendants testified as follows:

I have lived in Kansas City 43 years and for 35 years of that time have been in the real estate business. I have had experience in the platting and selling of residence property having platted a number of additions. This experience has extended over the entire 35 years. I have been familiar with the development of the park system in Kansas City and with the effect of that development upon the prices of property. I am also familiar with the real estate values here. I am familiar with the character of the ground within the limits of the benefit district shown on Plaintiffs' Exhibit 12 and am familiar with the grading that has been done on this boulevard and with the physical conditions there.

In my opinion the benefit district established for the assessment of the benefits for the grading of Meyer Boulevard is a reasonable district. I base that opinion upon this theory;

that the property which is the benefit district was acre property and undeveloped and unplatted, and not built on, and was susceptible of a better improvement than property that had already been built up. Consequently, it could respond to the benefits that would come to the neighborhood by the building and construction of this Boulevard. It is practically impossible to change a neighborhood once built up. You can take all the boulevards of this City as you know them and you will find that neighborhoods which were built up with poor buildings when the boulevards were constructed through them continue with poor buildings. It is practically impossible to change the character of property after it has once been established. But with vacant unplatted lands the effect of a boulevard is different. It is possible to develop a large acre tract in some scientific way beneficially, so that it will derive the benefits that come from some great improvement.

The property south of 67th Street has been platted into comparatively small lots and built up with quite small houses. It has been developed sufficiently to characterize the neighborhood. Its character has been established, so much so that it would be practically impossible, in my opinion, to change it.

The property north of 63rd Street had been platted and some improvements had been built and a sort of development had been begun there so that it didn't appear wise to undertake to change it. Those are my principal reasons for limiting this district at 63rd Street and 67th Street.

As a general rule in the development of a boulevard, property directly abutting on the boulevard is more favorably affected than that farther back. This is not always the case, however. With regard to this particular improvement the improvement unfortunately practically destroyed a lot of the property fronting on the boulevard. The grading of the boulevard left a lot of the property below grade, some of it, I think as much as 35 feet below grade. I don't know how to develop a piece of property of that kind. It has no value. Such property although abutting on the boulevard would not be benefited as much as property lying further back. The benefit would be affected in the same manner though in a different degree with property which was not so much below grade.

On Cross Examination Mr. Moore testified as follows:

In my opinion it would not be fair to assess property left below grade to the same extent as property on grade with the boulevard. It is my notion that a lot 35 feet below the level of the street is not justly chargeable with the same expense as property on grade. In my opinion the benefits following the grading of a street should not be assessed arbitrarily, but in proportion to the benefits actually received. That would seem the equitable way. Property which, by reason of the topography of the country, is low or inaccessible to the improvement, ought not to be assessed the same amount as the good property.

My theory in connection with the establishment of this benefit district is this. Here we have about 240 acres of land just a mile long, from Brooklyn to Prospect. If some man with a broad vision got hold of the tract it is capable of being made one of the finest developments around Kansas City. In order to get this benefit it should be developed under substantially a unified or a uniform development. It would be very injurious to the property in this benefit district if the various tracts are developed under separate ownership and platted into small insignificant lots with small houses on them. Such a development would absolutely destroy the possibility of large development along the lines I have suggested. I am bound to say that the recent platting and development which has gone on out there in the last year has been shameful. I refer to the Park Gate development.

223 Defendants hereupon introduced in evidence the contract for the sale of Park Gate addition. This contract was admitted in evidence by the Court as Defendants' Exhibit "L" and is substantially as follows:

224 Defendants' Exhibit "L"

Agreement

This agreement made this 4th day of April, 1920, by and between Thomas H. Swope party of the first part, and N. P. Dodge of Omaha, doing business as N. P. Dodge & Co. party of the second part, witnesseth:

First: That whereas the party of the first part owns acreage property in Kansas City, Mo., bounded by Prospect Avenue, Swope Parkway, 65th Street, and 67th St., containing ninety-seven acres more or less which it is proposed to plat into twenty-five foot lots, and is desirous of obtaining the services of the second party as selling agent for said lots, and,

Second: In consideration of the covenant made by the party of the second part, it is agreed and understood that he shall have the exclusive right to sell said land into lots for a period of Two years from date of this contract, and shall receive a commission of fifty dollars (\$50.00) on each lot sold by him or his agents, which commission is paid out of one-half of the proceeds of the sale of each lot, as it is paid for by the purchaser. That is to say, the second party shall receive one-half of the amount paid in on each lot, until his commission is paid, then all payments shall be credited to the party of the first part by the collecting bank. It is also understood and agreed that all payments on the contracts that are cancelled for non-payment or "lapsed", are to be divided share and share alike up to the amount of commission and in case lots are sold again to new purchaser a new commission will be allowed just as if the lots were never sold before.

225 Third: In consideration of the above, the second party agrees to have said lots surveyed and staked on street and alley with stakes 2x2x24 inches, painted white, each stake to be numbered with a lot number, and at each block corner, a sign post to be erected 4x9x9 feet, with neatly lettered street signs attached, a gas pipe stake to be used at block corners as monuments. The streets are to be graded with blade machine in a neat form, the grass and weeds are to be cleared off the premises, plowed, ground, if any, to be seeded, trees to be trimmed and the property in every way to be made neat and attractive. For this purpose, the party of the first part agrees to bear the expenses of surveying, staking, trimming trees, clearing, seeding, grading of the streets and either to advance the money for these improvements in getting the property ready for sale, or to allow the party of the second part all of the proceeds from the sale of lots until the owners share of such proceeds equals the money actually expended for the purpose above set forth. It is understood and agreed, however, that the expenditure or allowance shall not exceed Twenty-five Hundred Dollars should it exceed that amount, such additional cost shall be borne by the party of the second part.

Fourth: The party of the second part agrees to put on a sale of said lots on terms as follows: All lots fronting on the Meyer Boulevard shall be sold on terms of not less than ten dollars (\$10.00) down and two dollars (\$2.00) a week. The other lots shall be divided into two classes the higher priced lots to sell for five dollars (\$5.00) down and one dollar (\$1.00) a week and the balance for one dollar (\$1.00) and one dollar

(\$1.00) a week, it being understood that one-half of the lots shall be offered at the minimum terms.

226 All contracts to be without interest or regular taxes for two years and allowing a bonus of 10% for all payments of ten dollars or over in advance during the two year period in which no interest is charged and a 15% discount for payment in full within thirty (30) days. The contract to contain reasonable restrictions as to houses. The exact terms of the contract to be issued are set forth in a form attached to this contract, ad made a part thereof. No change in the terms of this contract shall take place without the approval of the owner.

Fifth: The second party agrees to put on a sale of said lots in the spring or early summer of 1920, and during the continuance of this contract, to use every effort to sell said lots, the same as he has done on his own and other additions in various cities of the United States. He also agrees to re-sell the lapsed lots, using every endeavor to keep all of the lots sold. If the second party fails to sell one-half of the lots within one year from June 1st, 1921, the party of the first part may cancel his agreement upon thirty days notice in writing and in the event of such cancellation party of the second part shall have no further claim for commission save on lots sold prior to said cancellation.

Sixth: Party of the first part agrees that he will execute a plat of said addition and will execute all deeds to lots when paid for under the terms of the contract attached hereto, and authorize the party of the second part to sign for him, all contracts at the sale and thereafter, as lots may be sold during the terms of this contract, and he agrees to carry out all covenants of the contract attached hereto, and to furnish a printed copy of abstract on said property with each lot sold, said abstracts to be brought down to date and delivered with deed, when lot is fully paid for.

227 Seventh: It is understood and agreed that all payments on contract for the sale of lots save such payments as are made on the ground at the time of the sale, shall be made at the, which shall be the collecting bank and the proceeds after deducting the charge of the bank for collecting, shall be divided share and share alike, until the commissions above stipulated are paid, and thereafter all of the proceeds from the sale of each lot shall be credited to the account of the parties of the first part each week, subject to their check. It is understood and agreed that

such division of the proceeds shall not take place until the party of the second part is reimbursed for the expense of improvements, and preparation for the original sale as provided in paragraph three, out of the share of the parties of the first part, hence all of the proceeds from the sale of the lots shall be credited to the party of the second part until the share of the parties of the first part has equalled the amount expended on the ground, but not to exceed Twenty-five Hundred Dollars, as above provided.

Eighth: The second party agrees to make a price list at which the lots shall be sold and submit it to the party of the first part for his approval before opening the sale, it being agreed that the gross selling price of the lots shall not be less than Three Hundred Thousand Dollars (\$300,000.00).

Ninth: Weekly reports of collections shall be made to both parties by the bank upon collection sheets furnished by the party of the second part, and the second party at his own expense shall send notices each week to delinquent purchasers and shall keep an accurate account of all money paid on contract, so long as he shall have an interest in the sale of the individual lots, it being understood and agreed that the first party save as stipulated in Section 3 of this contract, is to be put
 228 to no expense whatever, in connection with the sale of lots save for taxes, abstracts and the collection fee of the collecting bank.

In witness whereof, we have hereunto set
 our hands and seals this date above
 written.

THOS. H. SWOPE
 N. P. DODGE

It is agreed that party of first part may reserve from the sale lots facing Swope Parkway.

N. P. DODGE.

229 Thereupon the Defendants rested their case.

Mr. Jones: If the Court please, I have one little formal matter in my case. I will state for the record that Felix Swope is now and was at the time of the commencement of this suit a non-resident of Missouri, being a citizen of Kentucky, living at Georgetown; and Gertrude Brown is a citizen and resident of Springhill, Tennessee, is now, and was at the commencement of this suit.

And thereupon all parties hereto, both Plaintiffs and Defendants, rested.

The foregoing is an abstract of all the testimony introduced by either party.

(Approval of Condensed Statement of Testimony by District Judge.

The above and foregoing is hereby approved as a true, complete and properly prepared condensed statement of all the material testimony taken in the above entitled cause, and it is ordered that said statement be filed herein, and made a part of the record in this cause, for the purposes of the appeal heretofore allowed to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

ARBA S. VAN VALKENBURGH, Judge.

O. K.

Scarritt, Jones, Seddon & North,
Attys. for pltfs.

231

(Praecipe for Transcript.)

(Filed in U. S. District Court on February 24, 1922.)

In the District Court of the United States for the Western Division of the Western District of Missouri.

Felix H. Swope and Gertrude M. Brown, Plaintiffs,
No. 215. vs. In Equity.

Fidelity National Bank and Trust Company of Kansas City,
a corporation, (formerly Fidelity Trust Company);
Standard Investment Company, a corporation; Silas C.
Delap; Hunter M. Meriwether and Gilmer Meriwether,
Defendants.

To The Clerk Of Said Court:

In the preparation of the transcript on the appeal of Fidelity National Bank and Trust Company of Kansas City, a corporation; Standard Investment Company, a corporation; Silas C. DeLap; Hunter M. Meriwether and Gilmer Meriwether, defendants above named, from the order and decree made and entered in the above entitled cause on July 7, 1921, please in-

corporate the following portions of the record into the transcript:

1. Complainants' bill of complaint, filed October 13, 1919.
2. Separate answer of defendants Silas C. DeLap, Hunter M. Meriwether and Gilmer Meriwether to complainants' bill of complaint, filed January 22, 1920.
3. Amended separate answer of defendant Standard Investment Company, a corporation, to complainants' bill of complaint, filed January 24, 1921.
4. Amended separate answer of defendant Fidelity National Bank and Trust Company of Kansas City, a corporation, to complainants' bill of complaint, filed January 25, 1921.
5. Complainants' reply to the amended separate answer of defendant Standard Investment Company, filed January 28, 1921.
6. Complainants' reply to the amended separate answer of defendant Fidelity National Bank and Trust Company, filed January 28, 1921.
7. Memorandum opinion, filed June 28, 1921.
- 232 8. Decree of July 7, 1921, cancelling the special tax bills involved in this action.
9. Petition for appeal from said decree, filed January 4, 1922.
10. Assignment of errors filed therewith.
11. Order allowing appeal, entered January 4, 1922.
12. Citation to complainants, with acknowledgment of service thereon, dated January 4, 1922.
13. Bond for appeal, filed and approved January 6, 1922.
14. Election as to printing transcript, filed January 4, 1922.
15. Condensed statement of testimony, prepared pursuant to Equity Rule 75-B, filed February 13, 1922.

16. Notice to complainants of the filing of said condensed statement, with acknowledgment of service thereon, filed February 13, 1922.

17. Praecipe for transcript.

BOWERSOCK & FIZZELL,
MILLER, CAMACK, WINGER &
REEDER,
CLARENCE S. PALMER,
Attorneys for Defendants and Appellants.

Received copy of the above and foregoing praecipe this 23rd day of February, 1922.

SCARRITT, JONES, SEDDON &
NORTH,
Attorneys for Complainants.

234 Order Extending Time for Filing Record in Circuit Court of Appeals.

Now on this 27th day of February, 1922, this cause coming on to be heard on the application in open court made by the above named defendants for an extension of time within which to file in the office of the Clerk of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals of the Eighth Circuit, a transcript of the record in the above entitled cause.

It Is Now By The Court, For Good Causes Shown, Ordered, Adjudged And Decreed that the time within which the above named defendants may file said transcript in the office of the Clerk of said Court for the purposes of the appeal heretofore taken in this cause to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, is hereby extended for a period of sixty days from the return day of said appeal.

ARBA S. VAN VALKENBURGH, Judge.

236 (Stipulation for transmission of certain original exhibits to Circuit Court of Appeals.)

(Filed in U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals on March 4, 1922.)

It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between the parties hereto that the following original exhibits introduced and received in evidence on the trial of this cause, and filed herein,

to-wit: Plaintiffs' Exhibits 12, 13, 16 to 23, inclusive, and 25 to 27, inclusive, may be transmitted to the Clerk of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, and that said exhibits may be considered as incorporated in and as a part of the condensed statement of testimony, filed herein pursuant to Equity Rule 75-b, as though actually and fully set out in or attached to said condensed statement.

SCARRITT, JONES, SEDDON &
NORTH,

Attorneys for Complainants.

BOWERSOCK & FIZZELL,
MILLER, CAMACK, WINGER &
REEDER,

CLARENCE S. PALMER,
Attorneys for Defendants.

237 (Order for transmission of certain original exhibits to
Circuit Court of Appeals.)

Now on this 4th day of March, 1922, this cause coming on to be heard, and it appearing to the court that a stipulation by and between the parties hereto has been filed herein, to the effect that certain original exhibits introduced and received in evidence on the trial of this cause may be transmitted to the Clerk of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, and that said exhibits may be considered as incorporated in the condensed statement of testimony filed herein.

Now, Therefore, it is by the court ordered, adjudged and decreed that the following original exhibits introduced and received in evidence on the trial of this cause, to-wit: plaintiffs' Exhibits 12, 13, 16 to 23 inclusive, and 25 to 27 inclusive, shall be transmitted by the Clerk of this court to the Clerk of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, for use on the hearing of this cause on appeal in said court, and in lieu of the incorporation of said exhibits in the condensed statement of testimony filed herein, to be by said Clerk returned to this court upon the final determination of said appeal; and said exhibits are hereby incorporated and included in said condensed statement of testimony and made a part thereof, the same as though actually and fully set out therein.

ARBA S. VAN VALKENBURGH,
District Judge.

239 (Supplemental praecipe for transcript.)

(Filed in U. S. District Court on March 10, 1922.)

To The Clerk Of Said Court:

In the preparation of the transcript on the appeal of Fidelity National Bank and Trust Company of Kansas City, a corporation, Standard Investment Company, a corporation, Silas C. DeLap, Hunter M. Meriwether and Gilmer Meriwether, defendants above named, from the order and decree made and entered in the above entitled cause on July 7, 1921, please incorporate into the transcript in addition to the portions of the record called for in the praecipe heretofore filed herein on February 24, 1922, the following:

1. Order extending time for filing record in Circuit Court of Appeals, entered February 27, 1922.

2. Stipulation as to forwarding to Clerk of Circuit Court of Appeals plaintiffs' original Exhibits 12-13, 16 to 23 inclusive, and 25 to 27 inclusive, filed March 4, 1922.

3. Order in accordance with said stipulation, entered March 4, 1922.

4. Supplemental Praecipe for transcript.

BOWERSOCK & FIZZELL,
MILLER, CAMACK, WINGER &
REEDER,
CLARENCE S. PALMER,
Attorneys for Defendants and Appellants.

Received copy of the above and foregoing supplemental praecipe this 10th day of March, 1922.

SCARRITT, JONES, SEDDON &
NORTH,
Attorneys for Complainants.

- 241 (Order further extending time to file record on appeal.)
(Filed in U. S. District Court on May 2, 1922.)

Now on this 2nd day of May, 1922, this cause coming on to be heard on the application in open court made by the above named defendants for an extension of time in which to file in the office of the Clerk of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit a transcript of the record in the above entitled cause.

It Is Now By The Court For Good Cause Shown, Ordered, Adjudged And Decreed that the time within which the above named defendants may file said transcript in the office of the Clerk of said Court for the purpose of the appeal heretofore taken in the above named cause to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, is hereby extended to July 4, 1922.

ARBA S. VAN VALKENBURGH, Judge.

- 243 (Second Supplemental Praecipe for Transcript.)

To the Clerk of Said Court:

(Filed in U. S. District Court on May 3, 1922.)

In the preparation of the transcript on the appeal of Fidelity National Bank and Trust Company of Kansas City, a corporation, Standard Investment Company, a corporation, Silas C. DeLap, Hunter M. Meriwether and Gilmer Meriwether, defendants above named, from the order and decree made and entered in the above entitled cause on July 7, 1921, please incorporate into the transcript in addition to the portions of the record called for in the praecipes heretofore filed herein on February 24, 1922, and on March 10, 1922, the following.

1. Order extending time for filing record in the Circuit Court of Appeals, entered May 2nd, 1922.

2. Second supplemental praecipe for transcript.

BOWERSOCK & FIZZELL
MILLER, CAMACK, WINGER
& REEDER
CLARENCE S. PALMER

Attorneys for Defendants and
Appellants.

Received copy of the above and foregoing second supplemental praecipe this 3rd day of May, 1922.

SCARRITT, JONES, SEDDON & NORTH,
Attorneys for Complainant.

244

(Opinion of the District Court.)

In the District Court of the United States for the Western Division of the Western District of Missouri

Walter L. Abernathy and Carrie S. Abernathy, Complainants
No. 163 vs. In Equity
Fidelity National Bank & Trust Company, et al., Defendants

B. Haywood Hagerman, Complainant
No. 207 vs. In Equity
Fidelity National Bank & Trust Company, et al., Defendants

Felix H. Swope, et al., Complainants
No. 215 vs. In Equity
Fidelity National Bank & Trust Company, et al., Defendants

These cases involve the validity of certain tax bills issued against the property of complainants to pay for the grading of Meyer Boulevard from the Paseo east to Swope Park. These bills are based upon proceedings instituted under Section 28 of Article 8 of the Charter of Kansas City, Missouri. This section provides that where, in the grading of a street there is an unusual amount of filling, or cutting or grading away of earth or rock, so that the expense imposes too great a burden on land situated in the benefit district, consisting of property abutting upon the street to be improved, as provided in Section 3 of Article 8, then the cost may be assessed against the property located within a larger benefit district to be fixed by the city council.

245 Section 28 further provides for the enactment of an ordinance authorizing the improvement, and that the city shall file a proceeding in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, in the name of the city, against the respective owners of land chargeable, and that the prayer of the petition shall be that the court find and determine the validity of the ordinance, and the question of whether or not the respective tracts of land within the benefit district shall be charged with the lien of the work. Service of process shall be governed by the provisions of Section 11 of Article 13 of the Charter, which provide for service by publication. After such court proceedings have been disposed

of it is provided that the city may then enter into a contract for the work contemplated, and that after the work has been completed the estimate of the cost thereof, and the apportionment of the same against the various lots, tracts and parcels of land within the benefit district shall be made by the Board of Public Works according to the assessed value thereof exclusive of improvements, with the assistance of the City Assessor, who shall, on demand of the Board of Public Works, cause an assessment to be made of the value of the lands to be charged with the cost of such grading, and shall deliver such assessment to the Board of Public Works, who shall apportion the cost according to the value thereof fixed by the City Assessor.

Meyer Boulevard, from the Paseo to Swope Park, is a broad highway, being two hundred and twenty feet wide at its narrowest point, and five hundred feet wide as it approaches the park. Provision is made for parkways between the driveways, so that of the total area of the Boulevard only about eleven acres are taken up by the driveways, and the remaining twenty acres consist of grass parkways. The grading includes the entire area. The benefit district extends
246 approximately one mile in length, and lies between 63rd and 67th Streets, a width of approximately four blocks, which area includes the land taken for the boulevard itself. The grading cost, for which the tax bills were issued, was substantially \$97,000. The total assessed valuation of the benefit district, specially made for the purposes of this improvement, was \$378,955. The rate of assessment to total assessed value is thus found to be approximately 26 per cent.

It appears from the evidence that the City Assessor, in assessing the value of the property in the benefit district, assessed all of the property at substantially the same value per acre, and that all the property was assessed for this special purpose at a value several times that at which it is and was assessed for general tax purposes. This will appear concretely from a consideration of the tracts belonging to complainants.

Tract No. 2, belonging to Gertrude M. Brown, was assessed, for general tax purposes, in the year 1915, at \$4750; for 1916 at \$4750; for 1917 at \$5000. In 1916, for the purposes of this grading, at \$25,960. The tax bill against this property for this grading was \$6,693.40. Tract No. 3, belonging to Felix H. Swope, was assessed, for general tax purposes, in the year 1915, at \$6240; for 1916, at \$6240; for 1917 at

\$6240. In 1916 for Meyer Boulevard at \$25,440. The tax bill against this property for this grading was \$6558. Tract No. 8, belonging to Felix H. Swope, was assessed, for general tax purposes, in the year 1915, at \$4470; for 1916 at \$4470; for 1917 at \$4320. In 1916 for Meyer Boulevard at \$29,250. The tax bill against this property for this grading was \$7540.20. Tract No. 11, belonging to B. Haywood Hagerman, was assessed, for general tax purposes, in the year 1915, at \$12,480; for 1916 at \$12,480; for 1917 at \$10,350. In 1916 for Meyer Boulevard at \$48,535. The tax bill against this property for this grading was \$12,511.60. Tract No. 14, belonging to Carrie S. Abernathy, was assessed, 247 for general tax purposes, in the year 1915, at \$6400; for 1916 at \$6400; for 1917 at \$6400. In 1916 for Meyer Boulevard at \$24,920. The tax bill against this property for this grading was \$6424. Tract No. 15, belonging to Carrie S. Abernathy, was assessed, for general tax purposes, in the year 1915, at \$6000; for 1916 at \$6000; for 1917 at \$6000. In 1916 for Meyer Boulevard at \$24,570. The tax bill against this property for this grading was \$6333.80. It will thus appear that for the year 1916 these tracts, in the aggregate, were assessed for general tax purposes at a value of \$40,340; that in the following year, after the Meyer Boulevard improvement, which is claimed to have added value to the way of benefits, had become a fixed fact, the same assessor assessed this same ground for general tax purposes at an aggregate of \$38,310; more than \$2,000 less than the previous year; that in 1916 these same tracts, in the aggregate, for the purposes of this grading, were assessed at \$188,680; a little less than five times the value at which they were assessed during the same year for general tax purposes. It further appears that the tax bills issued against these tracts, for this improvement, aggregate \$46,061; nearly \$6,000 more than the assessed valuation for general tax purposes in 1916, and nearly \$8,000 more than they were assessed for the same purposes in 1917. It further appears that these tracts, practically unimproved suburban property, were assessed to pay almost one-half of this entire improvement, at an average rate of over \$350 an acre.

Meyer Boulevard, with its heroic proportions, was conceived for the purpose of establishing an inspiring approach to Swope Park, the great playground of Kansas City, and incidentally a thoroughfare into which, directly and indirectly, the boulevard system of Kansas City might discharge 248 the throngs of pleasure seekers and pleasure drivers who visit that park. It is altogether an appropriate

and desirable enterprise for the gratification of the public at large, and its chief value is to the public at large, and to the city property to which it is tributary, and only very incidentally to the locality through which it passes. Notwithstanding this fact, the Board of Public Works assessed no part of the benefits against the city at large, nor against the property of the city, which would indirectly effect the same purpose, although that seems to have been contemplated by Section 28, by the ordinance authorizing the improvement, and by the petition filed in the Circuit Court. That court, as shown by its order, may well have contemplated, and undoubtedly did contemplate, that a portion of the whole cost would be charged against the city. The Board of Public Works, however, imposed the entire burden upon the private property within the benefit district.

Many points are urged by complainants against the regularity of the proceedings and the validity of the tax bills. It is claimed that the method of apportionment provided for in Section 28 of Article 8 of the Charter, is fundamentally so unfair and unjust as to result in the taking of property without due process, in violation of the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution; that the tax assessed against the property in question exceeds the special benefits received to such an extent as to result in the taking of the property without due process; that this is a general public improvement, and not a local one; that the benefit district is unreasonable; that the Circuit Court proceeding is an essential step in the grading procedure, and was not followed with sufficient strictness, in that a suit was not brought in the name of Kansas City,

and the parties charged were not named; that that
249 proceeding was, in effect, a moot one without recognition in the judicial procedure of the state, binding no one, and that the decree entered cannot be urged as res-adjudicata. They also claim that the benefits were not apportioned equitably, and with a due regard for actual benefits.

Defendants reply that the grading is of such a nature that its cost may lawfully be charged against a local benefit district; that the benefit district is a reasonable one; that distribution of cost in proportion to assessed valuation is a proper method of apportionment; that the amount of benefit to the particular tracts in question cannot be inquired into in this proceeding; that the suit in the Circuit Court is such a proceeding as comports with due process of law and affords sufficient opportunity to be heard on the questions involved; that

Section 28 was duly complied with; that all questions raised, or which could have been raised, in the Circuit Court proceeding are now *res adjudicata*; and chiefly, that if a legislative body charges the cost of an improvement upon lands which it deems to have benefited therefrom, the courts must accept the legislative determination.

Both parties, in exhaustive and learned briefs, have cited abundant authority to sustain their several contentions and each of them, regard being had for the special facts, circumstances and emergencies which control the cases cited. It will serve no useful purpose, and it is beyond the limit of practical possibility in this memorandum, to analyze, discuss and distinguish the authorities adduced and the doctrines there announced. I am of opinion, that the Charter Section involved is susceptible of such arbitrary application as to amount, if such be the course pursued, in view of presumptions generally indulged and of the development of decisions, seeking carefully to preserve, and not too greatly to hamper the exercise of municipal sovereignty for the common good, to a burden upon private property almost, if not quite, to the point of confiscation. It may be that the suit as entitled would be held to conform analogously to city condemnation proceedings in general, but it must be confessed that the provisions for notice and hearing approach very closely to the frontier of judicial recognition. The proceeding in the Circuit Court is a mere adjunct to the legislative action of the council, and the issues made in that suit, if not wholly abstract in their nature, at least fall far short of contemplating a complete adjudication upon all matters with which those whose property is to be taken for public use are vitally concerned. "It may well be doubted (as said by Mr. Justice Brewer in *Tregea vs Modesto Irrigation District*, 164 U. S. 179) whether the adjudication really binds anyone". However, I do not feel justified in going so far as to declare the Charter Section itself to be wholly unconstitutional and void; nor is this necessary. Counsel for defendants concede the settled rule to be that a state legislature, and, of course, a city council, may create taxing districts to meet the expense of local improvements, and may fix the basis of taxation without encountering the 14th Amendment unless its action is palpably arbitrary or a plain abuse. They say: "This legislative power is, however, not unlimited. It is subject to the limitation that its exercise must not be arbitrary or unreasonable". It must be admitted that:

"If the statute providing for the tax is of such a character that there is no reasonable presumption that substantial justice generally will be done, but the probability is that the parties will be taxed disproportionately to each other and to the benefit conferred the law cannot stand against the complaint of one so taxed in fact".

Gast Realty Co. vs. Schneider Granite Co., 240 U. S. 55;

Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., et al vs. Road Improvement Dist. No. 6 of Little River Co., Ark. (Supreme Court of the United States, decided June 6, 1921).

251 The defense contends, however, that complainants herein cannot raise this question because of the Circuit Court proceeding. To this I cannot agree. Finally, defendants concede that the fairness of the Assessor's valuation remains open to the consideration of whether it was arbitrary and unreasonable. I think this may be properly considered in connection with the action taken in defining the benefit district, and that when these two questions are disposed of it will be unnecessary to consider the other criticisms made and the defenses interposed.

What was done in this case appears clearly from the evidence as well as from common knowledge of procedure. It was desired to establish this super-boulevard, and it was realized that the expenditure would be entirely too burdensome if charged against the abutting property, as is usual in grading proceedings. Therefore, resort was had to Section 28 of Article 8, which was intended to relieve in a situation of this sort. But merely adopting the form prescribed by Section 28 does not necessarily afford such relief in practice.

Next, as appears from their testimony, the municipal representatives, Boards and Council, felt themselves more or less circumscribed and limited by physical conditions. They did not feel justified in going beyond 63rd Street on the north and 67th Street on the south because of their conception of such physical conditions. They, therefore, deemed themselves confined to the restricted benefit district established. Now, while we may say that this involved the exercise of judgment and discretion in excluding property which was left out, all of which, in the condemnation proceeding, was deemed to be benefited by the establishment of this boulevard, there was very little exercise of judgment and discretion as to reasonable benefits respecting the territory included. The dominant idea was that the boulevard must be established in any event, and

252 this benefit district was arbitrarily selected to produce the funds. Although the improvement was primarily of benefit to the city at large, assessment against the city or its property was not considered because of the well known fact that the city had no funds which could be spared for this purpose. But the assessed valuation of the property in the benefit district for general tax purposes aggregate no more than the cost of this grading. This would never do, because such an assessment would be obvious confiscation, not of a single isolated lot, but of the entire benefit district. Therefore, an arbitrary assessment was made, presumably with the assistance of the same Assessor who makes the assessment for general tax purposes, amounting, as we have seen, to nearly five times the normal assessed valuation. Now, while property of this nature is not assessed at full valuation for general purposes, no one will contend that it is assessed at practically only one-fifth of its actual value. Thirty or forty percent on city property would be the lowest acceptable figure. This property, for this improvement, is charged with considerably more than its entire assessed valuation for general tax purposes. It sufficiently appears that these tax bills amount to more than one-third of the actual value, and that the benefit to complainants' property, if any, is negligible. Such assumed benefit is entirely speculative and bears no reasonable relation, in any view, to the amount of the tax.

It appears that Meyer Boulevard lies to the south of these tracts and furnishes no direct thoroughfare to the city, which lies almost entirely to the north and west; besides, ample routes to the city, for all purposes, already exist. Swope Parkway, itself a very broad and commanding boulevard, runs along the eastern boundary; and 63rd street, up to that time a recognized thoroughfare, bounds most of these tracts upon the north.

253 I find, for the reasons stated, as disclosed by the record, that both the benefit district and the assessment were arbitrary and unreasonable, and that the tax bills unreasonably exceed any possible benefit to this restricted benefit district. ..

The court is not unmindful of the necessity of recognizing liberal power in municipalities to provide for public improvements, even such as that under consideration, although this is not of the class, under the circumstances disclosed, which is essential to the public health and safety, which sometimes calls for the exercise of more arbitrary and summary municipal

power. To uphold this proceeding would be a practical recognition that the power of the city in such matters is unlimited, and that its exercise is not open to individual challenge in any case.

In *Norwood vs. Baker*, 172 U. S. 269, the Supreme Court of the United States said:

"In our judgment, the exaction from the owner of private property of the cost of a public improvement in substantial excess of the special benefits accruing to him is, to the extent of such excess, a taking, under the guise of taxation, of private property for public use without compensation. We say "substantial excess" because exact equality of taxation is not always attainable, and for that reason the excess of cost over special benefits, unless it be of a material character, ought not to be regarded by a court of equity when its aid is invoked to restrain the enforcement of a special assessment".

To this may be added the language of the Supreme Court of Missouri in *McCormack vs. Patchin*, 53 Mo. 33:

"The whole theory of local taxation or assessments is that the improvements for which they are levied afford a remuneration in the way of benefits. A law which would attempt to make one person, or a given number of persons, under the guise of local assessments, pay a general revenue for the public at large, would not be an exercise of the taxing power, but an act of confiscation."

254 And finally the language of Judge Agnew in the *Washington Avenue* case, 69 Pa. State Reports, 352, is pertinent and applicable to the principle here involved.

"In questions of power exercised by agents, it is sometimes the misfortune of communities to be carried step by step, into the exercise of illegitimate powers, without perceiving the progression, until the usurpation becomes so firmly fixed by precedents it seems to be impossible to recede or to break through them".

This case is cited with approval in *Norwood vs. Baker*, 172 U. S. 285. The court is further mindful of the fact that the improvement has been made, the work has been done, the money has been spent, and much of it probably has been advanced upon the faith of the validity of this proceeding; but this is always the case, and we must not lose sight of the fact that one of the arguments made in support of the insistence that complainants in this and similar cases have not been de-

nied due process of law is that all defenses of this nature may be made in a suit upon the tax bills, or in proceedings like those at bar for the protection of those whose lands are taken or taxed for public purposes. In fact, complainants are practically remitted to this remedy.

It follows necessarily then that the present status of the parties who are charged with knowledge of the law and of the power of public officers, can, and should, have no controlling influence upon this decision.

The relief prayed by petitioners will be granted and decrees to that effect may be prepared and entered.

Kansas City, Missouri, June 28th, 1921.

ARBA VAN VALKENBURGH, Judge.

255 (Clerk's Certificate to Transcript.)

United States of America, Set.

I, Edwin R. Durham, Clerk of the District Court of the United States for the Western Division of the Western District of Missouri, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and complete transcript of the record, assignments of error, and all proceedings in the case wherein Felix H. Swope and Gertrude M. Brown are plaintiffs and Fidelity National Bank and Trust Company, Standard Investment Company, Silas C. Delap, Hunter M. Meriwether and Gilmer Meriwether are defendants, as fully as the same appears on file and of record in my office, in accordance with praecipes filed herein and made a part hereof.

I further certify that the original citation is prefixed hereto and returned herewith.

Seal
U. S. Dist. Court,
Western Division,
West. Dist. of Mo.

Witness my hand as Clerk, and the seal
of said Court. Done at office in
Kansas City, Missouri, this 30th
day of June, A. D. 1922.

EDWIN R. DURHAM, Clerk,
By, Deputy Clerk.

Filed Jul. 10, 1922. E. E. Koch, Clerk.

IN UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT
No. 6136

FIDELITY NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY et al., Appellants,
vs.
FELIX M. SWOPE et al.

APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL—Filed Jul. 10, 1922

The Clerk will enter my appearance as Counsel for the Appellants.
Justin D. Bowersock, Robert B. Fizzell, Guy V. Head, Arthur
Miller, Frank P. Barker, Clarence S. Palmer.

Appearance of Mr. R. E. Ball as Counsel for Appellants—Filed Jan.
15, 1923

The Clerk will enter my appearance as Counsel for the Appellants.
R. E. Ball.

Appearance of Counsel for Appellees—Filed Sep. 22, 1922

The Clerk will enter my special appearance as Counsel for the
Appellees.
Elliott H. Jones, Wm. C. Scarritt, 1127 Scarritt Bldg., Kansas
City, Mo.

IN UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

NOTICE OF MOTION TO DISMISS—Filed July 15, 1922

To the above-named appellants and their attorneys of record:

You, and each of you, are hereby notified that the appellees in the above entitled cause have prepared for filing, and will file forthwith in said cause, their motion to dismiss the appeals of said Fidelity National Bank and Trust Company et al., a copy of which said motion to dismiss is hereto attached and made a part of this notice.

You are further notified that said motion will be submitted and called to the attention of the Court on Monday, the 31st day of July, 1922, or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard.

Scarritt, Jones, Seddon & North, Edward L. Scarritt, Attorneys
for Appellees.

Copy of the above notice of said motion to dismiss appeals received this 11th day of July, 1922.

Justin D. Bowersock & Robert B. Fizzell, Arthur Miller, and
Frank P. Barker, Attorneys for Appellants.

[File endorsement omitted.]

IN UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

MOTION OF APPELLEES TO DISMISS APPEAL—Filed July 15, 1922

Come now Felix H. Swope and Gertrude M. Brown, complainants and appellees, and appear specially for the purposes of this motion and without an intention to appear generally, and without intending to waive the question of the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, and move the court to dismiss the appeal of defendants, Fidelity National Bank and Trust Company et al., herein for the following reasons, to-wit:

1. This suit was instituted by a bill in equity in the District Court of the United States for the Western Division of the Western District of Missouri, for the purpose of having certain alleged special taxes upon the lands of the complainants in Kansas City, Missouri, purporting to have been levied under the laws of the State of Missouri, adjudicated and declared illegal and void, because such alleged taxes, if enforced would deprive the complainants of their property without due process of law in violation of the fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, a copy of which bill of complaint, under which said suit was tried, is included in the transcript of said cause, heretofore lodged in this court, to which reference is hereby made.

2. That the jurisdiction of the United States District Court in said cause was invoked in complainant's bill by reason of an attack upon a law of the State of Missouri, that is upon certain ordinances of and certain provisions of the charter of Kansas City, Missouri, because of their alleged violation of the Federal Constitution.

3. That on July 7th, 1921, said District Court of the United States rendered a final judgment and decree in favor of said complainants, adjudging said alleged special taxes upon the property of the complainants to be null and void, solely because they were levied and assessed contrary to and in violation of the provisions of the Federal Constitution.

4. That thereafter and on January 4, 1922, defendants Fidelity National Bank and Trust Company et al., filed a petition for an appeal from said final judgment in said District Court to this Honorable Court and said District Court made an order allowing said appeal.

5. That by virtue of the facts as herein stated, this Honorable Court did not and could not acquire jurisdiction over said cause by virtue of said attempted appeal.

6. Because appellants failed to file and docket this cause with the clerk of this court on or before the return day, as required by Rule 16 of this court.

Wherefore, said appellees pray this Honorable Court to make an order dismissing said appeal.

Edward L. Scarritt & Scarritt, Jones, Seddon & North, Attorneys for Complainants and Appellees.

[File endorsement omitted.]

IN UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

Before Judges Lewis, Kenyon, and Munger

ARGUMENT AND SUBMISSION OF MOTIONS TO DISMISS—September
22, 1922

No. 6134

McMILLAN CONTRACTING COMPANY, et al., Appellants,
vs.

WALTER L. ABERNATHY et al.

Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Western
District of Missouri

No. 6135

McMILLAN CONTRACTING COMPANY, et al., Appellants,
vs.

B. HAYWOOD HAGERMAN

Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Western
District of Missouri

and

No. 6136

FIDELITY NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY OF KANSAS CITY
et al., Appellants,
vs.

FELIX H. SWOPE et al.

Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Western
District of Missouri

These causes, Nos. 6134, 6135 and 6136, are this day called for hearing on the motions of appellees to dismiss appeals, having here-

tofore been specially assigned for this day, and argument in support of said motions was commenced by Mr. H. M. Langworthy and continued by Mr. E. H. Jones; continued by Mr. Justin D. Bowersock for appellants in opposition to said motions and concluded by Mr. H. M. Langworthy in support thereof.

Thereupon, said motions and memoranda of counsel in support of and in opposition thereto were by the Court taken under advisement.

IN UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 6134, September Term, A. D. 1922

McMILLAN CONTRACTING Co. et al., Appellants,

vs.

WALTER L. ABERNATHY et al., Appellees

Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Western
District of Missouri

No. 6135, September Term, A. D. 1922

McMILLAN CONTRACTING Co. et al., Appellants,

vs.

B. HAYWOOD HAGERMAN, Appellee

Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Western
District of Missouri

No. 6136, September Term, A. D. 1922

FIDELITY NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST Co. et al., Appellants,

vs.

FELIX H. SWOPE et al., Appellees

Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Western
District of Missouri

OPINION ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS APPEALS IN CAUSES NOS. 6134,
6135 AND 6136—Filed Oct. 23, 1922

Mr. H. M. Langworthy (Mr. O. H. Dean, Mr. Roy B. Thomson and Mr. Melville W. Borders were with him on the brief), for appellees in No. 6134.

Mr. A. S. Marley and Mr. W. H. Reed filed brief for appellees in No. 6135.

Mr. E. H. Jones (Messrs. Searritt, Jones, Seddon & North and Mr. Edward L. Searritt were with him on the brief), for appellees in No. 6136.

Mr. Justin D. Bowersock (Mr. Robert B. Fizzell, Mr. Arthur Miller, Mr. Maurice H. Winger, Mr. Clarence S. Palmer, Mr. Frank P. Barker and Mr. G. V. Head, were with him on the brief), for appellants.

Before Lewis and Kenyon, Circuit Judges, and Munger, District Judge

Per CURIAM:

Motions to dismiss the appeals in these cases have been made, upon the ground that the appeals could be taken only to the Supreme Court of the United States. The suits sought to have decrees entered declaring certain assessments and levies of special taxes against land in Kansas City, Missouri, to have been illegally imposed, and declaring them to be no lien against the land of the complainants. The asserted grounds for relief were, that a portion of the state statutes of Missouri, known as the Kansas City charter, and the city ordinance enacted to carry into effect this portion of the charter were in violation of the constitution of the United States, and also that this and other provisions of this charter and ordinance were not followed in the proceeding leading to the assessments.

The jurisdiction of the court in the first two cases to entertain the case depended upon the assertion of the conflict of the local statutes with the Constitution of the United States, as there was no allegation of diversity of citizenship nor allegation of any other ground of jurisdiction. The decree was in favor of the complainants. It is settled that where the jurisdiction of the court depends only upon the ground that the cause of action arises under the Constitution of the United States, the Circuit Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to review the case, as an appeal in such a case must be sought in the Supreme Court of the United States, under Sections 128 and 238 of the Judicial Code. *American Sugar Refining Co. v. New Orleans*, 181 U. S. 277, 281; *Huguley Mfg. Co. v. Galeton Cotton Mills*, 184 U. S. 290, 295; *Union and Planters' Bank v. Memphis*, 189 U. S. 71, 73; *Vicksburg v. Waterworks Co.*, 202 U. S. 453, 458; *Carolina Glass Co. v. South Carolina*, 240 U. S. 305, 318; *Raton Water Works Co. v. Raton*, 249 U. S. 552, 553; *Lemke v. Farmers' Grain Co.*, — U. S. —, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 244; *Grammer v. Fenton*, 268 Fed. 943, 945.

In the third case now before the court, No. 6136, the jurisdiction of the court was invoked upon the same assertions of a violation of the Constitution of the United States, and also because of diversity of citizenship of the parties. In such a case an appeal lies to the Circuit Court of Appeals. *American Sugar Refining Co. v. New Orleans*, 181 U. S. 277, 281; *Lemke v. Farmers' Grain Co.*, — U. S. — 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 244; *Spreckels Sugar Refining Co. v. McClain*, 192 U. S. 397, 407. A further ground urged for the dismissal of case No. 6136 is a failure of appellants to have the case

docketed within the period limited as the return day. The record was received by the clerk of this court within that period, but because the docket fee was not then paid, the case was not docketed for several days after the return day. No injury is shown to have occurred to appellees because of this delay and no motion to dismiss the appeal was made before the case was docketed. The delay is therefore no ground for dismissal. *Equitable Life Assur. Co. v. Tolbert*, 145 Fed. 338, 339; *Gould v. United States*, 205 Fed. 883, 885. The motion to dismiss appeal in No. 6136 will be denied.

In the other two cases our attention has been called to the Act of Congress approved September 14, 1922, adding Section 238a to the Judicial Code, which reads as follows:

"If an appeal or writ of error has been or shall be taken to, or issued out of, any Circuit Court of Appeals in a case wherein such appeal or writ of error should have been taken to or issued out of the Supreme Court, or if an appeal or writ of error has been or shall be taken to, or issued out of, the Supreme Court in a case wherein such appeal or writ of error should have been taken to, or issued out of, a Circuit Court of Appeals, such appeal or writ of error shall not for such reason be dismissed, but shall be transferred to the proper court, which shall thereupon be possessed of the same and shall proceed to the determination thereof, with the same force and effect as if such appeal or writ of error had been duly taken to, or issued out of, the court to which it is so transferred."

Appellees claim that no transfer of these cases to the Supreme Court should be ordered under this statute, because the appeals were not applied for within three months after the entry of the decree (Sec. 6, Ch. 448, 39 Stats. 726) and therefore that the Supreme Court would have no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. This is a question that is more properly determined by the court whose authority is questioned. An order will be entered transferring the appeals in cases numbered 6134 and 6135 to the Supreme Court of the United States.

IN UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

No. 6136

FIDELITY NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY OF KANSAS CITY,
a Corporation; Standard Investment Company, a Corporation; Silas
C. Delap, Hunter M. Meriwether, and Gilmer Meriwether, Appel-
lants,

vs.

FELIX H. SWOPE and GERTRUDE M. BROWN

Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Western
District of Missouri

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL—October 30, 1922

This cause came on to be heard on the motion of appellees for an
order dismissing the appeal herein, and was argued by counsel.

On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered, adjudged and
decreed by this Court, that the said motion to dismiss be, and the same
is hereby, denied.

IN UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

MOTION TO DISPENSE WITH PRINTING CERTAIN EXHIBITS—Filed
Oct. 31, 1922

Come now Fidelity National Bank and Trust Company of Kansas
City, a corporation, Standard Investment Company, a corporation,
Silas C. De Lap, Hunter M. Meriwether and Gilmer Meriwether, ap-
pellants herein, and respectfully show to the Court as follows:

This suit was instituted by appellees in the District Court of the
United States for the Western Division of the Western District of
Missouri for the cancellation of certain special tax bills affecting lands
owned by appellees, issued under Section 28 of Article VIII of the
Charter of Kansas City, pursuant to ordinance of said City No. 21831.

On March 4, 1922, a stipulation was filed in the lower court to the
effect that certain original exhibits, to-wit: Plaintiffs' Exhibits 12, 13,
16 to 23 inclusive and 25 to 27 inclusive, introduced in evidence at
the trial, might be transmitted to this court, and that said exhibits
should be considered as incorporated in and as a part of the condensed
statement of testimony prepared pursuant to Equity Rule 75-B, as
though actually and fully set out in or attached to said condensed
statement; and on said date an order was duly entered in accordance
with said stipulation reciting that said original exhibits should be
transmitted to this court for use at the hearing of this cause on appeal,
in lieu of the incorporation of said exhibits in the condensed state-
ment of testimony.

Appellants state that Plaintiffs' Exhibit 12, referred to in said stipu-
lation and order, is a large, half-scale, blue print reduction of the

plat of the benefit district involved in said assessment proceedings on file in the office of the City Engineer of Kansas City, Missouri; that Plaintiffs' Exhibit 13, referred to in said stipulation and order, is a certain colored map of Kansas City, prepared by the Board of Park Commissioners in 1915; that Plaintiffs' Exhibits 16 to 23, inclusive, are photographs of Meyer Boulevard, for the grading of which the tax bills were issued, and adjacent territory in the benefit district; and that Plaintiffs' Exhibit 25 to 27, inclusive, are plats of Park Gate Addition, an addition in Kansas City embracing certain portions of the land in the benefit district.

Appellants state that it will be necessary for the court, at the hearing of this cause on the merits, to make only casual reference to the exhibits referred to in said stipulation and order; and that great cost would be entailed in having sufficient copies of said exhibits made in all three of said cases, for insertion in the printed records.

Appellants further pray for an order of the Court directing that Plaintiffs' Exhibits 12, 13, 16 to 23, inclusive, and 25 to 27, inclusive, be not copied and inserted in the printed record, but that in lieu thereof the originals of said exhibits, now on file with the Clerk of the Court, be submitted to the Court at the hearing on the merits.

Justin D. Bowersock, Robert B. Fizzell, Arthur Miller, Maurice H. Winger, Clarence S. Palmer, Frank P. Barker, G. V. Head, Attorneys for Appellants.

[File endorsement omitted.]

IN UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISPENSE WITH PRINTING OR REPRODUCTION OF CERTAIN EXHIBITS—November 7, 1922

Upon consideration of the motion of appellants to dispense with the printing or reproduction of Plaintiffs' Exhibits 12, 13, 16 to 23 inclusive and 25 to 27 inclusive, introduced in evidence at the trial in the Court below, It is now here ordered that said motion be, and the same is hereby, granted, and that said exhibits be not copied, printed or reproduced and inserted in the printed record in this cause, but that in lieu thereof the originals of said exhibits now lodged with the Clerk of this Court be submitted to the Court at the hearing on the merits.

IN UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

ARGUMENT AND SUBMISSION—January 15, 1923

This cause having been called for hearing in its regular order, argument was commenced by Mr. Justin D. Bowersock for appellants, continued by Mr. Elliott H. Jones for appellees, and concluded by Mr. R. E. Ball for appellants.

Thereupon, this cause was submitted to the Court on the transcript of the record from said District Court and the briefs of counsel filed herein.

IN UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

[Title omitted]

Before Stone, Circuit Judge, and Trieber and Johnson, District Judges

OPINION—Filed Nov. 17, 1924

JOHNSON, District Judge, delivered the opinion of the Court.

Appellees, hereinafter called plaintiffs, residents and citizens of the State of Tennessee, brought suit in the court below to have declared null and void certain tax bills issued by Kansas City assessing plaintiff's lands their alleged pro rata share of the cost of grading Meyer Boulevard in said city. The trial court granted the relief prayed for, canceled the tax bills, and adjudged plaintiffs' lands free of any and all liens of or on account of the same. The defendants have appealed the case to this court. It was claimed in the court below and it is claimed here that the assessments were unreasonable, discriminatory and arbitrary and amounted to the taking of property without due process of law in violation of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The validity of the tax bills was not attacked by plaintiffs on the ground of lack of notice. Indeed a defense to the action, and the one standing at the threshold of the consideration of the case, is that the matters complained of are res judicata by reason of the proceeding had in the Circuit Court of Jackson County in which Kansas City is situated.

Section 28 of Article 8 of the charter of Kansas City provides:

"The public work (street improvements) * * * shall be provided for by ordinance, and the city may provide that after the passage of the ordinance and after an approximate estimate of the cost of the work shall have been made by the Board of Public Works, the city shall file a proceeding in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, in the name of the city, against the respective owners of land chargeable under the provisions of this section with the cost of such work. In such proceeding the city shall allege the passage and approval of the ordinance providing for the work, and the approximate estimate of the cost of said work; and shall define and set forth the limits of the benefit district, prescribed by the ordinance, within which it is proposed to assess property for the payment of said work. The prayer of the petition shall be that the court find and determine the validity of said ordinance, and the question of whether or not the respective tracts of land within

said benefit district shall be charged with the lien of said work in the manner provided by said ordinance."

There was at least an attempted compliance with this provision of the statute which resulted in a judgment of the Circuit Court declaring the ordinance to grade Meyer Boulevard valid, and adjudging that the proposed lien of assessments for the cost of the work provided for in the ordinance should be a valid and legal lien against the respective lots and tracts of land within the benefit district created by the ordinance, when duly assessed, apportioned and charged as provided in the ordinance and the charter of the city.

It is not necessary to consider the alleged defects in the procedure. In our opinion, as between parties situated as the parties to this action, it was not the intention of the legislature to authorize the state court to pass upon the constitutionality of the tax bills (under the Fourteenth Amendment) which might be issued under a contract to be thereafter entered into by the common council for the contemplated work, because to attempt to confer such authority upon the court would be beyond its power. Federal courts at least are constitutional tribunals for the determination of actual controversies between parties having some interest in the subject matter. The questions in controversy in this case at the time of the hearing in the state court could only be moot and a finding by the state court upon these questions, even if authorized by the legislature and specifically made in its judgment, would not in a Federal court be binding upon the parties to this action. *Tregoe v. Modesto Irrigation District*, 164 U. S. 179; *Muskrat v. United States*, 219 U. S. 346.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Some twenty-five years ago Swope Park, consisting of about 1,300 acres, was donated to Kansas City by Colonel Thomas H. Swope to be used as a public park. The entrance to the park is about eight and a half miles from the business center of the City. Meyer Boulevard, from the Paseo to Swope Park, is a broad highway, being two hundred and twenty feet wide at its narrowest point, and five hundred feet wide as it approaches the park. Provision is made for parkways between the driveways, so that of the total area of the Boulevard only about eleven acres are taken up by the driveways, and the remaining twenty acres consist of grass parkways. The grading includes the entire area. The benefit district extends approximately one mile in length and is something less than a half mile in width. It consists of about 250 acres of suburban unimproved and unplatted lands lying adjacent to the park and between it and the city, and at its nearest point the benefit district is about seven miles distant from the business center.

Section 3 of Article 8 of the charter of Kansas City provides the proceedings to be observed by the city in authorizing street improvements, including grading, and provides further that:

"The cost of all grading * * * shall be charged as a special tax on all lands on both sides of the street * * * graded within

the following limits, viz: * * * in case any land fronting on such street * * * graded, be not laid off into lots or blocks, then the land not so laid off, and the land in the rear thereof on the line of the street * * * graded, back 150 feet, shall be so charged, whether fronting on the street or not; and land liable for such grading shall be charged according to the value thereof, exclusive of improvements thereon, as herein provided."

It is well settled that the cost of local improvements such as street grading and paving, curbing and guttering and laying of sidewalks may be assessed against the abutting property running back a reasonable distance and apportioned upon the frontage, the area, the value of, or the estimated benefit to, the several parcels. *Houck v. Little River District*, 239 U. S. 254; *Gast Realty and Investment Co. v. Schneider Granite Co.*, 240 U. S. 55; *Bauman v. Ross*, 167 U. S. 548 (590).

While such improvements are for public use, the assessment of the cost thereof against the abutting property is not inequitable. In the course of time through continued improvement all abutting property and each owner of abutting property in the community make similar, if not exactly the same proportional, contributions for the public good. Under these conditions the increase in the value of the abutting property and the convenience resulting to the several owners are generally, and as far as humanly practicable, the same. The underlying principle is that the special benefits accruing to the abutting property from the improvements justify the assessments. *Norwood v. Baker*, 172 U. S. 269.

On the other hand, there is no principle of law or equity which justifies the assessment of property abutting on one street to pay for local improvements on some other street. *State v. Newark*, 37 N. J. L. 415.

Over against strictly local public improvements, the cost of which may be assessed against the adjacent property specially benefited thereby, there are public improvements of such general character that the cost of making them may not be legally assessed upon anything less than all the property of the municipality, as for instance, city halls, court houses and the like.

Between these there is a class of public improvements the cost of which, while not confined to adjacent or abutting property, may be assessed upon something less than the whole of the municipality because specially benefited; parking districts, districts to pay for the construction of bridges, viaducts and the like, belong to this class. For lack of a better name this class may be designated as semi-public improvements. Section 28 of Article 8 of the charter of Kansas City covers some improvements of this class. It provides:

"When in grading or regrading any street, avenue, highway, or part thereof, a very large or unusual amount of filling in or cutting or grading away of earth or rock be necessary, necessitating an expense of such magnitude as to impose too heavy a burden on the land situate in the benefit district as limited in Section three of this

article, and when in grading or regrading, constructing or reconstructing any street, avenue, highway or part thereof, one or more bridges, viaducts, tunnels, subways, cuts or approaches on, along, over or under the same is or are required or needed, the cost of grading or regrading such street, avenue, highway, or part thereof, including the cost of constructing or reconstructing such bridges, viaducts, tunnels, subways and approaches, or any of them, may be charged as a special tax on parcels of land (exclusive of improvements) benefited thereby, after deducting the portion of the whole cost, if any, which the city may pay, and in proportion to the benefits accruing to the said several parcels of land, exclusive of improvements thereon, and not exceeding the amount of said benefit, said benefits to be determined by the Board of Public Works as hereinafter provided, and the limits within which parcels of land are benefited shall in all such specified instances be prescribed and determined by ordinance. If the Common Council shall find and declare in the ordinance providing for the doing of the work above described that a very large or unusual amount of filling in or cutting or grading away of earth or rock is necessary, necessitating an expense of such magnitude as to impose too heavy a burden on the land situate in the benefit district as limited in Section three of this article, or that in grading or regrading, constructing or reconstructing any street, avenue, highway, or part thereof, one or more bridges, viaducts, tunnels, subways, cuts or approaches on, along, over or under the same is, or are required or needed, the finding and declaration in said ordinance shall be final and conclusive as to all such matters."

Instead of assessing the cost of the grading of Meyer Boulevard against the abutting property as provided in Section 3 of Article 8, the Common Council proceeded under Section 28 and in the ordinance authorizing the grading of the boulevard provided:

"The Common Council hereby finds and declares that in the grading of said boulevard or highway a very large or unusual amount of filling in, or cutting or grading away of earth or rock is necessary, necessitating an expense of such magnitude as to impose too heavy a burden on the land situate in the benefit district as limited in Section 3 of Article VIII of the Charter of Kansas City.

"The cost of grading said boulevard or highway as provided herein, shall be charged as a special tax on parcels of land (exclusive of improvements) benefited thereby after deducting the portion of the whole cost, if any, which the city may pay, and in proportion to the benefits accruing to the said several parcels of land, exclusive of improvements thereon, and not exceeding the amount of said benefits, said benefits to be determined by the Board of Public Works and after said work shall have been fully completed, the cost thereof shall be estimated by the said Board of Public Works and shall be apportioned by said Board of Public Works against the various lots, tracts and parcels of land within the benefit district, according to the assessed value thereof, exclusive of improvements, as provided in Section 28, of Article VIII of the Charter of Kansas City

aforesaid; and the limits within which parcels of land are benefited as aforesaid, and within which it is proposed to assess property for the payment of said work and improvement, are hereby prescribed and determined to be the same limits as are hereinbefore, in Section 4 of this Ordinance, prescribed and determined as the limits within which private property is deemed benefited by the proposed grading of said boulevard or highway, all in pursuance of Section 28 of Article VIII of the Charter of Kansas City, aforesaid."

The Common Council in Section 4 of the ordinance created a benefit district of about 250 acres of suburban unimproved and unplatted lands upon which it assessed the cost of the improvement.

The principle that assessments be in proportion to benefits, applicable to semipublic improvements, is applied by the express terms of Section 28 of Article 8 of the Charter of Kansas City, above quoted, which provides that the cost "may be charged as a special tax on parcels of land * * * benefited thereby * * * in proportion to the benefits accruing to the said several parcels of land * * * not exceeding the amount of said benefit."

The extent to which the lands of plaintiffs were benefited is in sharp dispute in the record, but it is not in dispute that Swope Park, and a very considerable portion of the city, was greatly benefited by the construction of Meyer Boulevard.

As already said, Meyer Boulevard is a broad highway 220 feet wide at its narrowest point and 500 feet wide as it approaches the park. As stated by the trial court, "Meyer Boulevard with its heroic proportions was conceived for the purpose of establishing an inspiring approach to Swope Park, the great playground of Kansas City, and incidentally a thoroughfare into which, directly and indirectly the boulevard system of Kansas City might discharge the throngs of pleasure-seekers and pleasure-drivers who visit that park." We agree with the trial court that it was clearly arbitrary and unreasonable and grossly unjust for the Common Council of Kansas City to impose upon the owners of 250 acres of unimproved suburban land the whole cost of this improvement. No such improvement as Meyer Boulevard would have been made if 65th or 66th street had been opened and graded as a local improvement for the benefit of the lands adjacent and for the use of the owners of these lands. Similar streets in the neighborhood, such as 67th, 63rd, Brooklyn Avenue, and others, are examples of the character of street improvements considered necessary in that neighborhood. If the street had been graded for the ordinary use of the neighborhood, the Common Council would have had no occasion to recite in the ordinance that a "very large or unusual amount of filling in, or cutting or grading away of earth or rock is necessary." The street would have been made in the main to conform to the natural grade of the country, and one roadway of modest width, without parking accessories, undoubtedly would have been deemed sufficient, and the cost of such grading would have been assessed in the usual way on the abutting property extending back 150 feet from the highway.

Meyer Boulevard, conceived for the purpose of establishing an inspiring approach to Swope Park, is, as stated by the trial court, "an appropriate and desirable enterprise for the gratification of the public at large, and its chief value is to the public at large and to the city property to which it is tributary, and only very incidentally to the locality through which it passes."

The truth is Section 28 was made in this matter to apply to a situation never contemplated by the legislature. In cities situated as Kansas City upon hilly and rolling ground it may often happen that it may be necessary to make heavy cuts or deep fills, and such highways when constructed often serve not only the adjacent lands but neighborhoods and communities far beyond them. Such a highway (or bridge, viaduct, tunnel or subway also provided for in Section 28) may serve and be of benefit to lands lying far beyond the improvement because rendering such lands, not otherwise so, accessible to the business center of the city. Under such conditions such remote lands are benefited directly by the improvement, and Section 28 provides that "the cost of grading in such case may be charged as a special tax on parcels of land * * * benefited thereby * * * in proportion to the benefits accruing to the said several parcels of land * * * not exceeding the amount of said benefit."

The benefit district created to pay the cost of grading Meyer Boulevard does not come within either the letter or the spirit of this provision of the charter. The charter provision was improperly applied, with the result that the assessments against plaintiffs' lands, irrespective of their value, were arbitrary and unreasonable and should not be permitted to stand. *Martin v. District of Columbia*, 205 U. S. 135.

The lower court committed no error in holding the tax bills invalid.

The judgment is affirmed.

IN UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

[Title omitted]

DECREE—November 24, 1924

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Missouri, and was argued by counsel.

On Consideration whereof, it is now here ordered, adjudged, and decreed by this Court, that the decree of the said District Court, in this cause, be, and the same is hereby, affirmed with costs; and that Felix H. Swope and Gertrude M. Brown have and recover against the Fidelity National Bank and Trust Company of Kansas City, a corporation, Standard Investment Company, a corporation, Silas C. Delap, Hunter M. Meriwether and Gilmer Meriwether the sum of Twenty Dollars for their costs herein and have execution therefor.

IN UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

PETITION FOR APPEAL—Filed Feb. 2, 1925

Now come the appellants by their solicitors and complain that in the record and proceedings, and also in the rendition of the decree of this Honorable Court entered in the above styled and numbered cause on the 17th day of November, 1924, affirming the decree of the United States District Court for the Western Division of the Western District of Missouri in said cause, manifest error has intervened, to the great damage of your petitioners.

That the jurisdiction of the District Court of the United States for the Western Division of the Western District of Missouri depended upon the fact that there was diversity of citizenship and a Federal constitutional question involved herein: and this is not a cause in which the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Appeals is made final, and it is a proper cause to be reviewed by the Supreme Court of the United States on appeal.

That the matter in controversy and the amount involved herein, exceeds the sum of One Thousand Dollars, besides costs.

Wherefore, petitioners pray that an appeal be allowed them herein to the Supreme Court of the United States, and that the Clerk of this Honorable Court be directed to send the record and proceedings in said cause, with all things concerning same, to the Supreme Court of the United States, in order that the errors complained of in the assignments of errors herewith filed by petitioners, may be reviewed and if error be found, corrected according to the laws and customs of the United States, and for such other process as is required to perfect the appeal prayed for.

Justin D. Bowersock, Arthur Miller, Frank P. Barker, Hunter M. Meriwether, Bowersock & Fizzell, Miller, Winger & Reeder, Solicitors for Appellants.

[File endorsement omitted.]

IN UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS—Filed Feb. 2, 1925

Come now Fidelity National Bank & Trust Company of Kansas City, a corporation, Standard Investment Company, a corporation, Silas C. DeLap, Hunter M. Meriwether and Gilmer Meriwether, appellants above named, and respectively state that the order and decree made and entered in the above entitled cause on November 17, 1924, sustaining the decree of the District Court of the United States for the Western Division of the Western District of Missouri, entered on the 7th day of July, 1921, cancelling the tax bills involved in this action, is erroneous and unjust to said appellants for the following reasons:

1. The court erred in not finding and holding that the provisions of Section 28 of Article 8 of the Charter of Kansas City, Missouri, had been complied with in the matter of the suit required by that Section to be filed in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, and in all other matters required by that Section.

2. The court erred in not finding and holding that the judgment in the suit filed in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, under the provisions of said Section 28, was and is res adjudicata as to the propriety and reasonableness of the benefit district fixed by Ordinance Number 21831, as to the method of apportionment and as to all other matters that were or might have been litigated therein.

3. The court erred in ruling that the benefit district was arbitrary and unreasonable.

4. The court erred in ruling that the assessment was arbitrary and unreasonable.

5. The court erred in holding that the tax bills involved in this action exceeded the special benefits received by the lands in question.

6. The court erred in holding that the tax bills unreasonably exceeded the benefit or any possible benefit to the lands in question.

7. The court erred in holding that the improvement in question was in its nature a general public improvement, rather than a local improvement.

8. The court erred in holding that the method of apportionment within the benefit district was arbitrary and unreasonable.

9. The court erred in decreeing that the tax bills were null and void and that the land in question be released from said tax bills.

10. The court erred in making any finding as to the relation between the amounts of the tax bills in question and the values of the lands in controversy, for the reason that there was no competent evidence as to such values.

11. The court erred in holding the amounts of the tax bills in question to be unreasonable or confiscatory for the reason that there was no competent evidence as to the values of the lands in controversy.

12. The court erred in making any finding as to the extent of the special benefits received by the respective tracts, for the reason that there was no competent evidence as to such benefits, and erred in admitting any evidence on that issue.

13. The court erred in determining the validity of the tax bills in question upon the relation between the amount of each tax bill and the extent of the special benefit to the respective tract covered by such bill.

14. The court erred in affirming the judgment of the District Court.

Wherefore, said defendants pray that said order and decree be reversed and that an order be entered denying the relief prayed for in the bill of complaint herein.

Justin D. Bowersock, Arthur Miller, Frank P. Barker, Hunter M. Meriwether, Bowersock & Fizzell, Miller, Winger & Reeder, Solicitors for Appellants.

[File endorsement omitted.]

IN UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

ORDER ALLOWING APPEAL—Filed Feb. 2, 1925

The petition of Fidelity National Bank & Trust Company of Kansas City, a corporation, Standard Investment Company, a corporation, Silas De Lap, Hunter M. Meriwether and Gilmer Meriwether, praying for an appeal from the order entered herein on the 17th day of November, 1924, to the Supreme Court of the United States, this day coming on for hearing, and being duly advised:

Now therefore, it is ordered that the appeal in the above entitled case to the Supreme Court of the United States, be and is hereby allowed as prayed, and the bond on such appeal is fixed in the sum of \$500, conditioned as the law directs.

Dated this 2nd day of February, 1925.

Walter H. Sanborn, Judge United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

[File endorsement omitted.]

BOND ON APPEAL FOR \$500—Approved and filed Feb. 2, 1925; omitted in printing

CITATION—In usual form showing service on Elliott H. Jones; filed Feb. 6, 1925; omitted in printing

IN UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

PRECIPE FOR TRANSCRIPT OF RECORD—Filed Feb. 6, 1925

To the Honorable E. E. Koch, Clerk of said Court:

In the preparation of the transcript on the appeal of the appellants above named in the above entitled cause, from the order and decree

made and entered herein on the 17th day of November, 1924, please incorporate the following portions of the record into the transcript.

(1) The complete record in this cause as printed and used in this court; also printed motion of appellees to dismiss the appeal, and the Court's order and opinion thereon;

- (2) The appearances of counsel in this court;
- (3) The order of submission on the merits entered by this court;
- (4) The opinion on the merits;
- (5) The final decree entered herein;
- (6) All appeal papers filed herein including:
 - (a) Petition for appeal;
 - (b) Assignment of errors;
 - (c) Bond;
 - (d) Order allowing appeal;
 - (e) Citation;
 - (f) Praecipe.

Justin D. Bowersock, Arthur Miller, Frank P. Barker, Hunter M. Meriwether, Solicitors for Appellants.

Received copy of the above and foregoing praecipe this 3rd day of Feb. 1925.

Elliott H. Jones, Scarritt, Jones & North, Solicitors for Appellees.

[File endorsement omitted.]

IN UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

MOTION FOR TRANSMISSION OF ORIGINAL EXHIBITS TO SUPREME COURT, U. S.—Filed Feb. 11, 1925

Come now the appellants herein and state to the court that pursuant to the order of the District Court, the following exhibits to wit: Plaintiffs' Exhibits 12 and 13 and 16 to 23 inclusive and 25 to 27 inclusive, were transmitted by the District Clerk to the Clerk of this Honorable Court for use on the hearing of this cause in this court, and said exhibits are now in the custody of the clerk of this court.

That it is necessary and proper that these original papers be inspected, examined and considered upon appeal of this case in the Supreme Court of the United States.

Wherefore, your petitioners pray that the clerk of this Honorable Court be instructed to transmit said original exhibits to the clerk of the Supreme Court for use on the hearing of this cause in said court.

Justin D. Bowersock, Arthur Miller, Frank P. Barker, Hunter M. Meriwether, Solicitors for Appellees.

[File endorsement omitted.]

IN UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

ORDER FOR TRANSMISSION OF ORIGINAL EXHIBITS TO SUPREME COURT—February 11, 1925

The motion of the appellants that certain original exhibits to wit, plaintiffs' exhibits 12 and 13 and 16 to 23 inclusive and 25 to 27 inclusive, be transmitted to the Clerk of the Supreme Court for use on the hearing of this cause on appeal in said court, this day coming on for hearing;

And it appearing to the court that said Exhibits are now in the custody of the Clerk of this court and that it is necessary and proper that said original papers be inspected, examined and used on the hearing of this cause on appeal, and being duly advised:

Now Therefore, it is ordered that the clerk of this court transmit said exhibits to the clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States for use in said court.

IN UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

I, E. E. Koch, Clerk of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, do hereby certify that the foregoing contains the transcript of the record from the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Missouri as prepared and printed under the rules of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, under the supervision of its Clerk, and full, true and complete copies of the pleadings, record entries and proceedings, including the opinion, had and filed in the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, except the full captions, titles and endorsements omitted in pursuance of the rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, prepared in accordance with the præcipe of counsel for appellants, in a certain cause in said Circuit Court of Appeals wherein the Fidelity National Bank and Trust Company of Kansas City, a corporation, et al., were Appellants, and Felix H. Swope, et al., were Appellees, No. 6136, as full, true and complete as the originals of the same remain on file and of record in my office.

I do further certify that the original citation with acknowledgment of service endorsed thereon is hereto attached and herewith returned.

I do further certify that on the twenty-fourth day of January, A. D. 1925, a mandate was issued out of said Circuit Court of Appeals in said cause directed to the Judges of the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Missouri.

In Testimony Whereof, I hereunto subscribe my name and affix the seal of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth

Circuit, at office in the City of St. Louis, Missouri, this fourteenth day of February, A. D. 1925.

E. E. Koch, Clerk of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. (Seal of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.)

Endorsed on cover: File No. 30,895. U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. Term No. 294. Fidelity National Bank & Trust Company of Kansas City, Standard Investment Company, Silas DeLap, et al., appellants, vs. Felix H. Swope and Gertrude M. Brown. Filed February 24th, 1925. File No. 30,895.

(5938)

